29 November 2011

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) comes into force....

 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) comes into force with the notification of the attendant rules for its implementation.

THE rules for implementing the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010), which were being awaited for long, particularly by foreign nuclear goods suppliers, were notified on November 11 and made public on November 16. In effect, therefore, the Act came into force as of November 11. The concern of the suppliers related chiefly to Section 17(b) of the Act, which provides for ‘right of recourse' to the nuclear power plant (NPP) operator to move against any supplier of “equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard devices” if that was determined to be the cause for a nuclear incident and render the supplier liable for nuclear damage (see box).
 Key provisions 
 
I. The requirement under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) in respect of the operator's right of recourse in a national law:

Article 10 of the Annex:
National law may provide that the operator shall have a right of recourse only:
(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing;
(b) if the nuclear incident results from an act of omission done with intent to cause damage, against the individual who has acted or omitted to act with such intent.

II. Provisions in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) for the operator's right of recourse:

Section 17: The operator of the nuclear installation, after paying for the compensation for nuclear damage…, shall have a right of recourse where:
(a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; (b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or substandard services;
(c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of an individual done with the intent to cause nuclear damage.

III. Provision in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules (2011) for the operator's right of recourse:

Rule 24:
(1) A contract referred to in clause (a) of Section 17 of the Act shall include a provision for right of recourse for not less than the extent of the operator's liability under subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act or the value of the contract itself, whichever is less.
(2) The provision for right of recourse referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be for the duration of the initial licence issued under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules (2004) or the product liability period, whichever is longer.

The right of recourse can be exercised by the operator after paying the compensation for nuclear damage in accordance with Section 6 of the Act so that the affected public is compensated for the damage, including loss of life or property, immediately after the incident. The provision 17(b), however, flies in the face of the standard international practice for nuclear liability which indemnifies the supplier entirely and makes the operator strictly and absolutely liable for the incident or accident irrespective of the cause. The international liability regime that is currently being followed by most of the 30 NPP operating countries, either through international conventions or through domestic laws, do provide for ‘right of recourse' which, however, is much more limited in scope than what the Indian Act seeks to provide.

 A VIEW OF the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. It is not clear as yet if suppliers will accept the apparent relief from indefinite liability that the rules have now given them and begin to do business with NPCIL.

The international regime promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) (which is yet to come into force and which India has signed and is planning to ratify soon), requires that the domestic nuclear liability law of a country that is not a party to the Paris Convention of 1960 or the Vienna Convention of 1977 should be consistent with certain provisions laid down in the Annex of the CSC, which include operator's ‘right of recourse' (Article 10). But this provides for ‘right of recourse' (see I in box) and channelling liability to the supplier only in cases when it is “expressly provided for in the [operator-supplier commercial] contract” or “if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage”.

However, the Indian Act goes beyond these by providing for Section 17(b), mentioned above, in addition to Sections 17(a & c), which are in accordance with Article 10 of the CSC Annex (see II in box). Thus, the Indian Act would seem to be not consistent with the international liability regime. However, the CSC (Article XVIII) only requires that while submitting the instruments of ratification, a signatory country has only to declare that its domestic law is consistent with the provisions of the CSC Annex. Only when some party to the convention raises the issue of the Indian Act being inconsistent with the international liability regimes will the IAEA take cognisance of that aspect and set forth measures to resolve it.

Potential supplier countries to India – the United States, France and Russia – have voiced their dissent to this contentious ‘right of recourse' provision in the Indian Act at different times. One of the issues has been the period of applicability of the controversial Section 17(b). Operators have contended that a supplier of equipment or component cannot be held liable under the conditions of 17(b) throughout the lifetime of the reactor during which period many modifications to the NPP – both hardware and software – could be made. And that is why potential suppliers have been keenly awaiting the announcement of rules to operationalise the Act.

Besides 17(b), the other provision in the Act that the suppliers are wary of is Section 46, which allows for tort cases based on other domestic laws to be moved against the operator in addition to the damages that the operator has to bear under the Liability Act. In principle, the proceedings of such a case can bring the supplier of equipment too under its ambit if the operator contends that defective equipment was the cause of the nuclear incident.

Obviously, rules framed to implement an Act have to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. One thing the nuclear liability rules cannot, therefore, do is to resolve the Act's contradiction with the CSC Annex. So the issue of India's admission to the CSC will depend on how the IAEA will address the issue if the matter is brought up before it by any party. But, notwithstanding the commitment given by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to President Barack Obama in November 2010, India can choose not to ratify the CSC and yet seek to do nuclear commerce globally. This should be possible given that nuclear supplier countries have been doing business with countries that have not even signed the CSC or are parties to other international conventions. Indeed, only the U.S. has insisted on India ratifying the CSC ( Frontline, December 3, 2010), while France and Russia have only required in their bilateral agreements with India that the Indian law should conform to international standards. The only issue would be if aspects of liability governed by the Indian domestic law are acceptable to them as meeting international norms.

The Act does not specify any extinction period for the ‘right of recourse' provision under its Section 17 (see II in box). It is open-ended and would seem to be applicable for the whole lifetime of the NPP or the equipment in question, and for an unspecified extent of liability. In fact, this was the perception of people who argued for and succeeded in the inclusion of 17(b) in the Act.

But the rules that have now been announced change that. They cap both the time period for which the operator can exercise the right of recourse and the extent of financial liability of the supplier (see III in box). Firstly, the rules require that the operator shall include such a right of recourse provision in the commercial contract (emphasis added). Since, in case of a nuclear incident, the extent of the operator's liability is, vide Section 6(2) of the Act, Rs.1,500 crore, Rule 24(1) requires that the liability channelled to the supplier cannot be less than the lesser of the operator's liability (Rs.1,500 crore) and the value of the contract. That is, if the value of the contract is more than Rs.1,500 crore, the extent of the supplier's liability will be at least Rs.1,500 crore. But if the value of the contract is less than Rs.1,500 crore, the supplier's exposure will only be equal to the value of the contract.

As for the cap on the time period for right of course, it would be either the initial licence period issued by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules (2004) or the product liability period, whichever is longer. The italicised phrases, however, need explanation. Rule 9 of the Radiation Protection Rules (2004) specifies the period of validity of the licence issued for a nuclear reactor thus: “Every licence issued shall, unless otherwise specified, be valid for a period of five years from the date of issue of such licence” (emphasis added).

From the above, it is clear that, in principle, the licence period can be anything less than or more than five years. But, if unspecified, it will be five years by default. Indeed, it has been a codified practice of the AERB that the initial ‘operating' licence is for a five-year period. At the end of five years, a review of all aspects of the power plant operation is done and licence is renewed for another five-year period. At the end of 10 years, an elaborate and comprehensive review of the working of the plant is carried out before a renewal of licence for another five years.

But starting the operation of a nuclear reactor does not happen with the press of a button or the single throw of a switch. The commissioning of an NPP is a long-drawn process (which is completed over several months). It goes through the following distinct phases, each of them involving elaborate tests and simulations under the supervision of AERB and other experts. The operator, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), is given due authorisation or consent, which is equivalent to a licence though not termed so, for each one of these phases. These are for much shorter durations, varying from a month to six months or even more.

After the full loading of the fuel, authorisation for starting Phase A operations is given. This involves initiation of fission and gradual ‘approach to criticality'. Once criticality is achieved, the AERB gives its authorisation for Phase B, which involves operation of the NPP in low power over a length of time when various nuclear physics checks and safety checks are performed in the presence of experts. After satisfactory low power operation, yet another authorisation (Phase C) is given for gradually increasing the reactor's output to full power. Its performance, in particular its stability, is observed for 100 full power reactor days. Only after this the actual licence for commercial operation, including grid connectivity, is given, and this constitutes the initial operating licence with a validity of five years. Build-up of radioactivity begins once fission is initiated (Phase A), and there is the likelihood of a nuclear incident involving radioactivity during all the three phases of testing. While the operator's liability is clear in all of them, how will the operator's right to recourse clause be interpreted as the different stages of authorisations are for different and shorter durations?

From the perspective of liability and in the wake of the new rules for the operator's right of recourse, the AERB, according to reliable Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) sources, is now seized of this ambiguity in the licensing process and will evolve a new definition for initial operating licence that will include the initial start-up process as well. Any future operating licence that will be issued to NPCIL will be in accordance with the amended operating licence definition. Given that the progress to commissioning can even take up to six months, effectively, the period for the operator's right of recourse should technically be five years plus that initial build-up period.

The other phrase that needs similar elaboration is ‘product liability', a term akin to ‘warranty period' but something more than that. The Liability Rules define ‘product liability period' as the “period for which the supplier has undertaken liability for patent or latent defects or sub-standard services under a contract”. Thus this part of the rule actually has relevance to the controversial Section 17(b) of the Act and the product liability period refers to that of the product implicated, or sought to be implicated, in an incident though the announced rules do not explicitly include any clause for implementing 17(b) itself. The document on ‘General Conditions of Contract (GCC) for Supply of Indigenous Stores' of NPCIL specifies the ‘product liability period'. It must be pointed out that this document is specific only to indigenous suppliers because NPCIL has hitherto not dealt directly with foreign suppliers of products and equipment.

‘Patent defect' refers to a defect that is manifest or recognisable on inspection of the product, and there is a corresponding ‘patent defect liability period'. Under the NPCIL contract conditions, this is 12 months from the date of acceptance of the product or 18 months from the date of its receipt at the site, whichever is earlier. ‘Latent defect', on the other hand, means a defect within the material or arising out of design deficiency, which does not manifest itself and/or was not reasonably discoverable during the ‘patent defect liability period'. The supplier's ‘latent defect liability period', according to the GCC, is “limited to a period of five years from the end of ‘patent defect liability period' of the respective plant and equipment including spares”. In effect, therefore, the ‘product liability period', under NPCIL's terms, will be the sum of these two periods and is, therefore, six and a half years from the date of arrival of the product at the site or six years from the date of its acceptance.

From the perspective of nuclear liability during a nuclear incident, this would seem to be irrelevant as regards most products. This is because the clock starts ticking from the time they arrive on the site. Given that the NPP construction period itself can take up to five years or more, the product liability period for most products will expire before the initial operating licence period begins. That is, if a particular product is identified to be the single causative agent for a nuclear incident – which would rarely be the case because a nuclear incident is usually is a combination of several products and operating conditions – the liability period for that product (and hence for the supplier) would in nearly all cases have expired by then unless the incident occurs during the testing phases unless, of course, a product or component is changed before the expiry of the initial licence period. In such a case, the product liability period can extend beyond the initial licence period and, therefore, would have some relevance if it is involved in any incident.

One of the curious things in the ongoing debates on channelling of nuclear liability to suppliers, which should affect Indian suppliers as well, was the inexplicable silence of Indian suppliers on the issue as compared with their foreign counterparts. But Section 6.7 of the GCC, which provides for ‘Indemnity against Loss/Damage', gives an explanation for this. Subsection 6.7.7 states: “The Purchaser [NPCIL] shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor [supplier] in respect of Third Party life and Property damage claims arising out of nuclear event at Purchaser's Site.” This implies that in contracts with domestic suppliers, NPCIL has hitherto provided indemnity to them in case of an event at an NPP. That is, the GCC followed by NPCIL all along has been consistent with strict and absolute liability of the operator.

In fact, the GCC provides for this indemnity to the supplier even in cases of tort proceedings against the operator under other laws unless the contract explicitly provides for it. Section 9.1(a) of the GCC says: “Except in cases of criminal negligence or wilful misconduct, the Contractor shall not be liable to the Purchaser, whether in contract, tort, or otherwise, for any indirect or consequential loss or damage, loss of use, loss of production, or loss of profits or interest costs, provided that this exclusion shall not apply to any obligation of the Contractor to pay liquidated damages and/or any other penalties/recovery etc. specifically provided for in the Contract, to the Purchaser.” This again would seem to be consistent with the prevalent international norms for right of recourse. In the wake of the Liability Act and the attendant rules, it remains to be seen whether NPCIL chooses to amend these provisions under the GCC for domestic suppliers.

But, more pertinently, what will be the nature of the GCC that NPCIL would draw up for future contracts that it is likely to enter into directly with foreign suppliers? Will such a differential dispensation in commercial contracts with domestic and foreign suppliers be acceptable to the latter?

In queries to the different potential nuclear suppliers to India, such as Areva, GE and Westinghouse, all of them have said that they are still studying the rules and do not wish to make any comments. While the opposition parties have expressed their strong opposition to the rules by saying that the government has succumbed to suppliers' pressures, it is not clear as yet if these suppliers will accept the apparent relief from indefinite liability that the rules have now given them and begin to do business with NPCIL. If they do, the obvious impact of the rules is that there will be loading of cost of insuring for an amount equal to the extent of liability that the supplier is now exposed to for the initial five-year period, thus increasing project costs.

As for Parliament's assent to the rules, according to Section 48 of the Act, the rules made will remain before both Houses of Parliament, while in session, for a total period of 30 days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions. For any amendment recommended by Parliament to become effective, both Houses will have to agree to the change(s). The winter session for the year will last for a month from November 22 to December 21. With the opposition having already publicly voiced their dissent to the rules, the issue is bound to occupy a substantial fraction of the session period with acrimonious debates.

-R. Ramachandran
Courtesy: Frontline, Dec 03-16, 2011

25 November 2011

Complaint against "Dinamalar" for its unethical and illegal activity

Dinamalar Tamil Daily is a Pro-nuke media. And it used to publish the news items with a willful intention to defame the protesters and leaders of the people's movements. 

On 24-11-11, Dinamalar published a front page news-like material, which states the leaders of people's movements are inviting the queries from the common public, without the consent of the leaders. And Dinamalar published the addresses, email ids & contact numbers of the leaders which amounts the trespassing of their privacy. This unethical and illegal activity of Dinamalar caused many problems to the people's leaders. 

In this scenario, the "LAWYERS’ CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" filed a complaint before the Press Council of India. The copy the complaint is given below. 



LAWYERS’ CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Reg. No.274/2001
No.281, (Old No.134), II Floor, Thambu Chetty Street, Chennai-600 001

Date : 25.11.2011

To
          The Chairman
Press Council of India
New Delhi

Sir,
          Sub.: Publication of front page news item by “Dina Malar” a Tamil                    daily on 24.11.2011, instigating physical violence and                   humiliation against three leading personalities spearheading                    the agitation against the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project                    in Tirunelveli District of Tamil Nadu–requesting immediate                    action to curb the menace by the said daily as well as other                    print media–Reg.

---

          Ours is an organization of lawyers practicing at the Madras High Court formed to espouse the Constitutional ideals principally aimed at striving for political, economic and social justice as enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution of India and broader human rights.

          As far as we are concerned, we view the protests and resistance to the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project as a spontaneous peoples’ movement in a democracy, where the issues raised by them need to be addressed in a more concerned and accommodative manner. That apart, it is everyone’s knowledge that Kudankulam issue is the only real issue the people of Tamilnadu are witnessing and it needs due importance.

          Whileso, we were terribly shocked to read a top front page news item published in the Tamil daily, “Dina malar”, in its edition dated 24.11.2011 under the caption, which could be translated in English as, “Why do we oppose Kudankulam Nuclear Plant?” The said news item carried a sub title stating, “Protestors are ready to offer explanation”. A reading of both the caption and the sub title suggest that the news item seeks to report the willingness of the protestors against the project to explain their stand. The news would not surprise anyone if its content justifies the caption and the sub-title given to it.

          Unfortunately, it was not the case! The news item did not say that the protesters have either issued a statement justifying the caption or given an interview to that effect.

          Shockingly, the news item begins abruptly with a self-posed question that when the plant is about to be commissioned to benefit the people of Tamil Nadu, whether the protests were justified. It charges the protestors for claiming that their protest was only for the benefit of the Tamil people.

          After having given such an intro(duction) in the lead paragraph, the news item prompts the readers to contact (the leading protestors) over the one rupee coin box PCO to their phone numbers and e-mail addresses.

          Following this, the news item has furnished personal details of three persons (along with photographs) among the leading protesters with a tinge, suggesting to the readers that they are undesirable elements. Apart from their background, the details of the family, including children of one among them, has been provided in the news item.

          The news item also carried their respective contact numbers, landline and mobile, and their e-mail addresses. Specific details with regard to their residence and office have also been highlighted in the said news item.

          The news item also specifically and pointedly indicates as to the place where they could be seen and met.

While providing the background, provocative inputs have been deliberately incorporated so as to tune the readers to identify them as traitors, receiving funds from abroad.

The whole news item paints the said 3 persons as agents of some foreign force to stall the project.

          The inescapable conclusion one would arrive at after reading the said news item would be that these protesters have to be “taught” a lesson, i.e., the news item was published only with the sole intention and object of putting the persons described therein to the risk of their life and limbs. To put it more bluntly, except expressly suggesting to physically harm those protesters, the news item conveyed the message. The publication of the said news item as the top front page by the said daily is clearly indicative of its intention to instigate the readers to “react” in the way the Daily expects them of.

          On reading the same, we are unable to restrain ourselves from approaching you for taking up the matter in all its seriousness and to proceed against the said daily.

          We genuinely feel that in a democracy, one can have any opinion on any subject but there are ways and means to express their opinion. At the same time, it is more important that one cannot unleash violence against violence who is holding a view contrary to his.

          The case of “Dinamalar” may be that it wants to support the Kudunkulam Nuclear Power Project which can be assessed by the views expressed by it. However, the abuse of freedom of the press by it to instigate violence against those holding contrary news is impermissible under the Constitution of India and other laws.

          On enquiry, we learn that on publication of the abovesaid news item, there had been a flurry of telephonic calls to all the three persons and their family members mentioned in the news item, filled with obscene comments and brutal threats to their life. This has also been put in public domain by the persons concerned in an interview to a private television channel. It is in this context, we would like to draw your kind attention to the flagrant violation of press freedom by the Tamil daily “Dinamalar”.

          Therefore, we hereby request you to initiate appropriate action against the Tamil daily “Dinamalar” and also, issue appropriate directions to initiate criminal action against those responsible for publication of the said news item.
                                                                                               

(S. SATHIA CHANDRAN)                                  (C. VIJAYAKUMAR)
    Joint Secretary                                                       Secretary