Nuclear safety before vendor interests - M. V. Ramana & Suvrat Raju

The question that must be asked, is whether India is willing to compromise on its laws and the safety and rights of its citizens to protect the business interests of reactor suppliers

In 2010, under pressure from multinational nuclear suppliers, the Manmohan Singh government pushed through a law to protect them from the consequences of a nuclear accident. The law makes it impossible for victims to sue the supplier, even for an accident that results from a design defect. Liability is effectively transferred to the Indian taxpayer, first to the public sector Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) and then the government. Even this is capped at a maximum of Rs.2,500 crore and victims need not be compensated for any additional damage.

BEYOND MEGAWATT: Making the operator and supplier share liability is not only fair but crucial from the point of view of cover.

However, the law also includes a clause that, under certain circumstances, allows the NPCIL, although not the victims, to sue the supplier and recoup the money it has paid out. It is this relatively minor clause that nuclear suppliers, and their friends in the Indian establishment, have been railing against for the past two years.

The Russian Deputy Prime Minister warned India, on his recent visit, that if the Russian company Atomstroyexport (a subsidiary of Rosatom) was forced to obey this law, then the cost of power from the Kudankulam third and fourth reactors would go up. He must have been hoping that no one would try and square this threat with earlier claims of safety made about these plants.

In a paper, published by “Nuclear Engineering and Design” in 2006, three NPCIL officials claimed that, in any given year, the probability of a severe accident at these plants was one in 10 million. If Atomstroyexport can persuade insurers that this figure is correct, then to obtain cover even for accidents where the highest possible liability of Rs.2,500 crore is applicable, it would need to pay a premium of only about Rs.2,500 per year. For the 1,000 MW Kudankulam reactors, operating at an 80 per cent load factor, this should lead to an increase in tariff of about a third of a millionth of a rupee per unit!

This absurdly low figure arises because both the factors in the calculation earlier make little sense. As preliminary data from Fukushima shows, a nuclear accident can cause economic damage that is more than a hundred times larger than the artificial cap on liability in the Indian law. Moreover, empirical evidence — in a total of about 15,000 reactor-years of operation, there have been several “core-damage” accidents including Fukushima, Chernobyl and Three-Mile Island — suggests that the probability of severe accidents is about a thousand times higher than what the industry claims.

Suppliers have successfully wielded their influence in other countries to avoid economic liability for accidents. Their argument that the Indian law will lead to cost escalations is meant to veil the real reason for their worry: the law sets a bad precedent and, in the future, either in India itself or in another country, it may lead to a more rational law centred on victims rather than the industry. In such a law, there would be no cap on liability, and suppliers would be held jointly responsible with the operator for paying out damages.

In fact, the Supreme Court has already admitted a petition, by the lawyer Prashant Bhushan, requesting precisely these changes in the law. Making the operator and supplier share liability is not only fair but crucial from the point of view of safety.

Design and accidents

The history of nuclear power shows that design failures have played an important role in all severe accidents. This is true of Fukushima, where the underlying problems with the Mark 1 design had been recognised many years earlier. The Kemeny Commission, set up by Jimmy Carter, to analyse the Three Mile Island accident pointed out that the suppliers, Babcock & Wilcox, shared culpability. The disaster at the Chernobyl reactor, which was built by the Soviet predecessor of Rosatom, was caused by a combination of two grievous design features: a positive “void coefficient of reactivity,” and the lack of appropriate containment.

Apart from the untenable claim about higher tariffs, nuclear suppliers and the Indian government have made other disingenuous arguments to get rid of the clause on supplier liability. One of them is that the law is hurting India’s domestic manufacturers, some of whom are involved in supplying small parts of the plant.

In general, as in other industries, exposing all manufacturers along the supply chain to tort claims helps make them more conscious of safety and quality. Manufacturers who are supplying parts to a hazardous industry need to be more careful about reliability.

Nevertheless, the law does not, as such, prevent the NPCIL from signing subcontracts that indemnify smaller suppliers along the chain. The NPCIL’s problem is that it is politically infeasible to extend this indemnity to the manufacturer of the plant itself, as it discovered when it tried to provide blanket indemnity to Atomstroyexport for the Kudankulam third and fourth units.

Industry on Indian law

The nuclear industry also argues that India’s current law is out of sync with international conventions on nuclear liability. This is a poor argument because these conventions were all drafted under pressure from nuclear manufacturers who, historically, were in a stronger position than they are now. In the early days of nuclear power, American suppliers exploited this to impose the idea that liability should be channelled to the operator. Later, suppliers from other countries also adopted this self-serving argument.

Until recently, the United States itself never joined any international liability convention, because under its domestic law, called the Price Anderson Act, victims retain the right to sue suppliers. Economic compensation is channelled through a complicated insurance system, but manufacturers can be found legally liable and this has consequences.

In 1997, the U.S. engineered the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), with a special rider for itself. When Bush communicated the convention to the U.S. Senate for ratification, he emphasised that “The United States in particular benefits from a grandfather clause that allows it to join the convention without being required to change certain aspects of the Price-Anderson system that would otherwise be inconsistent with its requirements.”

India’s own law is largely borrowed from an annex of the CSC. After showing no inclination to join any of the existing treaties for half a century, the Indian government rushed to sign this discriminatory convention soon after the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. This shows that it was acting under external pressure, and not out of any concern for potential victims.

Even granting that suppliers should be liable in principle, many well-meaning people argue that India must acquiesce to the demands of the industry because it desperately needs electricity. Leaving aside the debate on the role of nuclear power in general, it is clear that India’s push towards importing reactors has less to do with electricity, and more to do with other factors.

Kakodkar article

Even by the standards of UPA II, the process of handing out multi-billion dollar contracts for reactors to various multinational companies has been opaque and arbitrary. In Jaitapur, the government has promised to buy up to six European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) from Areva. No EPR is in commercial operation anywhere in the world and in France and Finland, Areva is running into severe construction-difficulties. Two nuclear complexes have been promised to the U.S., again involving designs that have never been built before.

In a rare candid admission, the former chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, provided the rationale behind these seemingly bizarre decisions.

Writing in the Marathi daily Sakaal, in January 2011, Kakodkar explained: “America, Russia and France were the countries that we made mediators in the efforts to lift sanctions, and hence, for the nurturing of their business interests, we made deals with them for nuclear projects.”

As the debate on liability continues both in public and in the courts, the question that the country must ask is whether it is willing to compromise on its laws, and the safety and rights of its citizens to protect the business interests of reactor vendors.

(The authors are physicists.)

Courtesy: The Hindu, October 30, 2012

Reply to Indian Prime Minister's interview published in "Science"

SAFETY ISSUES PERTAINING TO KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR PLANT,

TAMIL NADU, INDIA

To

Mr. Bruce Alberts

Editor-in-Chief

Science

1200 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20005

United States of America

Phone: 001 202-326-6550

Fax: 001 202-289-7562, 001 202-371-9227

science_editors@aaas.org

science_letters@aaas.org                

Dear Sir,

This is with reference to India's Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh's interview published in the journal Science[1].  We are writing this letter to set the record of history straight and also bring to light the serious safety related issues of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) which Dr. Singh has sought to brush aside in his interview.  Two weeks prior to Dr. Singh's interview in your journal, the Russian Ambassador in India Alexander A. Kadakin, made the following statement during a press conference:  "Considering that Haripur was geologically much worse than Kudankulam and the ground situation due to fishermen's movement and state government's stand, India had agreed to suggest new site for the nuclear plant.  'We are ready to build. Where it will be convenient, it is India's choice not Russian choice,' he said."[2]  Kudankulam faces a series of problems relating to the site and availability of fresh water which are summarized below:

Past Volcanism

According to a recent paper "the area in and around Kudankulam, where India's largest nuclear power complex is being built, has a unique geology. The terrain is transected by mafic bodies cutting into the granulite grade of metamorphic rocks. The mafic bodies intrude into the country rock as plugs, ...while they acquire the form of dyke swarm towards the east. Despite the noted occurrence and structural characteristics, their importance in understanding the upper continental characteristics in and around Kudankulam and the Gulf of Mannar (GoM-a deep water body in the Bay of Bengal located towards the east) has not yet received detailed attention."[3] Several papers featuring these anomalies have been published since 1987.[4]^,[5]A 2010 paper reports mantle upwelling and crustal thinning south of the Achankovil shear zone.  Ground Magnetic Survey conducted at Kudankulam also reveals extreme mantle upwelling to the extent of 200 meters.[6]  The same phenomenon has been observed in the Gulf of Mannar as well.[7]  Bhoominathan who studied KKNPP site observes:  "confirmatory geological and geotechnical investigations carried out after excavation of strata to the founding level at various sites for nuclear facilities show the presence of weaker zones which have not (been) identified in the original investigation.  Therefore geological and geotechnical investigations shall be well planned and executed by reputed agencies at the beginning stage of the investigation."[8]

Indications of tectonism under reactivation (Small Volume Volcanic Eruptions (SVVE))

Since 1998, there have been four rock-melt extrusion (RME) events within a radius of 60 km from the reactor site, all near electric poles.  After conducting microscopic, spectrographic and chemical analysis of the samples, three groups of scholars reported that these were of volcanic origin.[9]^{, [10], [11]}

(Similar events near electric poles in Assam (India)[12]and Tor Zawar (Pakistan)[13] have also been named as SVVE.)  NPCIL investigated these intrusions only after we expressed serious concern about them.[14]  More than a decade after the events, "a team of officers visited the RME sites.  Interaction with locals and physical inspection of the features indicated that they resulted due to the lightning and/or shorting of the high voltage current into the ground through the concrete pole."[15]

Victor Rajamanickam, a senior geologist who studied the RME events testifies: "when such is the tectonic structure of this area, the rock melt injections... are confirming the activities of neo-tectonic movements. Over and above the seismic tremors, tectonics in this region is also bringing a question of stability for the area. Large scale studies have already brought forward for Achankovil shear zone’s role in destabilising this block. Under such circumstances, before going for any major structure in Kudankulam, one has to ensure the tectonics of this block. It is lying on a lineament plane. So, it is a must to take up microlevel studies for confirming the tectonic stability of this landmass in the region before launching a major plant in Kudankulam."[16]

In short, the site and the region have experienced volcanism, there are indications that these are being activated.  According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "volcanic activity or igneous intrusions, such as dykes, may change groundwater flow patterns and cause fluctuations in the depth of the water table. Unexpected discharges of water and mud from the interior of volcano edifices …generate lahars that are attributed to the disturbance of the hydrothermal or groundwater system by volcanic intrusions. Magma intrusions also can trigger explosions in the hydrothermal system. Changes in the groundwater system may cause subsidence in karst terrains."[17]

Near Field Tsunami

The NPCIL insists that there is no possibility of a near zone tsunami for any of the coastal reactors in India.  Since 1975, several researchers have found undersea volcanoes and volcano vents in the Gulf of Mannar at about 100 kilometers from the Kudankulam site. Hedervari places this site as one that belongs to the "Indo-Australian seismic belt, the longest, seismically active zone in the world-ocean."[18]  Vestal and Lowrie found evidences of past landslides in the 90 km long East Comorin Slump and the 35 km-long Colombo Slump[19]  while Sastriet al[20] and Murtyet al[21] reported volcanic vents beneath them.  Petrographic studies in this area of GoM have revealed the presence of large scale clay stones, which make the occurrence of submarine landslides easier.[22] Earthquakes have occurred near these slumps in 1938 (5.8R) and in 1991 (5.2R).  An earthquake on the Indrani fault that extends into the GoM can cause a slope failure in these slumps.  According to Wijetunge, "massive slope failures of these slumps have the potential to cause destructive tsunamis."[23]

Unstable shoreline and sea water recession

Studies by Brucknur, Altrin Armstrong Sam and others show that this shore had remained unstable in the geological past.[24] During 1948-49, the southern part of erstwhile Dhanushkodi town (a patch of land of about half a km wide and seven km long in the Rameswaram island) facing GoM, had sunk by 5 meters and submerged in sea due to vertical tectonic movement.[25]

After the December 2004 tsunami, many events characterized by sea water recession occurred in the GoM coast. Though these events have been extensively reported in the media, no scientific study has been done so far.  During such episodes, the sea water intake for the reactors will be disrupted, leading to dry intake and damage to the reactor.  Each reactor at Kudankulam requires 83,000 liters of seawater every second for condenser cooling.  The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission[26] mandates studies of paleo-tsunamis, the possible tsunamigenic factors in the near and far fields, issue of dry intake that may occur during tsunami or sea water recession and gives detailed guidelines for such studies near coastal reactors.

Not enough freshwater

Fresh water supply is the Achilles' heel of the Kudankulam project. According to the detailed project report of 1989, fresh water for industrial and domestic purposes was to be drawn from the Pechiparai reservoir, 65 km south-west of the site.  There was also a provision for storing 60,000 m³ of water at the campus.  In its sanction letter, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) wanted a backup pipeline from another reservoir.  The NPCIL did neither conduct any study on the assured availability of water in the reservoir, nor did they inform the people who have been using the water from the 120 year-old dam. According to a study, "the district had faced 52 years of drought and drought like situations during 1901-89. The run-off in the dam during 1963-90 was 15% to 37%t less than the expected average."[27]  Considering these and the agitation by farmers, NPCIL changed its plan and went for desalination plants for meeting the industrial and domestic needs. Even though India is considered to be a leader in seawater desalination, the plants based on multi-vapor compression technology were imported from Israel.  There are four desalination plants of which three will be online and one on reserve and the daily water production will be 7,600 m³ and the site's daily requirement is 6,936 m³. As reserves, there are twelve tanks with combined capacity of 11,445 m³.  Out of this, fire water reserve is 2,000 m³.  The site has a reserve for running two reactors for less than two days as against seven days of reserve promised in the project proposal.  According to AERB, "if the minimum water supply required for long term heat removal from the core cannot be ensured under all circumstances, then the site shall be deemed unsuitable. Availability of adequate quantity of water to maintain the reactor under safe shutdown state for at least thirty days needs to be ensured under all circumstances."[28]

In response to the criticism regarding the inadequacy of the reserve water, the NPCIL responded that "in the case of grid failure, the desalination plants and the reactors will be shut down." They have not factored the possibility of breakdown of the plants due to mechanical or zoological (jelly fish intrusion) reasons.

Limestone mining within the exclusion zone

A third of the 700 hectares of land acquired by the NPCIL for the nuclear project at Kudankulam was used for mining limestone by a cement industry during 1999-2005. This was allowed because of "the superior technology of the machine, (sic)" with which "collection of lime stone was done by surface scrapping only" and "they (the cement company) also carried out tree plantation in the areas."[29]  While the safety related structures at the Kudankulam project are just 2.5 meters above the anticipated flood level (5 meters MSL), several other buildings are at a lower elevation.  Intensive mining for seven years at a coastal nuclear site, with a thinned out crust (of 200 meters) is intriguing.

To sum up, the Kudankulam project has been built at a site without conducting the necessary geological, oceanographic and hydrological studies, ignoring the warnings from professional geologists.  The plant is illegal and violates the conditions and safety guidelines laid down by the national regulator and IAEA.  Attacking non-governmental organizations, the church or the Russian Ambassador is not a creative solution to a mega-misery and a trillion rupee disaster in the making. 

It is time the Prime Minister and his government woke up to the warning issued by the IAEA three years ago:  "Nuclear power generation does not occur in a vacuum. Exposure to the outside world can bring dangers such as hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tsunamis and volcanoes.  With safety the first priority for nuclear plants, it is incumbent upon nuclear installation designers and builders to prepare for the worst that nature can bring to bear."[30]

Thanking you for giving us an opportunity to write to you,

Sincerely yours

R Ramesh, V Pugazhendi,  VT Padmanabhan

---

[1] Haripur in the state of West Bengal was proposed as a site for setting up 10 GW(e) nuclear power plants from Russia.  The proposal has been frozen due to opposition from the local communities and the State Government.

---

[1]  India's Scholar-Prime Minister Aims for Inclusive Development, Science, Volume 335 (6071), 24 February 2012, 907-908, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/335/6071/907.full

[2]  Anon., 2011, N-energy, military ties focus of Indian PM's Moscow visit,  Indo-Asian News Service,7 December, accessed from the website of Russian Embassy in Delhi, India, http://www.rusembassy.in/index.php?

[3]  Biju Longhinos, S. P. Anand and Mita Rajaram, 2010, Physical Geology of Subvolcanic Systems: Laccolith, Sills and Dykes, LASI 4 Conference, Moab and Mount Hillers, Utah, USA, 22-26 September 2010

[4] R. Ramaswamy, 1991, Occurrence of Soda-trachyte near Kudangulam village, Tamilnadu, Current Science, Vol. 61, 401- 402

[5] M.Ramasamy, 1993, The evidence of late Cenozoic volcano tectonic deformations in Kudangulam, near Cape Comarin, Tamilnadu, International Geological Correlation Programme

[6]  Biju Longhinos, S. P. Anand and Mita Rajaram, 2010, Physical Geology of Subvolcanic Systems: Laccolith, Sills and Dykes, LASI 4 Conference, Moab and Mount Hillers, Utah, USA, 22-26 September 2010

[7]  G.R.K. Murty, Y. Satyanarayana and T, Pradeep Kumar, 1994 Magnetic Profile across Gulf of Mannar,Journal Geological Society of India, Vol. 44 , 443-449

[8]  A. Boominathan, 2004, Seismic site characterization for nuclear structures and power plants, Current Science, Vol. 87, No. 10, 1388-97

[9]  R.Ramasamy, 2000, Molten Rock Extrusions, Journal of Geological Society of India, Vol.55,

[10]  G.Manimaran, P.Sivasubramaniyan and M.Senthiyappan, 2001, Rock Melt Extrusion at Abhishekappatti, Tirunelvelli district, Tamil Nadu-A Report, Journal of Geological Society of India, Vol.57,

[11]  G. Victor Rajamanickam and N.Chandrasekhar, 2000, Extrusion of Rockmelt in the vicinity of high tension electric line, Journal of Geological Society of India, Vol.55,

[12]  B J Saikia, G Parthasarathy, N C Sarmah and G D Baruah, 2008, Fourier–transform infrared spectroscopic characterization of naturally occurring glassy fulgurites,Bulletin of Material Sciences, Vol. 31(2), 155-158

[13] A. C. Kerr, M. Khan and I. McDonald, 2010, Eruption of basaltic magma at Tor Zawar, Balochistan, Pakistan on 27 January 2010: geochemical and petrological constraints on petrogenesis, Mineralogical Magazine, Vol. 74(6), 1027-1036

[14] Expert Group on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project constituted by the Government of India, Supplementary Report on Safety of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project  and Impact of Its Operations on Surroundings Report dated - 31 January 2012

[15] A Muthunayagam, et al, 2012, Expert Group on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project constituted by the Government of India, Supplementary Report on Safety of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project  and Impact of Its Operations on Surroundings, 31 January 2012

[16]  G.Victor Rajamanickam, Personal Communication to Prof.N.Markandan, 15 May, 2002

[17] International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011 Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, DS405 Draft Specific Safety Guide

[18]  P. Hedervari, 1978, Volcanism and Seismicity in the Indo-Australian Seismic Belt: Manifestations of Intraplate Tectonics, March 1978

[19]  William Vestal and Allen Lowrie, 1982, Large Scale Slumps Off Southern India and Sri Lanka, Geo-Marine Letters, Vol. 2, pp. 171-177

[20] V. V.Sastri, B. S. Venkatachala, B.S. and V. Narayanan, 1981, The evolution of East Coast India, Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology, Vol. 36 (1-2), pp 23-54

[21] G. R. K Murty, Y Satyanarayana and T Pradeep Kumar, 1994, Magnetic Profile Across Gulf of Mannar,Journal of Geological Society of India, Vol.44, 443-449

[22] N. A.Eremenko and A. Gagelganz, 1966. New data on the tectonic framework of the New Indian Peninsula, Bulletin of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Vol. 3(2), 1-3 

[23] Janaka Wijetunge, 2010, Assessment of Potential tsunamigenic seismic hazard to Sri Lanka, International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, Vol 1(2), 207-220

[24] H. Bruckner, 1989, Late Quaternary shorelines in India; In: Late Quaternary sea-level correlation and application; (eds) D. B. Scott, P. A. Pirazzoli and C. A. Honig, Dordrecht, 169–194

[25] G.G. Vaz, M. Hariprasad, B.R. Rao, V. SubbaRao, 2007, Subsidence of southern part of erstwhile Dhanushkodi township, Tamil Nadu - Evidences from bathymetry, side scan and underwater videography, Current Science, Vol. 92(5), 671-672

[26] Rajiv Prasad, 2009, Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America -  Final Report, United States Nuclear Regularty Commission

[27] R Ramesh,  2006, KKNPP and the Pechiparai Reservoir of Kanyakumari District”, Paper submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government of India

[28]  AERB, 2005, Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/documents/regprocess.pdf

[29]  A Muthunayagam et al, 2012, Expert Group on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project constituted by the Government of India, Supplementary Report on Safety of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project  and Impact of Its Operations on Surroundings, 31 January

[30]  International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011, Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, DS405 Draft Specific Safety Guide,  54, 74, 75

Hell’s Boilers : It’s time to banish the belief that N-power is clean, green and safe

Fissile Argument

• The N-industry calls nuclear energy “clean and green”
• Being taken in by this poses a global danger—to ecology, health, and economies
• Money would be better spent on R&D in renewable energy

***

The nuclear power industry has been resurrected over the past decade by a lobbying campaign that has left many people believing it to be a clean, green, emission-free alternative to fossil fuels. These beliefs pose an extraordinary threat to global public health and encourage a major financial drain on national economies and taxpayers. The commitment to nuclear power as an environmentally safe energy source has also stifled the mass development of alternative technologies that are far cheaper, safer and almost emission-free—the future for global energy.

When the Fukushima Daiichi reactors suffered meltdowns in March, literally in the backyard of an unsuspecting public, the stark reality that the risks of nuclear power far outweigh any benefits should have become clear to the world. As the old quip goes, “Nuclear power is one hell of a way to boil water.”
Instead, the nuclear industry has used the disaster to increase its already extensive lobbying efforts. A few nations vowed to phase out nuclear energy after the disaster. But many others have remained steadfast in their commitment to using nuclear power.

That has left millions of innocent people unaware that they—all of us—may face a medical catastrophe beyond all proportions in the wake of Fukushima through the continued widespread use of nuclear energy.

The world was warned of the dangers of nuclear accidents 25 years ago, when Chernobyl exploded and lofted radioactive poisons into the atmosphere. Those poisons “rained out”, creating hot spots over the northern hemisphere. Research by scientists in eastern Europe, collected and published by the New York Academy of Sciences, estimates that 40 per cent of the European landmass is now contaminated with caesium-137 and other radioactive poisons that will concentrate in food for hundreds to thousands of years.

Wide areas of Asia—from Turkey to China—the United Arab Emirates, north Africa and north America are also contaminated. Nearly 200 million people remain exposed.

That research estimated that by now close to a million people have died of causes linked to the Chernobyl disaster. They perished from cancers, congenital deformities, immune deficiencies, infections, cardiovascular diseases, endocrine abnormalities and radiation-induced factors that increased infant mortality. Studies in Belarus found that in 2000, 14 years after the Chernobyl disaster, fewer than 20 per cent of the children were considered “practically healthy”, compared to 90 per cent before Chernobyl.

Now, Fukushima has been called the second-worst nuclear disaster after Chernobyl. Much is still uncertain about the long-term consequences of this disaster. Fukushima may well be on par with or even far exceed Chernobyl in terms of the effects on public health, as new information becomes available. The crisis is ongoing; the plant remains unstable and radiation emissions continue into the air and water.

Recent monitoring by citizens’ groups, international organisations and the US government have found dangerous hotspots in Tokyo and other areas. The Japanese government, meanwhile, in late September lifted evacuation advisories for some areas near the damaged plant—even though high levels of radiation remained. The government estimated that it will spend at least $13 billion to clean up contamination.

 

Illustration by Leandro Lima

Many thousands of people continue to inhabit areas that are highly contaminated, particularly northwest of Fukushima. Radioactive elements have been deposited throughout northern Japan, found in tap water in Tokyo and concentrated in tea, beef, rice and other food. In one of the few studies on human contamination in the months following the accident, over half the more than 1,000 children whose thyroids were monitored in Fukushima city were found to be contaminated with iodine-131—this means many of them are condemned to thyroid cancer years from now. Children are innately sensitive to the carcinogenic effects of radiation, foetuses even more so.

Like the Chernobyl meltdown, the accident at Fukushima, too, is of global proportions.

True green and clean solutions for providing energy do exist. They lie in a combination of conservation and using renewable sources through smart-grids.

Unusual levels of radiation have been discovered in British Columbia, along the west and east coasts of the US and in Europe, and heavy contamination has been found in oceanic waters.

Fukushima is classified as a Grade-7 accident on the International Atomic Energy Agency scale, denoting “widespread health and environmental effects”. That is the same severity as Chernobyl, the only other Grade-7 accident in history, but such disaster measurement is hazy: there is no higher number on the agency’s scale.

After the accident, lobbying groups touted improved safety at nuclear installations globally. In Japan, the Tokyo Electric Power Co, which operates the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, and the government have sought to control the reporting of negative stories via telecom companies and internet service providers.

In Britain, The Guardian reported that days after the tsunami, companies with interests in nuclear power—Areva, EDF Energy and Westinghouse—worked with the government to downplay the accident, fearing setbacks on plans for new nuclear power plants.

Nuclear power has always been the nefarious Trojan horse for the weapons industry, and effective publicity campaigns are a hallmark of both industries. The concept of nuclear electricity was conceived in the early 1950s as a way to make the public more comfortable with the US development of nuclear weapons. “The atomic bomb will be accepted far more readily if at the same time atomic energy is being used for constructive ends,” a consultant to the Defense Department Psychological Strategy Board, Stefan Possony, suggested.

The phrase ‘Atoms for Peace’ was popularised by President Dwight Eisenhower in the early 1950s.

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons are one and the same technology. A 1,000-MW nuclear reactor generates 600 pounds or so of plutonium per year: an atomic bomb requires a fraction of that amount for fuel, and plutonium remains radioactive for 2,50,000 years. Therefore, every country with a nuclear power plant also has a bomb factory with unlimited potential.

The nuclear power industry sets an unforgivable precedent by exporting nuclear technology—bomb factories—to dozens of non-nuclear nations.

Why is nuclear power still viable, after we’ve witnessed catastrophic accidents, enormous financial outlays, weapons proliferation and nuclear-waste-induced epidemics of cancers and genetic disease for generations to come? Simply put, many government and other officials believe the nuclear industry mantra: safe, clean and green. And the public is not educated on the issue.

There are some signs of change. Germany will phase out nuclear power by 2022. Italy and Switzerland have decided against it, and anti-nuclear advocates in Japan have gained traction. China remains cautious on nuclear power. Yet the nuclear enthusiasm of the United States, Britain, Russia and Canada continues unabated. The industry, meanwhile, has promoted new modular and ‘advanced’ reactors as better alternatives to traditional reactors. They are, however, subject to the very same risks—accidents, terrorist attacks, human error—as the traditional reactors. Many also create fissile material for bombs as well as the legacy of radioactive waste.

True green, clean, nearly emission-free solutions exist for providing energy. They lie in a combination of conservation and renewable energy sources—mainly wind, solar and geothermal, hydropower plants and biomass from algae. A smart-grid could make possible the integration of consuming and producing devices, allowing flexible operation of household appliances. The problem of intermittent power can be solved by storing energy using available technologies.

Millions of jobs can be created by replacing nuclear power with nationally integrated, renewable energy systems. In the United States alone, this project could be paid for by the $180 billion currently allocated for nuclear weapons programmes over the next decade. In fact, there would be no need for new weapons if the Russian and American nuclear arsenals—95 per cent of the estimated 20,500 nuclear weapons globally—are abolished.

Advocates of nuclear energy often paint those who oppose them as Luddites who are afraid of, or do not understand, modern technology, or as hysterics who disproportionately exaggerate the dangers of nuclear power. One might recall the sustained attack over many decades by the tobacco industry upon the medical profession—a profession that revealed the grave health dangers induced by smoking. Smoking, broadly speaking, only kills the smoker, active or passive. Nuclear power bequeaths morbidity and mortality—epidemics of disease—to all future generations. The millions of lives lost to smoking in the era before the health risks of cigarettes were widely exposed will be minuscule compared to the medical catastrophe we face through the continued use of nuclear power.

Let’s use this extraordinary moment to convince governments and others to move toward a nuclear-free world. Let’s prove that informed democracies will behave in a responsible fashion.

-Dr. Helen Caldicott

(Helen Caldicott, Paediatrician, founder-president, Physicians for Social Responsibility, anti-nuclear activist)

Courtesy: Outlook Magazine, Jan 02, 2012

The Nuclear Safety Question

Hearing a recent PIL against India’s current nuclear policy and the need for an independent nuclear regulator, the Supreme Court wanted to know about a few examples of an independent regulatory mechanism. Top nuclear expert A Gopalakrishnan presents the French , the Canadian, and the U.S.models

Nuclear safety regulator: The US model

 Background: 

The Indian government intends to replace the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board with a newly proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority to strengthen the administration of nuclear safety. The NSRA Bill, 2011, was introduced on September 7 and is currently before the Parliamentary Committee on Science & Technology. In the meantime, while hearing a public interest litigation on nuclear issues on December 5, Chief Justice SH Kapadia is reported to have said, ‘Have a public debate. Come out with a concrete solution till Parliament considers the (NSRA) Bill and suggest a regulatory model or a framework and then we can consider.’ (The Hindu, December 5) Adjourning the case for a month, the court told the petitioners they could suggest some regulatory models independent of the government, adopted in countries like the US, France, the UK and Canada, which it would then ‘recommend’ to the government. (Indian Express, December 6) For an informed debate to be conducted, one needs to first place before the Indian public certain salient aspects of the nuclear regulatory structures in some advanced countries that rely heavily on nuclear power.

This article is the first in a series that I intend to publish to initiate a public understanding and debate of the kind the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India suggested on foreign nuclear regulatory frameworks. In preparing this article , I must acknowledge that I have directly used substantial portions of existing factual reports from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development document (2008) on ‘Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: United States’, as well as from the website of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This had to be done to keep the contents totally factual in every detail, without inadvertent distortions coming in while paraphrasing them in my own language.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

 Formation and Responsibilities:

In the US, until 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission served as the umbrella agency charged with responsibility for all civilian and military projects on atomic energy. That year, the AEC was abolished and the regulatory responsibilities of the erstwhile AEC were assumed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The NRC’s primary responsibilities include ensuring that the use of nuclear materials and facilities is consistent with the protection of public health and safety, the common defence and security of the US and protecting the environment. The NRC acts through setting standards and rule making, technical reviews and studies, issuance of licences, permits and authorisations, inspection and investigations, evaluating operating experience and undertaking confirmatory research. NRC maintains an active inspection and enforcement program, and it investigates violations and initiates enforcement proceedings. The NRC can seek judicial remedies like injunctions and can assess fines and penalties. The violation of some NRC regulations can also result in criminal prosecution. Lastly, the NRC is authorised to investigate the causes of major nuclear incidents and accidents and report their findings to the US Congress. 

NRC Organisational Structure:

The NRC was created under the Energy Reorganisation Act, 1974, as an organisation that exercises considerable independence in nuclear regulatory matters. NRC has five commissioners, of whom no more than three may be members of the same political party. The US president, with the Senate’s advice and consent, appoints the commissioners, who must be US citizens. Each commissioner serves for five years and, during that time, may not engage in any other business or vocation. The president appoints one of the NRC’s commissioners as chairperson, who acts as the principal executive officer and the official spokesman of the commission. The president may remove a commissioner only for neglect of duty, inefficiency or malfeasance in office, and the Senate has to ratify this action.

In contrast to the above, the Indian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill proposes that the chairperson and members of the NSRA shall be finalised by a Council of Nuclear Safety, under the prime minister’s chairmanship, and they are appointed by the government for an initial three-year period. Furthermore, the chairperson and NSRA members can be removed from office by the government, even for trivial reasons. As per the Bill, there is no requirement to inform the Parliament or get approval for their appointment or removal.

The NRC chairperson is responsible for preparing policy planning and guidance for commission consideration, and for conducting the administrative, organisational, budgetary, and certain personnel functions of the NRC. Each commissioner has equal authority and responsibility in decision-making. For the NRC to act, a majority of members present must concur, with a minimum of three commissioners needed for a quorum. A few senior officials and offices also report either directly to the chairperson or to the commission. 

The NRC Office of New Reactors is one such office which is of special relevance to India in today’s context, with the Government of India embarking on importing first-of-a kind foreign nuclear reactors, without involving the AERB to even cursorily examine the safety of such reactors

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NRC Office of New Reactors:

The NRO was formed in 2006, to take the responsibility to ensure the safety of any new nuclear reactor facility, of US or foreign design, even before a licence application is entertained to build the first of its kind on US soil. For such reactor installations, the NRO is responsible for pre-evaluations and regulatory activities in the areas of sitting, licensing and oversight to protect public health, safety and the environment. One of the first steps in this NRC evaluation is a ‘design certification’ for approval of a standard nuclear power plant design of that type, independent of a specific site approval application or an application to construct or operate a plant. The design certification application to the NRC from the reactor manufacturer will have to include details similar to what is normally expected in a final safety analysis report for an established reactor type. The application to the NRC from the manufacturer must also include a detailed probabilistic risk analysis and an evaluation of design alternatives to mitigate the impact of severe accidents.

AREVA, the French developer of the European Pressurised Reactor, has been wanting to sell four of their EPRs to US utilities for some time now, but they are still waiting for the NRC to complete a design certification of the EPR for building it in the US, even though Finland, France and China are in different stages of constructing EPRs. The NRC is not expected to finish their certification before end-2012, and only thereafter can the licensing procedure for building an EPR at a specific US site can start.

In stark contrast to the above, our prime minister has in 2007-08 itself taken a unilateral political decision to buy six EPRs for the Jaitapur site, purely as a quid pro quo for the French government’s help in facilitating the India-US nuclear deal. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board was never informed or consulted, and no safety evaluation was done by them or the Department of Atomic Energy. The PM and his government have shown scant regard for public safety in taking this decision.

NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards:

The ACRS is NRC’s only statutory advisory committee, constituted under the 1972 US Federal Advisory Committee Act. It is mandatory under the FACA that the membership of any federal advisory committee is fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by that committee. The Act further requires that the Rules under which the ACRS or any such committee is formed ‘contain appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and recommendations of the committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee’s independent judgment.’ The ACRS, accordingly constituted, has a maximum of 15 members with expertise in scientific and engineering disciplines, and it provides advice on potential hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities, the adequacy of proposed safety standards and such other matters that the NRC may request. It is important to note that most of the ACRS deliberations are totally open to the public and any member of the public may request an opportunity to make an oral statement during the committee meeting. I don’t think I will live long enough to see something like this happening in India.

Unfortunately, in India we do not have a legislation similar to the US Federal Advisory Committee Act. Therefore, our government gets away by forming totally biased committees and commissions in very crucial areas involving public safety. The Atomic Energy Commission of India is a classic example, manned by few designated senior secretaries of the central government who are under instructions from the Prime Minister’s Office to support his views, and a set of pliable and unethical nuclear scientists who are more than willing to raise their hand in support , in return for a Padma Vibhushan, a continuing pay cheque well beyond their normal retirement age, or the award of a well-paying Bhabha Professorship or a Ramanna Fellowship which is within the powers of the DAE to grant. Thus, we have the AEC going along with illogical and often unsafe decisions like the import of untested foreign reactors from France and the US, without even squirming about not evaluating their absolute need or safety. Similarly, we have almost all AERB Advisory Committees stacked with vast majority of Ex-DAE personnel, who all jointly skew their opinion mostly in the DAE’s favour.

NRC’s Transparent Functioning:

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as part of its value system and principles of good regulation, believes that public involvement in, and information about, NRC activities are the cornerstones of strong and fair safety regulation. Consistent with that belief, the NRC provides ample opportunities for the public to participate meaningfully in NRC’s decision-making process. NRC strongly considers that nuclear safety regulation is the public’s business, and it must be transacted publicly and candidly.

Commission meetings are usually held with the NRC staff and/or outside parties to discuss issues for action. Members of the public are welcome to attend and observe these public Commission meetings held at the NRC headquarters. Unofficial transcripts are produced for each public meeting and are made available on the NRC website for public viewing, two days after each meeting. There are vast numbers of current NRC records like action memoranda, commission voting record on each issue, meeting slides, transcripts, etc uploaded on the NRC website, which the public can access. There are several public hearings in a year, dates of which are announced in advance, and the public are welcome to attend them.

One can go on describing many more of NRC’s transparency and public outreach activities, for which procedures and rules are well laid out and announced. In contrast, the AERB in India keeps all its documents, meeting records, etc confidential by citing the Official Secrets Act. AERB hardly ever organises a press conference or conducts a public hearing. Let us not forget that the Americans too have a stringent Official Secrets Act, and the NRC interactions and openness described above take place despite that. The NRC does not see openness in safety regulation as conflicting with the US secrecy laws in any way. In India, we have indeed a very long way to go in this regard.

At the December 5 hearing of the PIL against the current nuclear policy or the lack of it and the need for an ‘independent’ nuclear regulator, the Supreme Court bench is reported to have remarked, ‘We want to know what mechanism for independent regulation there is’, ‘please show us one or two examples of an independent regulatory mechanism’, and ‘what is the nature of independence you are seeking? Please produce before us the model.’ (LiveMint.com) .

Through this article containing some of the highlights of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s operational philosophy and procedures, I hope I have provided some insight into a nuclear regulatory organisation that is truly independent from the government. One can argue that India cannot have a regulator like the US NRC overnight, by passing a new law, but certainly we must strive to reach that level of independence at least in a decade from now. That will be impossible unless we now put in place an NSRA Act that will enable the system to move steadily and systematically towards meeting that objective.

The success of French nuclear safety regulation

 Background

The French nuclear safety regulatory practice is one of the best in the Western world. A distinguishing feature of the French regulation is the legislative emphasis in the associated Act under which transparency and public communication are institutionalised through structured clauses, rules and procedures specifically created for this purpose.

France has 58 nuclear reactors, situated in 19 sites, generating almost 80% of the country’s total electricity production. Their nuclear power program, started in 1970, has a remarkable safety record and their regulatory agency enjoys wide public acceptance in the country and in Europe, mainly because it is lauded as truly independent and transparent. This article highlights just a few salient aspects of this success story, which provide a stark contrast to their parallels in India.

In preparing this article, I must acknowledge that I have directly used substantial portions from existing documents, including a 2011 report from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development titled ‘Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries : France’, as well as from the publications of the French government, the French Nuclear Safety Authority, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was done to keep the contents totally factual in every detail, without inadvertent distortions coming in while paraphrasing them in my own language.

TSN Act (2006) and the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN)

Independence of the ASN:

The first nuclear regulatory authority in France was created in 1973 as a department of the industry ministry. In 1991, it became a division of the same ministry, but became increasingly answerable to the environment ministry as well. In 2002, through a presidential decree, the Directorate General for Nuclear Safety & Radiation Protection was created, reporting to both the industry and environment ministries and with responsibilities for both nuclear and radiation safety. Then, on June 13, 2006, the French parliament adopted, and the president promulgated, the Act on Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field (TSN Act, 2006).

Under this act the Nuclear Safety Authority was established as an independent entity, not answerable to the government’s ministers but as part of the French state, answering to the French parliament. This ensures the ASN’s effective independence from any governmental structure charged with the promotion of nuclear energy.

The ASN board has five members appointed by decree on account of their competence in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Three members, including the chairman, are appointed by the president of the republic. Two others are appointed respectively by the president of the National Assembly and the president of the senate. The tenure of the members is for six years.

The effective independence of the nuclear regulatory body continues to represent a significant challenge for countries like India. The mere act of administratively separating the regulator totally from agencies that promote the setting up and operation of nuclear facilities is only part of the solution. What is important is that regulators have to be able to work without pressure from the promoters of nuclear energy. The effective independence of a regulatory body needs to be both de facto and de jure. The regulator should not be subject to political or corporate influence, pressure or indirect threats. Unfortunately, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, 2011, currently in Parliament, violates this dictum in many ways.

Outside Technical Support to the ASN

In some countries like the US, regulatory bodies are rather large and self-sufficient in technical staff. In France, however, the ASN is a relatively compact organisation and they need the help of Technical Support Organisations to carry out the comprehensive and wide-ranging technical evaluations that are required in the course of its work. ASN primarily seeks this support from the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety, which is a state-owned establishment working under the joint authority of the ministers of defence, environment, industry, research and health. The IRSN employs about 1650 persons, 1000 of whom are graduates. They provide their research and consultancy services not just to the ASN, but also to other governmental organisations and industry, including even ASN’s licensees like EDF & AREVA. These services span areas like nuclear safety, radiation protection, security of nuclear installations, and security of radioactive and fissile materials during transport against malicious acts, etc.

Under these circumstances, various steps have been taken to ensure that there is no potential conflict of interest in IRSN providing technical support to both ASN and the nuclear industry at the same time. To meet this objective, a detailed memorandum of understanding has been signed between the ASN & IRSN, which represents a code of conduct governing their relationship, under which the IRSN has agreed not to take up any technical support activity for any ASN Licensee, other than purely generic research assignments. IRSN has also set up ‘firewalls’ within their organisation, so that their employees who support the regulatory technical tasks from ASN are never employed at any time to assist in a support job for nuclear industry or other parts of government . Recently, about 400 of the IRSN staff were working full time for ASN on regulatory tasks and 50 ASN staff were seconded to IRSN to participate in related research tasks.

In India also, the nuclear regulator (AERB) does not have the comprehensive scientific and technological capabilities or in-depth experience required to carry out much of the safety analyses and evaluations needed. Therefore, almost 95% of the members in AERB’s review and advisory committees are drawn from among retired employees of the Department of Atomic Energy, either from one of their research institutes like the Bhabha Atomic Research Center or a power generation company like the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. Having worked for 30 to 40 years in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) organisations before retiring, and continually enjoying all the retirement benefits from the DAE, including family medical support in their old age, the loyalty of most such review committee members is likely to be with the DAE and rarely can one expect impartial regulatory reviews from them. And yet , there are very few non-DAE national experts in nuclear engineering within the country, because the DAE has been systematically discouraging the higher institutes of engineering in India from starting and expanding post-graduate programs in nuclear engineering. While we wait to get this done over the next decade or more, we must insist that AERB elicits the help of ex-DAE personnel under a strict contract of service and code of ethics which minimise the chances of conflict of interest, somewhat akin to the formal understanding under which the French ASN and the IRSN co-operate.

French Council for Nuclear Policy (CPN)

France established the Council for Nuclear Policy in April 2008, to lay down the broad courses of action concerning nuclear policy and to ensure their implementation in the area of exports and international co-operation, industrial and energy policy, and policies for research, security, safety and environmental protection. Chaired by the French president, the council has 12 members: the prime minister, the ministers of energy, economy, industry, external trade, research and finance, as well as the ministers for foreign affairs and defence, the army chief of staff, the secretary general for defence & national security, and the head of the Atomic Energy Commission. If the chairperson desires, the CPN may also hear submissions from qualified eminent persons and top industrialists in the nuclear sector.

Among other matters, the French CPN is able to discuss overall nuclear power policy within the context of the country’s overall energy policy and electricity requirements. The council is powerful enough and has all the concerned senior politicians and their advisers as members, and they are able to take major overall decisions on nuclear power, and concurrently review the safety implications of those decisions. The current Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, however, suggests the formation of a Council of Nuclear Safety, ostensibly to show emphasis on safety, but in reality for serving the narrow interest of creating a NSRA Board to the government’s liking and to keep a strict control over it. While the country has no agreed overall nuclear power policy or a rational and justifiable reactor import strategy, this anxiety to create a Council of Nuclear Safety does not make sense. Like the French, what India needs is a cabinet-level Council for Nuclear Policy. As in France, this council can indeed oversee nuclear safety as well, without in any way exerting direct administrative control over the NSRA.

ASN’s Public Outreach and Transparency

A detailed Title- III of the French TSN Act 2006 is on ‘Information of the Public as Regards Nuclear Safety’. Under that, Article 18 says ‘The State is responsible for informing the public about the procedures and results of the surveillance of nuclear safety and protection.’ Article 19-I states ‘Any person is entitled to obtain from the licensee of a basic nuclear installation — the information held — on the risks related to ionising radiations that can result from this activity and on the safety and radiation protection measures taken to prevent or reduce these risks or exposure —.’ And, Article 19-II states, ‘Pursuant to this Article, disputes relative to refusals to communicate information are brought before the administrative court in accordance with the procedures set forth —.’

What is unique about the French nuclear law is that it spells out in detail the instruments & procedures through which this openness is to be fully implemented. It does not leave any wriggle room for the nuclear operator or for the government to evade this responsibility. Thus, Article 22 is a step-by-step legislative recipe to form Local Information Committees (LICs) in the neighbourhood of each and every nuclear facility site, with wide-ranging membership of officials of local self government, local members of parliament and state assemblies, local economic & commercial interest groups, local trade union representatives, local medical doctors and environmentalists, etc.

Each committee will have to be formed by the equivalent of our district magistrate or his senior representative, while the ASN representative, the representatives of the facility licensee and the state services involved shall attend in advisory capacity. In pursuit of its mission, the LIC can have assistance of consultancy services, to get epidemiological studies done or to have any measurements or analysis of the environment made. All LIC expenditures will be met by the state or territorial authorities of the region. All relevant safety-related information sought by the LIC will have to be provided, within a stipulated time, by the nuclear facility management.

Article- 23 of the Act has created at the national level a High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security, as an autonomous body. This committee may be called upon to examine any matter relating to information concerned with nuclear safety and its control, by the ministries responsible for nuclear safety, the chairpersons of parliamentary committees, chairpersons of any LIC, or the operators of major nuclear installations. The opinions and the Annual Report of the High Committee are made public. Persons responsible for and promoting nuclear activities, the Nuclear Safety Authority and other government departments have to furnish all information and answers sought by this Committee.

Lessons from Canada on nuclear safety

Background

About 15% of Canada’s electricity comes from nuclear power, with 18 operating power reactors in three provinces providing over 12,600 MWe of power capacity. Besides these, there are eight research reactors, two at the Chalk River Laboratories of the Atomic Energy Canada Limited, a public sector corporation owned by the Canadian government, and the remaining six in various universities. All these reactors are owned by the government.

Since May 2000, Canada’s Nuclear Safety and Control Act (hereinafter called the ‘Act’) has been in force as the applicable nuclear safety regulatory legislation. This comprehensive law replaced the erstwhile Atomic Energy Control Act, first adopted in 1946, as the means by which the Canadian nuclear industry is regulated. The Act establishes the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (hereinafter called ‘CNSC’), replacing the erstwhile Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) as the regulatory body, clearly distinguishing the regulatory role of the CNSC from that of AECL, which is a federal R&D and marketing organisation.

In writing this article, I must acknowledge that I have directly used substantial portions from existing documents, including a 2009 report from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development titled ‘Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: Canada’, as well as direct quotes from the publications and websites of the IAEA, CNSC and AECB. This was done to keep the contents totally factual in every detail, without inadvertent distortions coming in while paraphrasing them in my own language.

Structure and Independence of CNSC 

The CNSC is an independent federal government agency, and consists of two components: a commission tribunal and a staff organisation. The Commission tribunal has the responsibility 1. to establish regulatory policies on matters relating to health, safety, security and environment, 2. make legally binding regulations, and 3. make decisions based on laws and regulations. The staff organisation has technical experts in various disciplines of nuclear safety and control. Both components of CNSC report to the president and chief executive officer of the CNSC. The CNSC, in turn, reports to the Canadian Parliament, through the minister of natural resources in the Cabinet.

Section 8(2) of the Act states that the commission ‘is for all purposes an agent of Her Majesty the Queen and may exercise its powers only as an agent of Her Majesty. The commission consists of not more than seven permanent members to be appointed by the governor ‘in Council’ (hereinafter meaning the governor, on the advice of Cabinet), and he designates one of the permanent members as president & CEO of the CNSC. Section 10(5) of the Act states that each permanent member holds office during good behavior for a term not exceeding five years and may be removed at any time by the governor, on the advice of the Cabinet, for cause.

Section 19 of the Act allows the governor in council may, by order, issue to the commission directives of general application on broad policy matters with respect to the objectives of the CNSC and these orders are binding on the commission. A copy of all such orders shall be published in the Canadian gazette and laid before both houses of Parliament. Interestingly, though the CNSC reports ultimately to the Parliament, the cabinet and the governor do not seem to require the prior approval of parliament to appoint or dismiss the president and members of the CNSC or for giving binding directives from time to time, though post-facto all such actions have to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. The IAEA, in reviewing the CNSC structure on request, has remarked that though the separation of nuclear regulatory and promotional functions in Canada appear to exist, both these aspects are represented by the common ministry through which the CNSC reports to the Parliament. Overall, the independence from the government enjoyed by the US NRC and the French ASN is somewhat more effective & complete than in the case of Canada.

Transparency and Public Interactions of CNSC 

Section 9(b) of the Act requires the CNSC to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public concerning the activities of the commission and their effects on the environment and on the health and safety of the persons. As a federal institution, the CNSC follows the principles of the government of Canada’s policy on communication to openly inform the public. Furthermore, the Access to Information Act sets forth the principle that every person in Canada has a right, upon request, to be given access to records under the control of CNSC, unless it is restricted.

The CNSC communicates actively with many external stakeholders, including individuals, community groups, public interest groups, NGOs, professional & scientific associations, etc. In Canada , there is a well-established Canadian Association of Nuclear Host Communities, which is a not-for-profit association that has been set up to provide a forum through which communities who have nuclear-related operations and facilities within or in close proximity to their municipal boundaries can discuss issues and concerns of mutual interest. The CANHC maintains a website (http://www.canhc.ca/) and conducts annual national meetings. The CNSC maintains open lines of communication with CANHC and the CNSC president and senior officials interact with them from time to time. Besides, CNSC’s website (www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca) is one of the most comprehensive and informative nuclear regulatory websites I have come across. It has uploaded Annual Reports of the AECB and CNSC from 1946 till today, historical information, news bulletins, all environmental assessment reports, etc. On most of these, the CNSC solicits comments from the public via e-mail and responds with more information or documents as needed.

CNSC Actions Following the Fukushima Incident

Following the Fukushima Daichi nuclear incident in Japan as a result of a major earthquake and tsunami, all nations having nuclear reactors took their own steps to re-examine the safety preparedness of each one’s nuclear installations. In India too, the NPCIL and the AERB have carried out safety audits and have released reports, but the public has no knowledge as to how the audits were carried out and what the follow-up steps and their time schedules are going to be. It will be a study in contrast to see how the Canadian nuclear regulator handled the same situation with total openness.

From March 11, when the nuclear incident occurred in Japan, CNSC started posting detailed progress reports on the event, along with factual comparisons of the Canadian CANDU reactors and the Fukushima BWRs, to alleviate any public concerns about the likelihood of similar incidents happening in their reactors.

CNSC also posted the daily radiation dose rates measured in various cities and towns to display that the incident in Japan has not affected Canadians health-wise. The unabridged minutes of the Commission meetings, where Fukushima problem was among topics discussed, are available on the website, as usual.

On April 20, CNSC uploaded the memo through which a Task Force on Fukushima Impact was formed, along with its terms of reference. In between, on June 23, they uploaded the 2010 Annual CNSC Staff Report on the Safety Performance of Canadian Nuclear Plants, and requested the public to send in their comments and questions.

On August 9, the CNSC Board constituted an External Advisory Review Committee to examine CNSC’s own responses and actions related to this incident, to evaluate whether these are indeed adequate and comprehensive. This committee consisted of independent & distinguished experts in energy, innovation, engineering, governance and safety, selected from outside the nuclear and government sector. On October 28, CNSC posted on their website the full report of the Post-Fukushima Task Force. In releasing the report, they also announced that CNSC has voluntarily decided to invite International Atomic Energy Agency experts to carry out an Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in Canada, to carry out a second independent appraisal to assess whether the CNSC actions taken and intended to be taken in view of the Fukushima incident are indeed adequate according to the best of international standards and expertise. The Task Force Report released in October will be presented to the Commission at a public meeting scheduled for February 15, 2012, to finalise the Action Plans to be followed by all nuclear power plants. Comments from the public on this report have been solicited through the website in early November itself and responses were to be sent in before December 1. The CNSC staff will take all such comments also into account before the meeting on February 15, 2012. Lastly, the CNSC has already announced that they will be submitting, on their own accord, a detailed report on the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear incident to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Vienna, at their meeting in August 2012.

The above two paragraphs amply bring home the transparency and competence with which one of the world’s best nuclear safety regulators protect the interests of the people of their country. The step-by-step intimation to the public of CNSC’s actions and their outcome in the nuclear safety area, on a real-time basis, brings confidence and comfort to the people and enhances the prestige of Canada in the comity of nations. 

-A Gopalakrishnan  

 

(The author is a former chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, Government of India)

Courtesy: Daily News & Analysis