Showing posts with label Frontline. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frontline. Show all posts

29 November 2011

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) comes into force....

 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) comes into force with the notification of the attendant rules for its implementation.

THE rules for implementing the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010), which were being awaited for long, particularly by foreign nuclear goods suppliers, were notified on November 11 and made public on November 16. In effect, therefore, the Act came into force as of November 11. The concern of the suppliers related chiefly to Section 17(b) of the Act, which provides for ‘right of recourse' to the nuclear power plant (NPP) operator to move against any supplier of “equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard devices” if that was determined to be the cause for a nuclear incident and render the supplier liable for nuclear damage (see box).
 Key provisions 
 
I. The requirement under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) in respect of the operator's right of recourse in a national law:

Article 10 of the Annex:
National law may provide that the operator shall have a right of recourse only:
(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing;
(b) if the nuclear incident results from an act of omission done with intent to cause damage, against the individual who has acted or omitted to act with such intent.

II. Provisions in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) for the operator's right of recourse:

Section 17: The operator of the nuclear installation, after paying for the compensation for nuclear damage…, shall have a right of recourse where:
(a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing; (b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or substandard services;
(c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of an individual done with the intent to cause nuclear damage.

III. Provision in the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules (2011) for the operator's right of recourse:

Rule 24:
(1) A contract referred to in clause (a) of Section 17 of the Act shall include a provision for right of recourse for not less than the extent of the operator's liability under subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act or the value of the contract itself, whichever is less.
(2) The provision for right of recourse referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be for the duration of the initial licence issued under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules (2004) or the product liability period, whichever is longer.

The right of recourse can be exercised by the operator after paying the compensation for nuclear damage in accordance with Section 6 of the Act so that the affected public is compensated for the damage, including loss of life or property, immediately after the incident. The provision 17(b), however, flies in the face of the standard international practice for nuclear liability which indemnifies the supplier entirely and makes the operator strictly and absolutely liable for the incident or accident irrespective of the cause. The international liability regime that is currently being followed by most of the 30 NPP operating countries, either through international conventions or through domestic laws, do provide for ‘right of recourse' which, however, is much more limited in scope than what the Indian Act seeks to provide.

 A VIEW OF the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. It is not clear as yet if suppliers will accept the apparent relief from indefinite liability that the rules have now given them and begin to do business with NPCIL.

The international regime promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) (which is yet to come into force and which India has signed and is planning to ratify soon), requires that the domestic nuclear liability law of a country that is not a party to the Paris Convention of 1960 or the Vienna Convention of 1977 should be consistent with certain provisions laid down in the Annex of the CSC, which include operator's ‘right of recourse' (Article 10). But this provides for ‘right of recourse' (see I in box) and channelling liability to the supplier only in cases when it is “expressly provided for in the [operator-supplier commercial] contract” or “if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage”.

However, the Indian Act goes beyond these by providing for Section 17(b), mentioned above, in addition to Sections 17(a & c), which are in accordance with Article 10 of the CSC Annex (see II in box). Thus, the Indian Act would seem to be not consistent with the international liability regime. However, the CSC (Article XVIII) only requires that while submitting the instruments of ratification, a signatory country has only to declare that its domestic law is consistent with the provisions of the CSC Annex. Only when some party to the convention raises the issue of the Indian Act being inconsistent with the international liability regimes will the IAEA take cognisance of that aspect and set forth measures to resolve it.

Potential supplier countries to India – the United States, France and Russia – have voiced their dissent to this contentious ‘right of recourse' provision in the Indian Act at different times. One of the issues has been the period of applicability of the controversial Section 17(b). Operators have contended that a supplier of equipment or component cannot be held liable under the conditions of 17(b) throughout the lifetime of the reactor during which period many modifications to the NPP – both hardware and software – could be made. And that is why potential suppliers have been keenly awaiting the announcement of rules to operationalise the Act.

Besides 17(b), the other provision in the Act that the suppliers are wary of is Section 46, which allows for tort cases based on other domestic laws to be moved against the operator in addition to the damages that the operator has to bear under the Liability Act. In principle, the proceedings of such a case can bring the supplier of equipment too under its ambit if the operator contends that defective equipment was the cause of the nuclear incident.

Obviously, rules framed to implement an Act have to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act. One thing the nuclear liability rules cannot, therefore, do is to resolve the Act's contradiction with the CSC Annex. So the issue of India's admission to the CSC will depend on how the IAEA will address the issue if the matter is brought up before it by any party. But, notwithstanding the commitment given by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to President Barack Obama in November 2010, India can choose not to ratify the CSC and yet seek to do nuclear commerce globally. This should be possible given that nuclear supplier countries have been doing business with countries that have not even signed the CSC or are parties to other international conventions. Indeed, only the U.S. has insisted on India ratifying the CSC ( Frontline, December 3, 2010), while France and Russia have only required in their bilateral agreements with India that the Indian law should conform to international standards. The only issue would be if aspects of liability governed by the Indian domestic law are acceptable to them as meeting international norms.

The Act does not specify any extinction period for the ‘right of recourse' provision under its Section 17 (see II in box). It is open-ended and would seem to be applicable for the whole lifetime of the NPP or the equipment in question, and for an unspecified extent of liability. In fact, this was the perception of people who argued for and succeeded in the inclusion of 17(b) in the Act.

But the rules that have now been announced change that. They cap both the time period for which the operator can exercise the right of recourse and the extent of financial liability of the supplier (see III in box). Firstly, the rules require that the operator shall include such a right of recourse provision in the commercial contract (emphasis added). Since, in case of a nuclear incident, the extent of the operator's liability is, vide Section 6(2) of the Act, Rs.1,500 crore, Rule 24(1) requires that the liability channelled to the supplier cannot be less than the lesser of the operator's liability (Rs.1,500 crore) and the value of the contract. That is, if the value of the contract is more than Rs.1,500 crore, the extent of the supplier's liability will be at least Rs.1,500 crore. But if the value of the contract is less than Rs.1,500 crore, the supplier's exposure will only be equal to the value of the contract.

As for the cap on the time period for right of course, it would be either the initial licence period issued by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules (2004) or the product liability period, whichever is longer. The italicised phrases, however, need explanation. Rule 9 of the Radiation Protection Rules (2004) specifies the period of validity of the licence issued for a nuclear reactor thus: “Every licence issued shall, unless otherwise specified, be valid for a period of five years from the date of issue of such licence” (emphasis added).

From the above, it is clear that, in principle, the licence period can be anything less than or more than five years. But, if unspecified, it will be five years by default. Indeed, it has been a codified practice of the AERB that the initial ‘operating' licence is for a five-year period. At the end of five years, a review of all aspects of the power plant operation is done and licence is renewed for another five-year period. At the end of 10 years, an elaborate and comprehensive review of the working of the plant is carried out before a renewal of licence for another five years.

But starting the operation of a nuclear reactor does not happen with the press of a button or the single throw of a switch. The commissioning of an NPP is a long-drawn process (which is completed over several months). It goes through the following distinct phases, each of them involving elaborate tests and simulations under the supervision of AERB and other experts. The operator, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), is given due authorisation or consent, which is equivalent to a licence though not termed so, for each one of these phases. These are for much shorter durations, varying from a month to six months or even more.

After the full loading of the fuel, authorisation for starting Phase A operations is given. This involves initiation of fission and gradual ‘approach to criticality'. Once criticality is achieved, the AERB gives its authorisation for Phase B, which involves operation of the NPP in low power over a length of time when various nuclear physics checks and safety checks are performed in the presence of experts. After satisfactory low power operation, yet another authorisation (Phase C) is given for gradually increasing the reactor's output to full power. Its performance, in particular its stability, is observed for 100 full power reactor days. Only after this the actual licence for commercial operation, including grid connectivity, is given, and this constitutes the initial operating licence with a validity of five years. Build-up of radioactivity begins once fission is initiated (Phase A), and there is the likelihood of a nuclear incident involving radioactivity during all the three phases of testing. While the operator's liability is clear in all of them, how will the operator's right to recourse clause be interpreted as the different stages of authorisations are for different and shorter durations?

From the perspective of liability and in the wake of the new rules for the operator's right of recourse, the AERB, according to reliable Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) sources, is now seized of this ambiguity in the licensing process and will evolve a new definition for initial operating licence that will include the initial start-up process as well. Any future operating licence that will be issued to NPCIL will be in accordance with the amended operating licence definition. Given that the progress to commissioning can even take up to six months, effectively, the period for the operator's right of recourse should technically be five years plus that initial build-up period.

The other phrase that needs similar elaboration is ‘product liability', a term akin to ‘warranty period' but something more than that. The Liability Rules define ‘product liability period' as the “period for which the supplier has undertaken liability for patent or latent defects or sub-standard services under a contract”. Thus this part of the rule actually has relevance to the controversial Section 17(b) of the Act and the product liability period refers to that of the product implicated, or sought to be implicated, in an incident though the announced rules do not explicitly include any clause for implementing 17(b) itself. The document on ‘General Conditions of Contract (GCC) for Supply of Indigenous Stores' of NPCIL specifies the ‘product liability period'. It must be pointed out that this document is specific only to indigenous suppliers because NPCIL has hitherto not dealt directly with foreign suppliers of products and equipment.

‘Patent defect' refers to a defect that is manifest or recognisable on inspection of the product, and there is a corresponding ‘patent defect liability period'. Under the NPCIL contract conditions, this is 12 months from the date of acceptance of the product or 18 months from the date of its receipt at the site, whichever is earlier. ‘Latent defect', on the other hand, means a defect within the material or arising out of design deficiency, which does not manifest itself and/or was not reasonably discoverable during the ‘patent defect liability period'. The supplier's ‘latent defect liability period', according to the GCC, is “limited to a period of five years from the end of ‘patent defect liability period' of the respective plant and equipment including spares”. In effect, therefore, the ‘product liability period', under NPCIL's terms, will be the sum of these two periods and is, therefore, six and a half years from the date of arrival of the product at the site or six years from the date of its acceptance.

From the perspective of nuclear liability during a nuclear incident, this would seem to be irrelevant as regards most products. This is because the clock starts ticking from the time they arrive on the site. Given that the NPP construction period itself can take up to five years or more, the product liability period for most products will expire before the initial operating licence period begins. That is, if a particular product is identified to be the single causative agent for a nuclear incident – which would rarely be the case because a nuclear incident is usually is a combination of several products and operating conditions – the liability period for that product (and hence for the supplier) would in nearly all cases have expired by then unless the incident occurs during the testing phases unless, of course, a product or component is changed before the expiry of the initial licence period. In such a case, the product liability period can extend beyond the initial licence period and, therefore, would have some relevance if it is involved in any incident.

One of the curious things in the ongoing debates on channelling of nuclear liability to suppliers, which should affect Indian suppliers as well, was the inexplicable silence of Indian suppliers on the issue as compared with their foreign counterparts. But Section 6.7 of the GCC, which provides for ‘Indemnity against Loss/Damage', gives an explanation for this. Subsection 6.7.7 states: “The Purchaser [NPCIL] shall indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor [supplier] in respect of Third Party life and Property damage claims arising out of nuclear event at Purchaser's Site.” This implies that in contracts with domestic suppliers, NPCIL has hitherto provided indemnity to them in case of an event at an NPP. That is, the GCC followed by NPCIL all along has been consistent with strict and absolute liability of the operator.

In fact, the GCC provides for this indemnity to the supplier even in cases of tort proceedings against the operator under other laws unless the contract explicitly provides for it. Section 9.1(a) of the GCC says: “Except in cases of criminal negligence or wilful misconduct, the Contractor shall not be liable to the Purchaser, whether in contract, tort, or otherwise, for any indirect or consequential loss or damage, loss of use, loss of production, or loss of profits or interest costs, provided that this exclusion shall not apply to any obligation of the Contractor to pay liquidated damages and/or any other penalties/recovery etc. specifically provided for in the Contract, to the Purchaser.” This again would seem to be consistent with the prevalent international norms for right of recourse. In the wake of the Liability Act and the attendant rules, it remains to be seen whether NPCIL chooses to amend these provisions under the GCC for domestic suppliers.

But, more pertinently, what will be the nature of the GCC that NPCIL would draw up for future contracts that it is likely to enter into directly with foreign suppliers? Will such a differential dispensation in commercial contracts with domestic and foreign suppliers be acceptable to the latter?

In queries to the different potential nuclear suppliers to India, such as Areva, GE and Westinghouse, all of them have said that they are still studying the rules and do not wish to make any comments. While the opposition parties have expressed their strong opposition to the rules by saying that the government has succumbed to suppliers' pressures, it is not clear as yet if these suppliers will accept the apparent relief from indefinite liability that the rules have now given them and begin to do business with NPCIL. If they do, the obvious impact of the rules is that there will be loading of cost of insuring for an amount equal to the extent of liability that the supplier is now exposed to for the initial five-year period, thus increasing project costs.

As for Parliament's assent to the rules, according to Section 48 of the Act, the rules made will remain before both Houses of Parliament, while in session, for a total period of 30 days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions. For any amendment recommended by Parliament to become effective, both Houses will have to agree to the change(s). The winter session for the year will last for a month from November 22 to December 21. With the opposition having already publicly voiced their dissent to the rules, the issue is bound to occupy a substantial fraction of the session period with acrimonious debates.

-R. Ramachandran
Courtesy: Frontline, Dec 03-16, 2011

16 November 2011

KOODANKULAM : TIME TO TALK - Praful Bidwai

The Kudankulam protesters must not be maligned as misguided by ‘foreign' interests. Dialogue with them on nuclear hazards remains an imperative. 



AS the popular agitation against the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) gains in strength and determination, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and its subsidiary, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), have mounted a multi-pronged attack on the movement and its leaders, while claiming that the Russian-designed reactors being installed are “perfectly” or “100 per cent” safe.

One part of the attack is that the agitators are “imperilling” the safety of the Rs.13,000-crore project by impeding its normal operation and maintenance through their picketing. In particular, Reactor 1, which is at an advanced state of completion, and recently had a “hot run”, is in danger of being “damaged”.

This underscores the protesters' grave irresponsibility. Another part of the attack is the disinformation spread through newspapers to the effect that the movement is backed by “anti-nuclear groups, the Church and foreign activists” ( The Times of India, November 7). NPCIL chairman S.K. Jain said activists from the United States, Finland, France and Australia “are simply sitting there”.

The second attack is reminiscent of past campaigns to malign environmentalists who fought against large dams and destructive mining and industrial projects – and made a valuable contribution to ecological protection and defence of livelihoods. Anti-nuclear groups naturally support the Kudankulam protests on well-reasoned grounds.

It is their legitimate job to do so. But it is pernicious to introduce a denominational/communal element here. The protesters include people from all communities.

My telephone conversations with a number of people around Kudankulam confirm that there are no “foreign” activists there. The only foreigners present recently were the Russian engineers invited by NPCIL itself.

The charge is particularly deplorable because it comes from an organisation that is bent on rewarding foreign nuclear manufacturers with lucrative reactor contracts for their governments' support to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and its endorsement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Former DAE secretary Anil Kakodkar put it straight to the Marathi daily Sakaal (January 5): “We also have to keep in mind the commercial interests of foreign countries and … companies …America, Russia and France were the countries that we made mediators in these efforts to lift sanctions, and hence, for the nurturing of their business interests, we made deals with them for nuclear projects.”

Worse, such propaganda about the “foreign hand” behind the protests guts the possibility of a genuine dialogue with the agitators, mandated by the Centre. The whole rationale of the Prime Minister's October 7 meeting with the people's delegation, in response to the Tamil Nadu Cabinet's call for suspending construction at Kudankulam until people's apprehensions about safety are allayed, was to facilitate dialogue and rational debate.

To return to the first line of attack, DAE Secretary Srikumar Banerjee has claimed he had “serious concern” about “damage” to the reactors: “It is not a plant which can be just switched on and off….We have done the hot run. We can't go from hot run to a freeze condition.… We have to have a minimal operational system….” S.K. Jain said: [a reactor] is “not a car factory where you can switch off the systems and close.... You have simulators, ventilators, computer and electronic systems… you have to maintain” them.

There is as yet no nuclear danger at Kudankulam. Reactor 1 has not gone “critical”– that is, had a nuclear fission chain reaction. For all intents and purposes, it is like a car factory, which too has simulators, ventilators and computers.

Contrary to the suggestion of a nuclear activity, a “hot run” involves loading of dummy fuel assemblies (without uranium) into the reactor, and then “taking the temperature of the primary coolant water to the operating temperature of 2800 Celsius…,” according to site director M.K. Balaji ( The Hindu, June 5). After the three-week-long hot run, “the reactor would be disassembled”, not just shut down, and the reactor vessel, pipelines, gauges and safety devices inspected. The run's purpose is to see how the coolant circuit operates and whether pipes, pumps, and so on work properly.

Until Reactor 1 attains criticality, its safety will not be affected in the least if operations are suspended even for months. Kudankulam is already delayed by 10 years. Shutting down reactors even after they have gone critical is not rocket science. All reactors are periodically closed for maintenance. Many have been shut down safely or for good – most recently in Japan and Germany, and earlier in the U.S., France, Britain, Italy, and elsewhere.

Former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam has lent a degree of legitimacy to the DAE's campaign by alleging that “geopolitical and market forces” (the layer presumably meaning rival nuclear suppliers to Russia) are behind the Kudankulam protests. He was categorical that the reactors are “100 per cent” safe, because they have multiple “sophisticated” safety features, and because 99 per cent of their spent fuel would be reprocessed.

NUCLEAR WASTES
Now, reprocessing is a known hazardous and expensive activity, which also produces nuclear wastes, with all their intractable problems. Many components of nuclear wastes have long half-lives (period during which they naturally decay to half their original mass) such as 24,000 years (plutonium-239) and even 710 million years (uranium-235).

Science knows no way of storing wastes safely for such long periods, leave alone neutralising them or disposing them of. No geological formations can be trusted to be stable for millennia and ensure that the wastes will not leach into the environment.

As for safety, no technology is “100 per cent” safe. All technologies carry a finite risk. Risk is particularly great in relatively high-pressure high-temperature systems such as nuclear reactors, which concentrate enormous quantities of energy in small volumes. The work of safety and organisation theory analysts such as Charles Perrow (of Normal Accidents fame) and Scott Sagan tells us that reactors are highly complex systems whose subsystems are, internally, tightly coupled, with the danger that a small mishap or abnormal event in one subsystem can get quickly transmitted to other subsystems, malfunctions get rapidly magnified, and the whole system goes into a massive runaway crisis. “Fail-safe” or “fail-soft” mechanisms can easily break down.

That is what happened at Fukushima, where a station blackout initiated by an earthquake and tsunami caused a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), leading to three core meltdowns and huge releases of radioactivity, whose effects have not fully unfolded, or been understood and studied. The accident is still continuing and the reactors remain crisis-bound.

A station blackout is not a rare phenomenon. LOCAs are known in virtually every reactor type with long operating experience.

FLAWED METHOD

Engineers try to make reactors safer by designing them to recover from various initiating failures, and installing multiple protections, all of which would have to fail before radioactivity is released (defence-in-depth). To quantify risks, engineers use a mathematical method called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). The physicist M.V. Ramana says that PRA conceives of accidents as resulting from one of many combinations of a series of failures, and computes the probability of a severe accident resulting from these “event-trees” or “fault-trees” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 19).

Japan's nuclear safety agency used PRA to extend the Fukushima Daiichi station's licence just one month before the accident. PRA is also cited by reactor manufacturers to make tall claims about safety. However, PRA is a deeply flawed method and has been questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. A Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study in 2003 says that “uncertainties in PRA methods and databases make it prudent to keep actual historical risk experience in mind when making judgments about safety”.

That experience says five core meltdowns have occurred in the global record of 15,000 reactor-years of operation. At this rate, one can expect a meltdown every eight years in the world's 430-odd reactors.
Conceptually, PRA uses chain-of-event modelling which “cannot account for the indirect, non-linear, and feedback relationships that characterise many accidents…. These risk assessments do a poor job of modelling human actions and their impact on known, let alone unknown, failure modes.” Therefore PRA-based conclusions about overall accident probabilities are undependable.

“Perhaps the only robust conclusion one can draw is that no two major accidents are alike.… This means, unfortunately, that while it may be possible to guard against an exact repeat of the Fukushima disaster, the next nuclear accident will probably be caused by a different combination of initiating factors and failures. There are no reliable tools to predict what that combination will be, and therefore one cannot be confident of being protected against such an accident.”

This grim conclusion warrants sobriety, caution and abundant humility on the part of our nuclear establishment. It should thank the Kudankulam protesters for raising the issue of nuclear safety, and highlighting its paramount importance. It should also reconsider its certification of the French-designed Jaitapur reactors in Maharashtra as safe when their design has not even been frozen or shared with it, and about which hundreds of queries have been raised in Finland, Britain, the U.S., and even France.

There must be a moratorium on all further nuclear activity unless an independent, broad-based, credible safety review is conducted.

 - Praful Bidwai

Courtesy: Frontline, Nov 19 - Dec 2, 2011

05 October 2011

For Nuclear Sanity - Praful Bidwai

THE Tamil Nadu Cabinet's resolution urging Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to suspend work on the Kudankulam nuclear reactors until “the apprehensions of the people” regarding their safety “are allayed” represents an unprecedented and handsome victory for the popular movement against ultra-hazardous technologies. It is a tribute to the moral strength and courage of the 12-day peaceful fast by more than 100 people, and successful mobilisation of tens of thousands of committed supporters from Tirunelveli, Kanyakumari and Thoothukudi districts, that Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa had to reverse her pro-project stand within days.

Never before has a State government demanded suspension of a project that it had approved, when it is at an advanced stage. Two reactors were cancelled in Kerala in the past, and two uranium mining projects, in Khasi Hills in Meghalaya and Nalgonda in Andhra Pradesh, have been kept in abeyance in deference to public opposition. But the Kudankulam decision is unique and holds the key to the post-Fukushima future of nuclear power in India.

The Kudankulam agitation was not sudden or new. Nor were the local people instigated by “outsiders” raising a false alarm about the safety of the Russian-designed reactors just before a planned evacuation drill. Local people have opposed the project right since its conception in the 1980s. They organised spirited demonstrations against it as early as in 1989. Indeed, misgivings about Kudankulam extend next door to Kerala. Numerous groups led by the People's Movement against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) have criticised the project on several grounds.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has all along failed to persuade the local farmers and fisherfolk that the reactors will cause minimal displacement with no damage to the marine ecosystem and that they pose no hazard to people – despite offering the lure of thousands of jobs, and labour and materials supply contracts, and the promise of vigorous “development” of the region. The people, highly literate and well-informed (as this writer found during two visits to the area) were not taken in. By 2007, large numbers of farmers had joined fisherfolk in agitating against the project, a process catalysed by Environment Impact Assessment-related public hearings for Reactors 3 to 6.

The most important factor that explains the recent struggle is without doubt the still-continuing meltdown of three nuclear reactors at Fukushima in Japan, which highlights the unique potential of nuclear power for catastrophic accidents even in a highly advanced industrial economy. Nuclear power generation is the sole mode of energy production with that hazard. Fukushima also highlighted the prevalence of unsafe practices and collusion between reactor operators and nuclear regulators. The recent accident at the Marcoule reprocessing facility in France has further undermined the public's already feeble confidence in the global nuclear industry.

FLAWED RUSSIAN REACTORS

Not least, three other factors have strengthened the opposition in Kudankulam. The first is the shocking disclosure by a Norwegian group, with a history of integrity and informed activism (http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rosatom_report), of a special report presented by nuclear safety experts from Russian state agencies to President Dmitry Medvedev this June on the country's nuclear reactors. This reveals that they are grievously underprepared for both natural and man-made disasters ranging from floods to fires to earthquakes and plain negligence.

The report comes from an amalgam of sources such as the Ministry of Natural Resources, Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Oversight, as well as Rosatom, the nuclear reactor operator. Chief engineer Ole Reistad of the Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology says: “The report reveals deficiencies which have never before been mentioned publicly, nor reported internationally.”

To paraphrase some of its alarming findings, Russian reactors are marked by 31 “serious flaws”. Among the more critical are: absence of regulations for personnel to know how to deal with large-scale natural disasters or other major contingencies; inadequate protective shelters for workers in the event of an accident; lack of records of previous accidents, which would enable learning from past mistakes; and poor attention to electrical and safety-significant systems.

This holds true not just of the RBMK design, which was implicated in the Chernobyl accident, but also of the VVER-type reactors being installed at Kudankulam. The report questions the reactors' ability to remain safe for extended periods if cooling systems fail, with no guarantee that the power backup will be effective. This is the primary difficulty that beset Fukushima Daiichi when the quake and tsunami hit Japan. Also, key equipment involved in the cooling process suffers from metal fatigue and welding flaws – yet another problem ignored at Fukushima. Russian reactors are vulnerable to the kinds of hydrogen explosions that ripped up three reactor buildings at Fukushima.

Most important, the report says that the risk of earthquakes has not been considered as a safety factor in designing Russian reactors. Not all of them have automatic shutdown mechanisms to be activated if an earthquake occurs. Nor are there currently clear guidelines or sufficient infrastructure for spent nuclear fuel management, leading to fears of its leaks during a disaster – as had happened in Japan.

These disclosures, to put it mildly, are damning. Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko has not denied their veracity or accuracy, but merely claimed that more money would fix the flaws. At any rate, the report totally contradicts the official Russian statement, made soon after March 11, that a Fukushima-type meltdown could never happen in Russia. This was supposedly based on a check ordered by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Russian reactors, of which no details have been made public. The global – and the Kudankulam – public has no more reason to trust the Russian government's early statement than to believe the Indian Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) assessment, following a purely internal and collusive recent review, that all of India's nuclear reactors have adequate safety systems to cope with earthquakes and tsunamis as well as human error.

A second reason underlying the public's sharpened opposition is the fact that the first two units of the Kudankulam project have never been put through the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) process, under which a comprehensive EIA report is prepared, made available to the local people in advance, and a public hearing is held, at which those affected can record their opposition. The EIA procedure is far from sound, and has been considerably weakened.

Reactors 1 and 2 did not even have to face such cursory or minimal EIA scrutiny – simply because the EIA procedure only came into being in 1994. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had cleared the reactors in 1989. There is no reason to believe that the approval process considered the intrinsic hazards of nuclear power, radiation releases, or long-term waste storage. NPCIL has not shared reports on site evaluation and selection or safety review with the public.

A third reason is the DAE/NPCIL's doublespeak as regards the reactors' siting. The siting norms stipulate that there be no human habitation within 1.6 km from the plant. The next 5-km radius area must be a “sterilised zone”, where population density is small “so that rehabilitation will be easier”. Finally, in the outlying 16-km radius, “the population should not exceed 10,000”. But it is clearly visible that thousands of people live within the 1.6-km zone, including 2,000-plus in a recently built tsunami rehabilitation colony. Two other large settlements lie within the 5-km zone: Kudankulam (population: 20,000) and Idinthakarai (population: 12,000). The population in the 16-km radius is at least 70,000. Yet, NPCIL says nobody will be displaced.

Add to these the generic safety problems of nuclear power, including harmful radiation exposure at each stage of the “nuclear fuel cycle”, routine emissions and effluents, accidental radioactivity releases, and generation of huge quantities of waste which remains hazardous for thousands of years, which science has found no safe way of storing. And the case for stopping work at Kudankulam becomes compelling.

Jaitapur falls in the same category. The government has postponed the purchase of the French-origin reactors for Jaitapur until they clear post-Fukushima safety tests ( The Hindu, September 20). Logically, all work at the site must be stopped until the certification is obtained and independently reviewed.

Fukushima marks a watershed for the global nuclear industry, which has been on the decline especially in the countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development since even before Chernobyl (1986). Not one new reactor has been ordered in the United States since 1973, and none completed in Western Europe for a quarter-century.

Reactor technology has stagnated and exhausted its potential. Nuclear generation costs are exorbitant in relation to not just fossil fuels but renewable sources such as wind and biomass too. Nuclear power competes poorly with renewables in reducing/averting greenhouse emissions.

Country after country is retrenching its nuclear plans, or opting out altogether – witness Germany, Japan, Italy and Switzerland. Investment banks say nuclear power has no future after Fukushima. Its unpopularity is spreading everywhere.

It would be suicidal for India not to impose a moratorium on new nuclear projects and subject all installations to an independent, thorough and transparent review by a broadly representative body, which includes non-DAE personnel and civil society.

Courtesy: Frontline, Oct 8-21, 2011

02 August 2011

NUCLEAR ISSUES : On slippery ground

The NSG's decision to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies will hurt India.
V.V. KRISHNAN

The nuclear Power reactor fuel reprocessing plant and advanced fuel fabrication facility at Tarapur. What India needs are plants with capacities of several hundred tonnes. 
 

ON June 24, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal arrangement among 46 countries to control trade and transfer of nuclear technologies, announced after its 2011 plenary meeting at Noordwijk, the Netherlands, that the members had “agreed [by consensus] to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies”, something which had eluded the conclave for over seven years.

Significantly, one of these new “objective criteria” for restrictions on transfers of (nuclear material) enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies, which are additional to the controls that already exist in NSG's Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (Articles 6 and 7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev. 9/Part I), requires that the recipient country be party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and should have put in place Comprehensive Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also referred to as “full-scope safeguards”, covering all its nuclear installations. Since India is not an NPT signatory and it does not have full-scope safeguards, this has raised the hackles of the Indian nuclear establishment, the Foreign Office bureaucracy and some Indian commentators. For they see it as a reversal, or a “roll-back”, of the waiver given by the NSG in September 2008 for countries to engage in nuclear commerce with India and as being against the letter and spirit of the India-United States nuclear deal, or the 123 Agreement, concluded on August 3, 2007.

Anil Kakodkar, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and one of the key negotiators of the civil nuclear cooperation agreements, in particular the 123 Agreement, wrote thus after the NSG announced its new guidelines on ENR transfers ( The Hindu, July 3): “It negates the positive and forward-looking orientation with respect to ENR issues that was built into bilateral and multilateral agreements developed as part of international civil nuclear cooperation. The NSG waiver for India now seems to have been circumscribed.... The United States, Russia and France have issued statements reiterating their adherence to understandings with India. One would only hope that this does not amount to doublespeak and the NSG waiver in respect of the NPT condition that was granted to India earlier remains undiluted in respect of ENR transfers as well. The statements of these countries are far from being explicit in this respect.”

What is, however, obvious, which Kakodkar too has noted elsewhere, is that the NSG decision will target India alone as it is the only country among the three non-NPT countries that have been granted a waiver for nuclear commerce with NSG countries.

Unless there were behind-the-scenes understandings that Kakodkar is referring to, what appears in cold print in the form of the Manmohan Singh-George W. Bush Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, is that the bilateral agreements with the U.S., France and Russia and the NSG waiver do not say anything about transfer of ENR technologies, except for the 123 Agreement (Article 5(2)) which provides for the possibility of transfer of such sensitive technologies (including heavy water technology), but only following an amendment to the Agreement.

In fact, one could say that Indian officials have been deluding themselves right from the beginning of the India-U.S. nuclear dialogue that ENR technologies are part of the deal, and this misconception has persisted all along through the NSG waiver and to date. One constantly comes across the phrase “clean NSG waiver”, a phrase invented by Indian commentators and used in all their statements, where what is being meant by “clean” is unclear as the waiver is neither clean nor unconditional.

The July 2005 Joint Statement talks of “full civil nuclear cooperation” without defining what full refers to (Frontline, June 29, 2007). But, as per Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement to Parliament on August 17, 2006, the Indian perception of “full cooperation” meant technologies relating to “ all aspects of the complete nuclear fuel cycle”.

However, the U.S., it must be pointed out, has never given such an interpretation to it. Indeed, both the preamble and the text of the 123 Agreement (Article 2(2d)) refer to only “full civil nuclear energy cooperation covering… aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle” with the word all significantly excluded, which was a clear indication that ENR technologies are unlikely to be part of the deal (emphasis added throughout). And this should have also been clear from the statements made by U.S. officials at various points of time leading up to the agreement, including the provision in the Hyde Act, the specific legislation passed by the U.S. Congress to enable the 123 Agreement with India.

During the November 2, 2005, hearings of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in reply to a question by the Chairman, Richard Lugar, the then Under Secretary of State, Robert Joseph, said: “We do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any state. Therefore, ‘full civil nuclear cooperation' with India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology. We have not determined whether such a prohibition would extend to heavy water production” ( Frontline, August 11, 2006).

Later, at the April 5, 2006, hearings, Condoleezza Rice, the then U.S. Secretary of State, clarified: “Our draft [123] agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation provides that SNTs [Sensitive Nuclear Technologies, which include, besides ENR, heavy water production technology] may not be transferred without an amendment to the agreement, which would be subject to congressional review.... There has been no discussion of possible transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology to India or any Indian request for such technology”.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY

PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN Singh with President Barack Obama in New Delhi on November 8, 2010. The U.S. assured India of its support for India's entry into four multilateral regimes, including the NSG. 
 

Further, Article 103(5) of the Hyde Act of December 2006 stated as a matter of U.S. policy to be pursued: “Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India”. Further, Article 104(d)(4) of the Act restricted the transfer of SNTs only to multilateral facilities participating in IAEA-approved programmes. Recently, in the wake of the wide expression of concern in India, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Centre highlighted some more of such statements made by U.S. officials at various times and pointed out that the U.S. position as regards the ENR issue in the India-U.S. deal has all along been consistent ( The Hindu, July 12).

The part of the NSG waiver (Clause 3a) relevant to the discussion here relates to Articles 4 (a, b and c) of Guidelines (Part I) – requiring “full-scope” safeguards. The waiver states: “… Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in IAEA-safeguarded facilities, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part I, as revised, and provided that transfers of sensitive exports remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Guidelines”. The current revision of guidelines, which seek to restrict ENR transfers to non-NPT countries, has essentially amended Guidelines 6 and 7. But, significantly, the waiver did not say that Guidelines 6 and 7 would not be amended. Nor did it provide for grandfathering the waiver in case of amendments subsequent to September 2008.

However, the waiver does have a provision (Clause 4) for the NSG Chair to consult with India in case of proposed amendments to the guidelines. Since the amendments relating to the transfer of ENR technologies have been under discussion for some time, it is reasonable to presume that India was well aware of these imminent amendments soon after November 2008 itself when the NSG adopted the so-called “clean text” for the proposed amendments that laid down criteria-based approach to limiting ENR transfers. The final revision is essentially the same as the “clean text”, barring minor changes with regard to ENR technology recipients bringing into force Additional Protocol. The amendment now provides for the (weaker) Argentina-Brazil material accounting and control arrangement as well instead of the Additional Protocol.

ENR transfers

The previous NSG guidelines on ENR transfers were simply that “[s]uppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities… (Paragraph 6)” and that neither the enrichment facility nor the technology transferred “will be designed or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium… (Paragraph 7)”. The new Guideline 6 expands on the old one and stipulates that “suppliers should not authorise the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and equipment and technology… if the recipient does not meet, at least, all of the following [six] criteria”, the most significant one among them being “Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] and… full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty”.

Likewise, Guideline 7 builds on the earlier one by adding, “Suppliers should… [a]void as far as possible, the transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology associated with such items; and seek from recipients and appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.”

Discussions at the NSG to restrict transfers of ENR technologies began in 2004 following President George Bush's speech of February 11, 2004, wherein he proposed that NSG members should not transfer ENR equipment and technologies to any state that did not already possess the full-scale capability, technology and functioning plants. Following this, the U.S. made a major diplomatic push to have the NSG revise its guidelines along the lines of Bush's proposal of ban on ENR to those who did not already have them. Considering that the U.S. piloted the move to bring about changes in the conditions for ENR transfers, even before the India-U.S. nuclear dialogue began, it should have been obvious to Indian officials that ENR technologies would not be easy to come by. However, the U.S. failed to obtain support for such a ban at the NSG. Most NSG members preferred a flexible non-proliferation criteria-based approach than an outright ban. The criteria-based approach was first put forward by France and later modified by other members. The French proposal significantly included, among other things, the requirement that the recipient be an NPT signatory with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol in place.

The U.S., however, disagreed on the criteria-based approach with the other members of the NSG and stuck to its line of a ban on those who did not already have them. After months of wrangling between the U.S. and others, the U.S. finally came around in early 2008 to accepting a criteria-based approach. However, the U.S. added a few additional criteria, including the black-box approach, which means that the transfer must take place under conditions that will not enable replication of the technology. This criterion now finds place in the revised guidelines though in a somewhat weaker form because there was severe opposition to the original suggestion, particularly from Canada.

Similarly, there were other dissenters to the other two new criteria proposed by the U.S., particularly the one relating to whether a transfer of ENR technology would trigger other countries in the region to seek ENR capability or might lead to instability in the region. Similarly, there was opposition from the Netherlands and Canada to the criterion initially mooted by France and supported strongly by the U.S. that suppliers should take into account “if the recipient had a credible and coherent rationale for pursuing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities”. It may, however, be pointed out here that if the NSG had agreed to the original U.S. proposal of an outright ban on the have-nots, and without any other condition, the NSG waiver would have, in principle, given India access to ENR technologies.

Finally, in the Consultative Group meeting on November 20, 2008, nearly all the dissenters (which included Canada, the Netherlands, Argentina and Brazil) were brought on board and the NSG was able to come up with a draft, which came to be called the “clean text”. However, even this “clean text” eluded consensus because inclusion of certain “subjective criteria”, including the issue of regional instability, was not acceptable to Turkey. On the other hand, South Africa continued to insist that NPT adherence should be the only criterion for ENR transfers. At the 2010 plenary of the NSG at Christchurch in New Zealand, Turkey came around after modifications to the criteria, but South Africa continued to hold out on the grounds that the criterion of Additional Protocol, being a voluntary arrangement, went beyond the NPT and was not required by the NPT. Though the NSG was close to a consensus since 2008, it could not be secured even at Christchurch.

Given the worrisome developments at the NSG, the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Shivshankar Menon, wrote in February 2009 to the U.S. Under Secretary, William Burns, that the U.S. initiative on an ENR ban at the NSG constituted a “derogation” of the 123 Agreement. According to WikiLeaks ( The Hindu, June 18), Ambassador David Mulford stated in a cable to Washington that Shivshankar Menon's letter made a legal claim that an ENR ban would be inconsistent with Article 5.2 of the 123 Agreement, which provided for the possibility of amendments to the Agreement to permit ENR transfers and that a ban would preclude the possibility of such changes.

Similarly, according to another cable from the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, during the India-U.S. strategic dialogue in November 2009, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao asked the U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control, Ellen Tauscher, that the U.S. position in favour of a global ban on ENR not be seen as a “roll-back” of the NSG decision and that India could not be seen as “half in and half out (of the NSG)”, the latter remark referring to the pending proposal for India's admission to the NSG. While Shivshankar Menon's remark may be valid, but only in a technical sense, Nirupama Rao's remark was clearly off the mark because the NSG waiver did not automatically assure ENR transfers as, to reiterate, the waiver was only with regard to Articles 4 (a, b and c) that relate to full-scope safeguards.

SUBHAV SHUKLA/PTI

SEPTEMBER 6, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee, flanked by National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan (left) and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar, at a press conference in New Delhi when India secured the NSG waiver. 
 

Even as India was lobbying hard with key NSG members after the adoption of the “clean text” and expressing its concerns to U.S. officials that the India-specific waiver of September 2008 must remain unaffected by proposed changes in NSG Guidelines and that India should be eligible for all nuclear transfers including ENR, at L'Aquila, Italy, in 2009, the G-8 declared as part of its statement on non-proliferation that pending consensus at NSG, the G-8 members would all implement the “clean text” nationally in the interim.
This came as a bombshell and as an anticlimax to the ongoing lobbying efforts. This would have given the lie to the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament in 2006 that all technology barriers would now be lifted following the India-U.S. nuclear deal. The government seemed to put on a brave front when Pranab Mukherjee told the Rajya Sabha on July 13, 2009: “We have a clean waiver from the NSG. We have India-specific agreement with the IAEA. We are not concerned with what position G-8 takes.” He probably did not realise that all the potential suppliers of ENR technologies are G-8 members.

Though India was relieved by the eluding consensus at the NSG, it was also getting increasingly concerned by the reaffirmation by the G-8 at Deauville in 2010. The G-8 statement said: “While awaiting the completion of this [NSG] work, we agree to continue to apply on a national basis the set of relevant export control criteria indicated in the declaration adopted at the L'Aquila Summit and re-endorsed at Muskoka in 2010 [to abide by the ‘clean text']”.

Thus, even without the recent consensus at the NSG, the U.S., France and Russia were effectively implementing the revised Guidelines already through national legislation/licence policies since 2009. Besides the fact that it was the U.S. that spearheaded the move at the NSG, it should be remembered that it was France that first proposed a criteria-based approach, which included NPT membership to be the chief criterion. Also, Vladimir Putin passed Resolution No.992 on December 4, 2009, which allowed the export of enrichment plant, reprocessing of irradiated fuel as well as related equipment and technologies only to non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT. The resolution has been subsequently reissued every year.

But Indian officials continue to harbour an illusion that the cooperation agreements with these countries include transfer of ENR technologies. This is apparent from the manner in which they seem to be interpreting the statements made by officials of these countries that the NSG decision does not in any way detract from the NSG waiver given to India and the civil nuclear cooperation agreements with these countries. Consider the U.S. statement made on June 23 on the eve of the imminent NSG announcement. “Nothing,” the statement from the U.S. Department of State said, “about the new ENR transfer restrictions agreed to by the NSG members should be construed as detracting from the unique impact and importance of the U.S.-India agreement or our agreement to full civil nuclear cooperation. Efforts in the NSG to strengthen controls on the transfer of ENR are consistent with long-standing policy that pre-dates the Civil Nuclear Agreement and have been reaffirmed on an annual basis by the G-8 for years. This new guideline reflects a consensus among all NSG members. The NSG's NPT references, including those in ENR guidelines, in no way detract from the exception granted to India by NSG members in 2008 and in no way reflect upon India's non-proliferation record.”

Given that the 123 Agreement had no reference to the U.S. agreeing to transfer ENR technologies, the above is a perfectly self-consistent statement. Consider the statement of Jerome Bonnafont, the French Ambassador to India. His country is, he said, “committed to the full implementation” of the cooperation agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed on September 30, 2008. “France confirms that this NSG decision in no way undermines the parameters of our bilateral cooperation” and these parameters did not specify ENR transfers. “The scope of cooperation is defined and decided by the parties, consistent with their national policies and international obligations, including the NPT, as far as France is concerned,” he added, which statement is a clear indicator of France's decision to adhere to the NSG's decision.
The Russian statement is also similar. “The decision to strengthen ‘sensitive' nuclear export controls… does not affect in any way the September 2008 decision of the group to unfreeze peaceful nuclear cooperation with India.” To construe that these statements, which may well have been orchestrated by the NSG members, imply that India will gaining access to ENR technologies would be a fallacy.

It must, however, be added that all of them are resorting to this hyperbole in their statements without stating, as Kakodkar had noted, explicitly whether they would transfer ENR technologies or not. Given the aggressive posture of Nirupama Rao when she said the Indian nuclear market would be open only to those who do not deny ENR technology to India, this hyperbole is likely to continue.

Indeed, at the press conference addressed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, after the India-U.S. strategic dialogue got under way on July 19, there was a pointed question by a journalist from Indian Express: “Can you, Madam Secretary, today set the record straight on the NSG intentions?... Can you also clarify whether the U.S. will provide ENR technology to India?” To this she gave an evasive reply by just repeating the statement of June 23 by the Department of State.

The above hyperbolic response, and the fact that there has been no clear-cut statement after the recent strategic dialogue with the U.S. delegation headed by Hillary Clinton, is indeed telling. To continue to pin hopes on ENR transfers from overseas after the NSG's new restrictions on them would be a mistake. The Indian power programme does not need enrichment technology as much as it needs large-scale reprocessing technology, which would undoubtedly be needed as nuclear power undergoes rapid expansion through imports. According to the present Chairman of the AEC, India will need to put up eight to ten times the present reprocessing capacity in the coming years to handle the spent fuel from the increasing number of reactors.

Having made the huge mistake of entering into the India-U.S. nuclear deal, it would be prudent now to focus on scaling up indigenous reprocessing capacity as a priority. The new facility opened early this year at Tarapur is also of only 100-tonne capacity. What we need are plants with capacities of several hundred tonnes. Given that the gestation period of these new plants is six to seven years, there is adequate time for expanding the reprocessing capacity. The flip side, of course, is that these new plants will have to be brought under IAEA safeguards.

NSG membership

The other related issue is the NSG membership that India is seeking. The U.S. has put its weight behind this quest as was evident from the Manmohan Singh-Barack Obama joint statement of November 2010, wherein the U.S. assured India of its support for India's entry into four multilateral regimes – namely, the NSG, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Following the recent NSG decision, the NSG is considering a ‘thought paper' on the issue piloted by the U.S.
It is now clear that India, having got a waiver for nuclear commerce with NSG members, does not stand to gain anything more by being an NSG member unless it hopes to gain some foothold and push for amending the NSG amendment on ENR transfers without NPT-related conditions. The Foreign Office and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) would do well to give serious thought to the pros and cons of accepting NSG membership.

-R. Ramachandran
 
Courtesy: Frontline July 30 - Aug 12, 2011



01 July 2011

Nuclear or broke : India's obsession with nuclear power is proving extremely damaging.

India's obsession with nuclear power is proving extremely damaging. It is time to switch to and participate in the renewables revolution. 

ARE Indian diplomats, known for their negotiating skills and sense of timing, losing touch with reality? Going by the proposal Indian negotiators tabled at the just-concluded Bonn intersessional climate talks for including nuclear power as a “green” technology under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it appears that they are either losing touch or are forced to adopt positions that attract disrespect and ridicule.

The CDM, part of the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, allocates carbon credits to technologies and processes (for instance, reafforestation, industrial-gas destruction) that, theoretically, avert/reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. These credits are sold profitably to developed-country governments or corporations, which can use them as a substitute for reducing domestic emissions, as they are obliged to do under the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is the world's sole legally binding agreement. But its early implementation phase, called First Commitment Period, runs out next year. Many developed countries are loath to negotiate a second period. The Protocol is on life support.

Apart from failing to recognise this, India's proposal was singularly ill-timed. It coincided with the still-continuing Fukushima disaster entering its fourth month, a serious worsening of the global nuclear industry's crisis, and a huge shift in public opinion against nuclear power. No wonder the proposal earned India the “Fossil of the Day” award given by the Climate Action Network of non-governmental organisations to governments that make outlandish or anti-green proposals.

The precise magnitude of the health and environmental damage from the radiation release from Fukushima is yet to be estimated. But it is indisputably the global nuclear industry's greatest accident, far greater than Chernobyl. At Chernobyl, only one reactor underwent a core meltdown. At Fukushima, three reactors did, and the spent fuel of a total of four reactors (containing even higher quantities of dangerous radionuclides) was exposed. This was equivalent to an estimated 20 Chernobyl-sized cores. The quantities of iodine-131 and caesium-137, just two dangerous isotopes, released from Fukushima are estimated to be of the same order as those released from Chernobyl. The releases of these and a host of other radionuclides continue uncontrolled.

Experts are still struggling to reconstruct the chain of mishaps beginning March 11. Each new or updated evaluation suggests that the disaster is far, far worse than earlier thought. Data released by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the station operator, show that the fuel rods in the three reactors started to melt down within hours of the earthquake at 2-46 p.m. By 8 p.m, an uncontrolled meltdown had begun at Reactor 1. Fuel slumped to the bottom of the pressure-vessel. By 9 p.m, temperatures had reached 2,800° Celsius, the fuel rods' melting point. The company admits a meltdown also happened at Reactors 2 and 3.

Among the early culprits identified in the scientific analysis were hydrogen explosions of March 12 and 14, which seriously damaged the cores and reactor structures. These are the very events which Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Secretary Srikumar Banerjee and Nuclear Power Corporation Chairman S.K. Jain dismissed as “purely chemical reactions” not signifying a nuclear emergency or even an “event”.

Fukushima has precipitated the closure of as many as 37 of Japan's 54 nuclear reactors, six of them probably for good. Yet more reactors are likely to be shut down for mandatory annual maintenance, and local authorities are unlikely to permit their early restarting. Japan is reviewing its energy policy and will almost certainly phase out nuclear power. Germany, Switzerland and Italy are opting out. Italy's referendum showed that 95 per cent of people opposed atomic power.

Even in France, nuclear power's most ardent advocate, 62 per cent of people recently polled wanted a nuclear phase-out, and 15 per cent immediate decommissioning. France, for all its advocacy, has only one reactor under construction; it is in deep trouble. The near-bankrupt nuclear company Areva's CEO, Anne Lauvergeon (“Atomic Anne”), has just been sacked, not least because of the fiasco involving the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) in Finland and the exorbitant costs and multiple failures of Areva's ventures in Europe, Africa and Japan. With this, says The Economist, “the future of France's nuclear-energy industry just became more uncertain”. Yet, India is planning to instal six EPRs at Jaitapur.

Both the United States and the European Union, which is doing a nine-month review of nuclear reactor safety, including “stress tests”, will probably halt the practice of uprating and extending the lifetimes of reactors. In the U.S., no new reactor has been ordered since 1973. And the European nuclear industry has not yet fully recovered from the Chernobyl shock.

Global financial institutions evaluating Fukushima's impact believe it will lead to the immediate shutdown of old reactors, suspension of new plant approvals, review of reactors in seismically active zones, higher safety and other costs, and re-evaluation of energy policies in all nuclear countries. An HSBC analysis concludes: “Overall, we expect a number of impacts from the public and political backlash against nuclear, which means the focus shifts to renewables.” Standard and Poor's nuclear and clean energy indices are moving divergently. The Swiss investment bank UBS says Fukushima casts doubt on “whether even an advanced economy can master nuclear safety. … We believe the Fukushima accident was the most serious ever for the credibility of nuclear power.”

It will be a miracle if nuclear power survives in the developed world. Before Fukushima, only China and India among developing countries had plans to expand nuclear generation substantially. But China has since imposed a moratorium on further nuclear activity. It has become the world's biggest renewable energy investor. It has 45 gigawatts in wind power, compared with just 10 GW in nuclear. It plans to generate 100 GW in wind and 10 GW in solar-photovoltaics and is already the world leader in solar-thermal.

India alone is playing the boy on the burning deck as far as nuclear power goes. This would carry a fig leaf of credibility if India's nuclear programme were indigenous, big and successful. Alas, it is not. All its reactors are based on imported designs.

Despite annually sinking thousands of crores into the nuclear programme for six decades, India gets only 2.7 per cent of its electricity from nuclear reactors. Its economic, environmental and safety costs are high and rising. The DAE has mismanaged its projects and failed to keep costs under check. Its last 10 reactors were 300 per cent over budget. Its frequent revisions of nuclear generation targets have rendered its energy planning meaningless.

Yet, so insistent is the Manmohan Singh government on forcibly instigating a “nuclear renaissance” that it is ready to violate its own legislation to hand out sweetheart deals to foreign nuclear companies. At stake is the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act, passed last year after a bitter, prolonged debate, during which the government discredited itself by repeatedly trying to doctor the Parliamentary Standing Committee's draft.

The law was originally drafted to meet the nuclear industry's demand that only the operator of nuclear facilities be held liable for accidents. But the government, under public pressure, made suppliers, too, liable in case of faulty equipment or design. It is now trying to bypass the Act in respect of Russian-designed Koodankulam reactors to allow a “cost mark-up” to cover additional insurance costs ( The Hindu, June 9). This despicable violation of the very spirit of the Act shows total disdain for Parliament. It must be strongly opposed.

The government confronts yet another unpleasant moment as it moves heaven and earth to be admitted to four plurilateral export-control regimes, which it long termed “cartels” run by “nuclear Ayatollahs”, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia group. This is happening just when the NSG is moving to ban enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) transfer to countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India claims this breaches the “clean waiver” and “full cooperation” assurances it got in 2008, without ENR exclusion.

Assurances aside, it is totally unrealistic to think ENR can be transferred to any country today, regardless of NPT membership. The U.S. made it clear that it would not sell this to India. India's exertions on this issue, then, are about symbolic recognition as a “responsible” nuclear weapons-state – a contradiction in terms. On nuclear matters, India has always placed an irrational premium on symbols and demanded equal treatment within a regime it long described as “Atomic Apartheid”.

However, a more important, substantial and worthy battle must be fought – working for total global nuclear disarmament. India would gain immensely in global prestige and credibility if it invested in the liability legislation a small fraction of the energies it put into the U.S.-India nuclear deal and in deceiving the public. Equally handsome gains are to be made by participating in and leading the Renewables (Energy) Revolution that is now under way. Both entail abandoning our nuclear obsession.

-PRAFUL BIDWAI