The $14m haze over India’s mega uranium discovery

Despite the major find at Cudappah India’s goal to produce 20,000 MW nuclear power by 2020 remains a distant dream

The announcement of a major discovery of uranium deposits in the Cudappah region of Andhra Pradesh just before the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is important. It is meant to tell the US that India might not budge on the clauses on which the strategic nuclear deal is stuck. 

The timing of the announcement is important because, say sources in the know, it may not be entirely accurate. India is nowhere near its target of producing 20,000 mw of electricity by 2020. And the US has a sense of this. Mining the metal at the Tummalapalli village belt in Cudappah would translate into electricity at a very high price as the quality of the newly-found ore is one of the poorest in the world. It promises a good yield only in terms of quantity. 

AK Rai, Director of the southern region of the Atomic Minerals Division of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was not available for comments despite repeated attempts. 

According to DAE data, the ore extracted from Jaduguda in Jharkhand is of 0.065 grade, while the one discovered at Cudappah is of 0.045 grade. This means an extractor would need to mine 1,000 kg of ore to get 65 gram of usable uranium at Jaduguda, while at Cudappah he would get only 45 gram. 

Sources in DAE said the exploration in Cudappah was put on hold after an initial find close to 17,000 tonne in 1995-1996. It was restarted in 2007 around the time when the negotiations between the US and India were on. This was part of a larger goal to make a strong case for India and show it does not have to wholly depend on the US for its goal of achieving the 2020 target. 

The department has been under tremendous pressure since 2007 to establish uranium ore deposits in India. The success rate has been good since there have been substantial discoveries in Karnataka, Meghalaya and Andhra Pradesh. But the problem is the poor quality, according to sources. Even quantity-wise they cannot help meet the 2020 target.  

In India, an average of 10 tonne of uranium is required to produce one megawatt of electricity, after including the wastage during mining and extraction processes. Going by this assessment, DAE secretary Srikumar Banerjee’s announcement that India’s total estimated reserves stand at 1.75 lakh tonne means that the country is in a situation to produce only 17,500 mw of electricity even if it uses up all of these reserves.  The power produced by using the whole yield from Cudappah after the tardy process of mining would be just 4,900 mw, taking the total production to 9,700 mw over the next ten years, way short of the target. And with the protests against the various nuclear plants in the country heating up, it is not even clear whether India would have enough reactors to consume the uranium extracted from Tummalapalli. For example, the two plants of 700 mw each at Rawatbhata in Rajasthan would only produce 1,400 mw by 2016.  Construction of other plants, meanwhile, is at a nascent stage – some are still in the planning stages.  On top of that, the cost of mining uranium in India is extremely high compared to world standards. According to sources it is difficult to establish an accurate cost as the process is state-controlled. Whereas in western countries it is done by private companies.  The profitable cost standards are between $80 and $130 per pound across the world, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Red Book. Sources say India spends more than $130 per pound to mine uranium, which makes it a loss-making venture for the exchequer.  “For example, just the cost of mining and extraction of uranium from the 49,000 tonne that DAE claims to have discovered will be a minimum of $14.1 million,” a source said.  There is scope for mining 16,000 tonne of comparatively good quality ore in Meghalaya. However, protests against the proposed Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) plants have put that into jeopardy. Protests have also erupted in Gulbarga, Karnataka, where exploration is on.  Arpit Parashar New Delhi Arpit Parashar is a Senior Correspondent with Tehelka.com.  arpit.parashar@tehelka.com

Courtesy: Tehelka, 22 July 2011

P.S.: Uranium mining costs the life of the local people. See the photo...

Accident Sites - radiation, cancer, blindness, tardiness, cover-ups. The lessons from the Kalpakkam nuclear facility

Pride of India Kalpakkam’s indigenous nuclear reactors produce electricity for commercial consumption

In the end, loud voices were all that mattered.

After three months of extended discussions, legislators in the Indian Parliament yelled their assent. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010 was a legislation.

As India charts its journey towards extended nuclear commerce — the legislation allows India to trade with global private firms in nuclear technology — we highlight key coordinates on the Indian nuclear map as we seek to understand how ready we are to embrace nuclear energy.

Last week’s story, Nuclear energy. Ministries warn they are far from ready, 4 September, laid bare the backroom machinations as the government worked to ensure that the Parliament cleared the draft Nuclear Liability legislation. Amidst the loud public din, voices of government officials warning that they were ill-equipped to deal with nuclear accidents were drowned out. When the legislation was finally passed in the Rajya Sabha, Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan, attempting to take dissenters on board, declared, “This is not final... We will take care of every single suggestion. If required, the Bill will be changed for the better.”

This week, TEHELKA travels to Kalpakkam and Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu where two nuclear plants are located.

IN AN inconspicuous corner of the Department of Atomic Energy’s (DAE) website is a large map that could easily belong in a student’s science textbook. On the map that captures atomic energy establishments in India, it isn’t difficult to find Kalpakkam. Located around 70 km from Tamil Nadu’s capital, Chennai, Kalpakkam plays host to seven nuclear organisations — from the Madras Atomic Power Station that generates nuclear energy to the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant that reprocesses spent fuel from the reactors for reuse in other nuclear programmes. But there is yet another reason to accord Kalpakkam a special place on the Indian nuclear map. The two pressurised heavy water reactors installed at Kalpakkam were developed indigenously. Commercial operation at the atomic power plant began way back in 1984 and 1986; and currently the plant produces 440MW of electricity from the two reactors. Plans for an additional 500MW capacity are on the anvil.

PLAYING WITH SAFETY > 1995 Dayanidhi and Khandhasamy record 50 times more than normal gamma radiation levels in Kalpakkam > 26 MARCH 1999 Heavy water leak in the K5 unit of MAPS II. At least seven people received a full radiation dose > 30 MAY 2001 S Sivakumar, a worker, suffers internal contamination after a neoprene glove is punctured > 7 JULY 2002 Selvakumar, a worker, burns his left hand after he picks up a radioactive substance > 19 DECEMBER 2002 Madhusoodanan and Rajan fail to follow safety procedures; suffer internal contamination

Further south, about 700 km from Kalpakkam, is Kudankulam. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited is in the process of constructing two 1,000MW capacity reactors here. Kudankulam reactors, being built with the support of the Russian nuclear vendor company, Atomstroyexport, will be India’s first collaboration with an international player when it begins operations in March 2011. The atomic power plants at Kalpakkam and Kudankulam then present two distinct coordinates within the Indian nuclear energy spectrum — a predominantly indigenous-technology powered Kalpakkam power plant versus a power plant that will bring on board collaboration with a foreign player.

And yet as TEHELKA found when it travelled to both places, the anxieties and the pain in the voices of the people living around these plants did not differ. If at Kalpakkam, whispers of nuclear incidents and accidents at the various nuclear facilities were very audible, at Kudankulam, it was the apprehension of an impending disaster that rang clear.

TEHELKA ACCESSED a confidential letter (BARCFEA/ 03/03/131 dated 24 January 2003) written to the Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the Mumbai-based organisation that oversees operations at the Kalpakkam Fuel Reprocessing Plant. The letter written by the general secretary of the BARC Facilities Employees’ Association recounted in detail a significant nuclear accident that took place on 21 January 2003 at the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant. According to the letter, a scientist, Srinivasa Raju, was asked to collect a sample of an unknown solution from a low-level radioactive waste tank. The tank had not been fitted with a gamma monitor that would raise an alarm in case of high radiation levels. Around 12 pm, Raju carried the sample to an internal laboratory by hand and left it in a tray for testing. The laboratory’s gamma monitor immediately began emitting visual alarms in response to the high-radiation level of the solution. It took the workers two hours to notice the radiation monitors. By the time, the source of the alarm was located, Raju had been working with the solution for nearly an hour. Besides Raju, five others, including a woman, had also been exposed to high levels of radiation. BARC officials acknowledged the event eight months later, and finally on 6 August 2003, B Bhattacharjee, then director of BARC, termed it “the worst accident in India’s nuclear history”.

A sorry sight A cancerous eye will eventually claim the life of three-year-old Abhi, warn medical experts

When we asked about the six people, including Raju, who were exposed to high levels of radiation, there were no easy answers. “One of them died,” said Dr A Vijaya, medical superintendent of the DAE established hospital in Kalpakkam, only to quickly add, “but not due to radiation. The rest are fine.” Deflecting queries about their whereabouts, Dr Vijaya directed us to the fuel reprocessing plant officials. Repeated attempts to contact the reprocessing plant officials proved futile.

Yet another Confidential letter reveals more cases of radiation exposure (see box). In an off-hand dismissal of accident claims by workers at the plant, Dr Vasudev Rao, Director, Chemical Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research in Kalpakkam said the Indian nuclear industry had a zero-tolerance policy towards radiation exposure. “Because of our clean track record, even small instances are blown out of proportion by the media and common people,” said Dr Rao.

Outside the facility too, there are enough voices that speak of radiation effects. Since plant operations began in the early 1980s, incidents of cancer and auto-immune thyroid diseases in the surrounding villages have increased. Five km south of the Kalpakkam nuclear facility, at Sadraskuppam village, we met with Rajesh (name changed), a contract worker at the nuclear facility. Rajesh’s three-year-old daughter, Abhi has been diagnosed with retinoblastoma, or cancer of eyes, and doctors have just confirmed the eventuality of her death.

“I want to donate her organs. But my wife is far too emotional and won’t hear of it,” he says. Rajesh earns 300 daily — a sum that is hardly enough to pay for an operation that could have possibly saved his daughter’s life.

A second-generation plant worker, Rajesh tells us emphatically that doctors treating his daughter at the Aarvind Eye Hospital in Madurai unequivocally confirm that radiation from the nuclear plant is responsible for her condition. Their advice is clear — move out of the area. Something that Rajesh cannot afford to do. “I have four young children who depend on me. How will I feed them if I don’t work here?” asks Rajesh. Point out the obvious irony and Rajesh turns away.

For the nation Kudankulam will have four more 1,000 MW capacity nuclear reactors, bringing the total number to six

Rajesh’s story is by no means an isolated one. An estimated 30,000 workers live in the five villages that fall within the 5 km radius from the plant, besides a DAE township that accommodates permanent plant workers. Ask for statistics on cancer-related deaths among workers and the local public health centre refuses our requests on grounds classifying the information as sensitive. The DAE medical officer, Dr Vijaya, claims that the number of cancer cases in the township is an insignificant 244 over a 10-year period. Local activists contest the figure and say that the official list excludes many deaths. The cause of death is often changed to keep numbers down. Activists and DAE officials also do not see eye-to-eye on the causes of diseases that are prevalent here. Despite studies by internationally recognised professionals, DAE officials maintain that the radiation levels emitted are too low to cause problems.

Though it hasn’t been officially announced, 30,000 villagers have been asked to leave once the Kudankulam plant gets ready

NONE OF these debates were taken on board by the parliamentary committee that visited the facility on 7 July this year while the nuclear liability legislation was under consideration. Over a few hours, committee members led by T Subbarami Reddy met officials from different facilities and local politicians and concluded that the facility was equipped to handle accidents and that people faced no problems in the area. “We are shocked. They didn’t even enter the villages. They accepted the version of the DAE officials and the politicians,” says Dr V Pugazhenthi, a physician who has been practising in the area for the past 20 years. Understandably, the doctor is a strong critic of the plant’s unsafe practices.

In Kudankulam, months away from the start of the operations, there is no sign of debate. Villagers allege that the mandated public hearings, one possible space for debate, were held 87 km from the plant site. Says AS Ravi, a local leader, “We went in huge numbers despite the obvious problem of distance. Nothing mattered though. In the end, our villages didn’t even figure on their map.” Adds Dr SP Udayakumar, another activist, “People here are bracing for the radiation effects once the plant operations begin in March 2011. Though officially, there has been no intimation, 30,000 villagers have been asked to leave once the plant is functional.”

In the end, for the villagers of Kudankulam, there is only one relevant question left to ask. In broken Hindi, an old banana vendor yells, “If Manmohan Singh thinks nuclear energy is good, why doesn’t he build a plant at 10 Janpath?” One suggestion that Prithviraj Chavan is not going to take on board.

- KUNAL MAJUMDER

Courtesy: Tehelka September 11, 2010 

There’s nuclear gold in this sand. And it’s being sent out with impunity

Eroded lives Beach sand mining has brought dwellings perilously close to the sea PHOTOS: KILDOS

VV MINERAL, a two-decade-old company, has been mining beach sand that includes radioactive minerals on the Kanyakumari coast. The company says it doesn’t have the technology to separate thorium from monazite, a rare earth ore found in the area — a claim verified by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). It admits it extracts and exports garnet and ilmenite to 20 countries, including Australia and the US. The question is: what happens to the four percent monazite known to be present in the sand? Since uranium is scarce in India, nuclear scientists have been working on an indigenous technology to utilise thorium, widely available on the southern sea coast, in nuclear power plants.

Though VV Mineral claims it doesn’t process monazite, it would be automatically generated during the mineral separation process in the form of tailings. AERB recommends that when the quantity of tailings generated is large and the monazite content in the tailings is relatively low (less than 5 percent), the tailings have to be disposed of by mixing with silicarich sand and backfilled at the mined out site. If the monazite content in the tailings is high (more than 5 percent) and the quantity of tailings generated is comparatively less, then it has to be stored in trenches and topped with silica-rich sand to bring it to the background level.

It is precisely this that worries Dr RS Lal Mohan, former principal scientist at Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Kochi. “Indian Rare Earth Ltd (IREL), Manavalakurichi, uses the sand from the same area and produces thorium, so what happens to the monazite in the VV mines? Does the company follow the procedure recommended by the AERB?” he asks.

The incidence of cancer has gone up since illegal sand mining started, says a priest

A REPORT by a committee of top district officials constituted by the District Collector of Kanyakumari, Rajendra Ratnoo, has in fact concluded that VV Mineral has been mining without proper regulatory clearance and has been involved in mineral separation, a process that emits high radiation, without fulfilling AERB norms. “Based on the report, we stopped issuing permits to the company. However, they have challenged the matter in the High Court,” says Ratnoo. The committee, which included the assistant director of mines, tehsildars of Vilavancode and Kalkulam and Revenue Division Officer (RDO) Padmanabhapuram, found out that the company has no plan for the safe and scientific disposal of waste from the mineral separation facilities.

VV Mineral, however, rubbished all these grouses as a ‘set-up’ by officials of IREL’s local unit in connivance with the district collector. “We have established a mineral separation plant and approached the AERB for a licence, which is awaited,” says S Vaikundarajan, Chairman and Managing Director of VV Mineral. He even claims that IREL has illegally mined in VV Mineral’s land and has indulged in other questionable practices. “No authority is ready to take action based on our complaint. Hence we approached the High Court,” he adds. In an email to TEHELKA, the regulatory body gave a clean chit to the company in this respect.

The effect of sand mining on the environment and people has been a major issue along the coastline of southern Tamil Nadu and Kerala for the past few decades. VV Mineral has been active in five seaside villages — Kurumpanai, Keezhmidalam, Midalam, Melmidalam and Helen Nagar — in the Vilavancode taluk of the Kanyakumari district.

“From 2004, it started buying and leasing hundreds of acres in these areas. The villagers initially had no clue that their seashore land was productive. Much later, they realised their land was worth crores,” says a church official.

Hazards galore IREL also produces thorium from the sand mined in Kanyakumari district

The company is storing sand mined from the shores of Keezhmidalam in its separation facility in Midalam. “We do get jobs due to mining,” concedes Thankappan, former president of the panchayat, “but there are health issues involving radiation from the minerals.” Church records show an average of 10-15 cases of cancer in every village. “It’s absolutely not true that this area already had high levels of cancer. It has increased in the past few years since the increase in illegal sand mining,” says a church official. Cases of Down’s Syndrome and impotence have also been reported.

But money power is making a dent on the villagers’ ability to put up a united fight. Some of them told TEHELKA that mining companies have divided the villagers by hiring the powerful elite of the villages as sub-contractors. “We never had cases of violence before,” says Subha (name changed), “But nowadays, whoever disagrees with the company faces violent attacks.”

The traditional livelihood of the sea coast has also been hit. “There is no place for spreading our fishing nets or equipment. We can’t even dry our fish. The sea has eroded our village as sand is being removed from the shore,” says Meiyance (name changed).

Meanwhile, VV Mineral has filed two writ petitions on the matter, which are pending in the Madras High Court. Locals fear this could become another ‘green case’ caught in a vicious cycle of allegation and counter-allegation.

- KUNAL MAJUMDER

Courtesy: Tehelka October 16, 2010 

Universities haven’t learnt the N-lesson. Safety is just theory

Fearful fallout An expert checks radiation levels in a Delhi scrapyard that had been decontaminated in May PHOTO: AP

DEEPAK JAIN, a Delhi scrap dealer, suffered multiple burns and suppressed bone marrow disease after touching what looked like just another piece of metal in April this year. He recovered after two months, but Rajendra Prasad, who worked in close vicinity to Deepak’s shop, died of pneumonia while exhibiting signs of kidney and liver dysfunction. They had been exposed to Cobalt-60, a deadly radioactive isotope that found its way into Mayapuri from the labs of Delhi University (DU). This incident, that left 10 more scrap workers seriously ill, was quoted by Didier Louvat of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the most serious global instance of radiation exposure since 2006. Six months on, TEHELKA finds out if the lessons have been learnt.

After the Mayapuri incident, DU’s licence to handle radioactive substance was revoked by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) on 15 September. The University Grants Commission (UGC) set up an expert committee in May as per the order of Human Resource Development ministry. The committee came up with an interim report, damning excerpts of which were quoted in a section of the media on 28 September. One of the several findings is that three universities out of 210 using radiation sources — University of Hyderabad, Osmania University and Pune University — have sidestepped safety procedures. When TEHELKA spoke to committee head Dr GK Rath, Department of Radiation Oncology, AIIMS, he refused to divulge any details.

The report’s highlights include formation of a University Safety Committee (USC), an apex body appointed by the Academic Council to oversee safety in handling of radioactive substances. There are clear guidelines on how liquid soluble waste and solid waste can be disposed of by qualified personnel in the sanitary sewage system and in burial pits located inside varsities respectively.

Key lab-related rules are laid down too which say, “All labs should prominently display the standard operating procedures”, while Radiation Safety Officers (RSO) — a faculty trained to handle radioactive substances and approved by the AERB — should supervise radiation-related research.

THE COMMITTEE is also said to have raised concerns about the existing shortcomings across research facilities. In fact, Delhi University Vice-Chancellor Deepak Pental accepts that in comparison to international facilities, Indian safety standards are below par. “Funding for international facilities is blocked in case of dereliction in following standard operating procedures,” he says.

To decode the process, TEHELKA spoke to professors who deal with radioactive substance in various universities. In terms of procuring radioactive substance, universities buy material from BARC or import it if it is unavailable in India. There are very strict regulations in place for transport of radioactive substances. They are brought in sealed lead containers with clear indicators of radioactive content.

Poor marks Osmania University is one of the three varsities that were found to have sidestepped safety norms PHOTO: CREATIVE COMMON LICENCE/JULIAN JOSEPH

According to Sandhya S Vishweshwaraiah, a professor in the Department of Molecular Reproduction and Developing Genetics, Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, the nature of the compound and its usage defines the method of disposal. For instance, letting the radioactivity of a compound decay in a sealed container post its half life (the period after which the radiation levels start decreasing) is one method. If the compound is inside a living organism, incineration is used, followed by disposal as per normal procedures. IISc has a radioactive disposal unit that ensures complete safety in terms of disposal.

“A great degree of caution must be exercised in procuring elements. Larger the scale of usage, higher should be the degree of caution,” Sandhya says. She adds that most universities in India, including IISc, use substances with negligible amount of radioactivity of 1 or 2 curie (a unit for measuring radioactivity).

Prathamesh (name changed), a student of IISc, opines that there should be separate labs to work on radioactive substances instead of having sub-sections in a common lab. “Chance of something happening is always an apprehension,” he adds. Echoing this point is a professor of a well-known university who says, “It is in our work culture to take shortcuts, cut corners, to be negligent and lackadaisical. If at all the regulatory bodies were strict in terms of regular inspection and stronger punishment for defaulters, the Mayapuri incident would have never happened.”

Given the apprehensions that exist even within the academic community, the remedies — albeit mountainous — could begin at the level of communication. A clear-cut understanding at all levels about changes in the ground realities thus becomes an imperative. However, the communication gap is alarming. Take, for instance, the reality that only 21 out of 500 institutions replied to a questionnaire sent by UGC’s expert committee seeking answers on storage and handling of radioactive substance. Mumbaibased AERB, which issues licences for using radioactive substances, is oblivious to the situation. However, in an email response to TEHELKA, AERB Secretary R Bhattacharya expressed concern that such a thing is happening.

AERB knows little about how radioactive substances are being handled on campuses

In its effort to avoid Mayapuri-like incidents, the AERB has undertaken several measures. “Bringing unattended radiation sources in the contaminated zone to light is a major challenge,” says Bhattacharya. As far as the standards go, “pertaining to obligations to the international community, the AERB follows standards set by the IAEA on issues of safety, training and security”. The regulatory body has also acknowledged the need for the syllabus to include training in medical management during radiation emergencies.

At the present juncture, the onus is on HRD ministry to bring these issues to the table while it reviews the interim report. The co-ordination between the supplier, the regulatory board and the institutions needs amplification to an extent that translates into transparency.

“Most projects and labs which handle radioactive elements are heavily guarded by layers of secrecy,” says a professor at IIT Powai on conditions of anonymity. “There is opacity in scientific community practices that makes asking questions difficult. Even if that science risks the lives of many others…”

Nikhil Ghanekhar & G. Vishnu

Courtesy: Tehelka October 9, 2010

The rules are in place. But they are broken all the time

Global technology The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre at Trombay

EVEN AS ramifications of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 were being debated at the national level, TEHELKA’s reporters fanned out to Kalpakkam, Kudankulam, Jaduguda and Tarapur (issues dated 11, 18 and 25 September) in a unique initiative to study the ground realities of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and uranium mines in India. What emerged, unfortunately, was a picture of callous disregard for human safety and, in the case of the proposed site at Jaitapur, of lack of concern for traditional livelihoods — all in the name of national interest. The string of lapses and a lackadaisical approach towards safety augurs ill for the seven plants that will become operational over the next six years.

After the legwork, it’s time to fix accountability.

What exactly are India’s existing safety guidelines relating to functioning of nuclear power plants and mining of radioactive material? If rules have been breached in the past, what hope is there that any regulations will be followed in the future? Especially as a number of plants will rapidly come up in the next decade.

The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is the apex body to which the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and research centres like Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Environment Survey Laboratory (ESL) and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) report. All these bodies are not independent of each other. Hence, if one is at fault, the reviewing body could turn a blind eye since both belong to the same brotherhood. There is no independent reviewing body that can question their functioning. This co-dependency of existing organisations leads to a conflict of interest. With chilling results, such as:

RULE IGCAR is responsible for developing fast breeder reactor technology. On the ‘Health and Safety’ page of its website, it instructs that occupational radiation exposure limits has to be at an average of 20 mSv (millisievert is the unit of radiation absorbed by the human body) per year, averaged over a period of five years, but not more than 50 mSv in a single year to the whole body. This, IGCAR says, is the permissible limit.

REALITY TEHELKA found out the following five cases where scientists and workers were exposed to high- level radiation at the Kalpakkam plant situated on the Coromandel Coast 80 km south of Chennai, Tamil Nadu.

1995: Dayanidhi and Khandhasamy, workers at the plant, were tested for gamma radiation levels (that causes organ failure and cancer) in the medical centre inside the plant. It was found to be 50 times more than normal in the Kalpakkam plant.

26 MARCH 1999: There was a heavy water leak (heavy water is used as a coolant in NPPs and contains tritium, a radioactive substance) in the K5 unit of the Madras Atomic Power Station II. At least seven people were exposed to a radiation dose well above the permissible limit.

30 MAY 2001: S Sivakumar, a worker, suffered internal contamination after his neoprene glove (waterproof gloves that can have layers of insulated material) got punctured. His body absorbed plutonium which emits alpha rays that get deposited in his bones and teeth. These rays cause bone cancer.

7 JULY 2002: Selvakumar, a worker, burned his left hand after he picked up a radioactive substance, copresspring.

21 JANUARY 2003: TEHELKA accessed a confidential letter (BARCFEA/ 03/03/131 dated 24 January 2003) written to the Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The letter written by the general secretary of the BARC Facilities Employees’ Association recounted in detail a significant nuclear accident that took place on 21 January 2003 at the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant. According to the letter, a scientist, Srinivasa Raju, was exposed to high-level gamma radiation while working on an unknown solution, which he collected from a low-level radioactive waste tank.

RULE According to AERB regulations, the mill waste after solid-liquid separation is sent to a tailings pond (dumping ground for waste in the liquid form from the mine) where the solid part containing radium settles down. Due care should be taken for the retention of radioactivity within the pond by providing impermeable lining over it.

REALITY TEHELKA found the local community living near the tailings pond in Jaduguda most susceptible to illnesses arising from exposure to radioactive and other toxic substances. In the past four years, there have been as many reported incidents of tailings pipes carrying the waste bursting, sending the toxic wastes into villages — on 10 April 2007, 16 August 2008 and 21 February 2008. As several organisations have reiterated often, the water from these tailings, leaking steadily into streams, joins Subarnrekha River, leaving a trail of toxicity. On 25 December 2006, the tailing dam itself broke, a nightmarish situation for villages in the path of the toxic flood.

RULE AERB standards say a Nuclear Power Plant should be sited in a relatively lowpopulation zone with the area around the plant divided in three zones (Exclusion Zone, Sterilised Zone and Emergency Planning Zone). An exclusion zone of 1.5 km radius is established around the plant and no public habitation is permitted in the area. The sterilised zone, on the other hand, covers the exclusion zone in a 5-km radius since this area has the potential for extensive contamination in case of a severe accident.

REALITY TEHELKA found about 30,000 people living in five villages in the so-called sterilised zone in Kalpakkam. There is also a DAE township that houses permanent staff of the plant. This populace also includes migrant workers and locals.

DAE medical officer Dr Vijaya said that the number of cancer cases in the township is around 244 over a 10-year period. Local activists contest the figure and say that the official list excludes many deaths. Despite studies by internationally recognised professionals, DAE officials maintain that the radiation levels emitted are too low to cause problems.

RULE AERB lays down very strict guidelines on management of waste water from uranium mines. It emphasises that there should be sumps (basins) sufficient to store mine water without any overflow.

REALITY In the Banduhurang opencast mine in Jaduguda (the only region in India with productive uranium mines), TEHELKA found that the water from the mine is allowed to flow beyond the sump to marshes. This was despite the fact that these marshes also connected to streams used by villagers for bathing and washing purposes.

RULE Open-cast mines should be fenced and guarded by CISF personnel round the clock, according to Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL) guidelines. They should be well-engineered and designed taking all possible measures to save the public from any radiation exposure.

REALITY TEHELKA found no fencing around the UCIL open-cast mine nor any CISF personnel guarding it. Women and children were seen collecting firewood dangerously close to these ponds.

RULE AERB rules says control measures should be taken to reduce the spread of radioactivity through air, water and by contamination from waste rock piles, ore stock points, crushers, ore transport surface, tailings dams and discharge points for final effluents.

REALITY At several places in Jaduguda, the trucks carrying uranium ore left a trail of toxic dust which could be seen settling in small heaps on the road. At Banduhurang, debris from the mine was dumped on the outskirts of villages bordering the mine.

-Tehelka Bureau

PHOTO: AP

Courtesy: Tehelka,  October 2, 2010

HIGH-GRADE ENERGY, LOW-GRADE SAFETY

Uranium mines in Jharkhand are being run in total disregard of the health of workers and local communities, reports G VISHNU

Hazardous job A labourer without protective clothing climbs a truck laden with uranium ore in Jaduguda

DYAN LOHAR was born in Jaduguda, Jharkhand, with one eye, no nose and a mouth too small for his own fingers. He has nine fingers and seven toes. Now 15, he lies on a cot as his mother feeds him rice porridge in small scoops. The past 15 years of 43-year-old Kunti’s life have been devoted to a son whose worldview is expressed only by grunts and foot taps. She is angry, bitter and suffers from depression. “There are so many kids like Dyan in the nearby villages. Go disturb them,” she grumbles. We did, and found 18-year-old Mithun Patrao, who fares slightly better than Dyan — he can utter six words.

It was in 1967 that Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL), a public-sector undertaking, opened its first mine in Jaduguda. This region in East Singhbhum district has rich deposits of copper, uranium and iron ore. For the past 20 years, activist group Jharkhand Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR) has been at the forefront of the struggle against the “radiation emitted from the uranium mining and the doom it has unleashed” in the region. “The British mined copper in this region, first disturbing the radiation-emitting minerals. UCIL just continued the legacy in a much more devastating manner,” says 47-year-old Ghanshyam Biruli, secretary, JOAR.

Uranium from the mines at Jaduguda and Bhatin (set up in 1985), is used for electricity generation and “other strategic purposes”. The ore is compacted into yellowcake, which is transported in sealed containers to Hyderabad for further processing. In the past 15 years, UCIL has opened five new uranium mines and two processing mills in the villages of Narwapahar, Bagjata, Banduhurang, Turamdih and Mohuldih, taking the total number of mines to seven.

AT BANDUHURANG, there are no prohibitory signs, no warnings about radiation, no barbed wire and no demarcation of territory. At mid-day, a time when blasts are carried out, several workers could be spotted in casual clothing, with no helmets, not even a breathing mask. This includes the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel who were guarding the site. CISF’S GB Rao, who apprehended the TEHELKA team for entering the “prohibited area”, had hardly any clue about the safety measures that he was supposed to take, even for his own good. Contrary to UCIL claims, the open-cast mine is not being managed any better than an illegal coal mine in private hands. The waste lies scattered in mounds of radioactive rocks and dust, sometimes inside the villages surrounding the mine.

The radioactive waste water released from the mines simply joins a stream flowing through the villages where children were found bathing and women washing clothes. One can see trucks carrying uranium ore loosely covered with plastic sheets, radioactive dust flying in the wind.

Moreover, it is easy for the public to access a ‘tailing pond’ (dumping ground for liquid radioactive waste) of a major mine. These wastes emit radon, a gas that contains alpha particles. If inhaled, these particles radiate inside our bodies, especially lungs, invading the cells and causing cancer. Though radon has a radioactive lifecycle of just three days, the slurry flow into the pond is constant, making it a perpetual health hazard. The local community goes about its daily routine alarmingly close by — women can be seen collecting firewood from the vicinity and children play hide-and-seek and football.

A health survey found that 9.5 percent of newborns die each year due to extreme physical deformities. Primary sterility is alarmingly common

If this is how the public sector organises itself, there is much trouble ahead. In the past three years, UCIL has been eyeing uranium deposits in Nalgonda, Lambapur and Tummalapalle in Andhra Pradesh, Gogi in northern Karnataka, Kyelleng-Pyndengsohiong, and Mawthabah in Meghalaya. Almost all these projects are lined up for clearance within a year. Except for Meghalaya, where several local groups, including politicians, have resisted opening up of the mines in the west Khasi hills, protests by locals in other places have been dimmer.

UCIL officials are dismissive about the allegations of health hazards due to radiation. In the words of UCIL chairman Ramendra Gupta, “The uranium we produce is of low grade and our mines have a density of only about 0.4 percent of uranium for all the drilling we do.”

When the productivity is so incredibly low, the cost-benefit ratio so drastically skewed, why mine at all, one might ask. “What is the alternative?” retorts Gupta. “How are you going to tackle India’s growing needs for electricity? For all those who scream foul on environmental sustainability of other forms of power generation like thermal or hydel projects, nuclear energy should have been the obvious choice. But the media, to a great extent, has ignored these questions while bashing UCIL incessantly — without any basis — by using the same pictures of deformed children that were taken 20 years ago.”

It would be cruel to repeat these casual arguments in the villages. Particularly in the home of Macho Kui, who died 15 days prior to TEHELKA’s visit to her village. She succumbed, supposedly to tuberculosis (TB), after suffering for four years. The same disease has affected Somra Maji of Chatijkocha village, weakened beyond identification from a picture taken six years back, lying on a cot outside his hut. Macho and Somra’s houses lie in dangerous proximity to a tailing pond.

Sukramani Maji (name changed), 38, has been down with TB for the past three years — two men in her house work in the UCIL mines. “We have seen too many deaths due to cancer and tuberculosis, too many deformed children, too many miscarriages among women. Too much sorrow. Our lives are governed by radiation. There is no escape from it,” says Ghanshyam Biruli, with the paleness of someone who has been repeating the same lines for a lifetime

Cesspool Waste from the UCIL mines flow into a pond that lies dangerously close to the villages in the region

Over the past decade, nuclear physicist MV Ramana of Princeton University, Professor Hiraoki Koide of Kyoto University and Dr Sanghamitra Gadekar of the anti-nuclear journal, Anumukti — who have studied the health conditions of locals in Jaduguda — have all voiced grave concerns about radiation-related hazards on several platforms.

Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD), an affiliate of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize recipient International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, conducted a health survey in 2007 that looked at 2,118 families within 2.5 km of the mines. It found that 9.5 percent of newborns die each year due to extreme physical deformities. Primary sterility is alarmingly common, with 9.6 percent of women not able to conceive even after three years of marriage.

For all the assertions of JOAR and others on the evils of radiation, UCIL officials have been doggedly denying that there is radiation-related disease in the area. Gupta claims, “Cancer in this region is not beyond the national average. Illnesses are largely due to malnutrition and an unhealthy lifestyle.”

The director of UCIL’s technical department Diwakar Acharya offers a similar defence. “They are all retired employees. Mining methods have changed a lot in the past two decades. Earlier, the workers’ health was in grave danger due to the lack of protective clothing and modern machinery. The technology we have today keeps them, as well as the local population, completely out of harm’s way,” he says.

It is perplexing to see one of the largest public corporations in India in such a state of psychological denial. “If you are a public corporation you simply cannot accept the responsibility,” explains Dr Shakeel Rehman of IDPD. “There is a rationale in their dismissal of all the independent reports that expose their deeds. However, if they had such confidence in their stance about no radiation-related hazards, then why have they not called for an independent inquiry? People do not suffer from TB for four-five years — it can be cured within months. If they are a responsible corporation, they ought to take more burdens and call for an independent epidemiological study on the health of the local population,” he says.

UCIL seems to believe that national interest overrides the baggage of liabilities the pursuit of nuclear ambitions carries. Is it in our national interest to stand by silently as this scenario plays out in other uranium mines in the next year?

---

OVERZEALOUS STATE CLAMPED DOWN ON US

BEFORE LEAVING Delhi, my appointment had been fixed for 4 September with Ramendra Gupta, chairman of Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (UCIL), at the corporate office in Jaduguda. A day before, en route, 30 km from Jamshedpur, we were surveying the mines from a vantage point when CISF personnel told me, the freelance photographer and our local guide that we were trespassing on UCIL territory. They took us in their jeep to their campus.

We were detained for hours, waiting for a ‘routine identification procedure’ by UCIL officials, who never turned up. Four hours later, we were handed over to the police. My press card did not satisfy them. Charges of trespassing, photography and ‘disobedience to a public servant’ were slapped on us. Our equipment was seized. The Sundernagar Police Station in-charge persistently asked us if we were American agents. He wanted to see our cell phones so that he could verify whether we had received calls from the US.

Meanwhile, my editors had appealed to all the relevant authorities, including the Jharkhand DIG, Jamshedpur SP and the CISF DIG. They contacted several ministers, including officials in the home ministry.

Thanks to these interventions, we were bailed out after nearly 12 hours. In this period, we were only given biscuits by the CISF men, who joked that they were being kind for the sake of upholding “human rights”.

As we shuttled between the police station and the district court in Jamshedpur for a week to get our equipment back, we got a glimpse into the kind of helplessness local villagers experience throughout their lives. If a journalist working for a national newsmagazine could be arrested and booked for visiting villages that have an overview of the mine, who would listen to the villagers?

Later, when I interviewed the UCIL officials, one of them asked, “Why couldn’t you just ask us to show you around? Why were you so curious?”

So, what should have we done? Behave like an embedded journalist in Iraq?

-G. Vishnu

PHOTOS: VINAY UPADHYAY

Courtesy: Tehelka, September 25 2010

Nuclear energy. Ministries warn they are far from ready

WHEN CONGRESS president Sonia Gandhi, in her recent address to the Congress Parliamentary Party, acknowledged “inadequacies” in dealing with the Bhopal gas tragedy, it made headlines. The collective gasp as the country heard her proclaim — “We cannot remain prisoners of the past. We must look ahead and answer the question - what can we do now, rather than, what could we have done in the past,” — was a very audible one. Twenty-six years after the world’s worst industrial disaster, could her words mean that hope was round the corner for the Bhopalis? Would it mean that as a country we would work to ensure we have no more Bhopals?

But, a day after her statement, Gandhi and her legislators were back at work — attempting to get the nuclear liability draft legislation passed in Parliament. If government officials and activists are to be believed, the legislation could potentially protect the Warren Andersons and Dow Chemicals of the nuclear industry. As this story goes to press, negotiations between political parties were still underway with likely indications that the draft legislation would pass through the Parliament.

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill (2010) or the Nuclear Liability Bill as it is frequently referred to, is a complex piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Lok Sabha on 7 May 2010. It seeks to define nuclear damage, nuclear installations and its operators. Also significantly, the bill seeks to define who will be liable for nuclear damage and the financial limits to the liability besides creating struc-tures for assessments of claims since its principal intent is to “provide prompt compensation to the victims of a nuclear incident or accident”. As TEHELKA found out, a closer look shows there is enough to doubt this stated intention.

Following vociferous objections by the opposition, the legislation was referred to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests. It was the government’s effort at achieving consensus — an effort that is however mired in controversy. The draft as well as the working of the Standing Committee has been criticised for compromising the interests of the people in favour of the nuclear industry.

The Health Ministry told a parliamentary committee they were nowhere ready to deal with a nuclear emergency

Why is the legislation important? At a time when India is looking to rapidly ramp up its nuclear energy production from the current estimated 4,560 MW to a massive 63,000 MW by 2032, enacting the legislation is seen as the first step towards achieving this target. India has 19 reactors operational and plans to build another 25-30 reactors.

BESIDES INCREASED production, the legislation also signals a massive direction change in India’s nuclear energy programme. Traditionally, India’s nuclear energy programme has been entirely in the public sector. Various government corporations such as the Uranium Corporation of India Limited, Indian Rare Earths Limited (agencies responsible for mining radioactive materials to feed the nuclear reactors) to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (responsible for nuclear plant operations) drive the implementation end. The technology required to build reactors has, for the most part, been developed in public sector research organisations such as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) — a ministry under the direct charge of the Prime Minister — oversees the functioning of these public sector corporations.

Nuke reactor This is the Kalpakkam reactor, which is slated to begin commercial production of N-power in 2011

All this is however set to change rapidly. The Indo-US agreement signed in July 2005 as well as the India-specific waiver that was granted by the influential Nuclear Suppliers Group in July 2006 paved the way for the opening up of the sector to private players. India already has negotiated agreements with the governments of Russia and France, allowing for Russian and French companies to participate in India’s nuclear energy programme. Significantly, India’s agreement with France in February 2009 allowed India to reprocess nuclear waste generated through the energy production programme and use it for its nuclear weapons programme.

But for India to allow private players like USbased Westinghouse, General Electric and a host of others to supply nuclear fuel and equipment, the nuclear liability legislation becomes absolutely crucial since it will specify whether these players can be held responsible for damages in case of nuclear accidents. Additionally, in September 2008, India gave a formal assurance to the US government that it would sign the Convention for Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for Nuclear Damage that is promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency — the international organisation that promotes and regulates nuclear programmes of different countries.

But a close reading of the CSC reveals the extensive protection it accords to nuclear suppliers, indemnifying them completely in case of nuclear accidents. A top-ranking DAE official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told TEHELKA the liability bill was “necessary” if India was to sign the CSC. Citing Article 3.3 of the CSC, which says “the liability of the operator for nuclear damage shall be absolute...”, the official talked of how the Indian Atomic Energy Act 1962 stipulated that the operators of nuclear plants should be government owned or controlled entities. Since amendments to the Act were not on the anvil, signing the CSC convention would then ensure that the liability charge in case of nuclear accidents would shift back to the government — instead of the private suppliers. “Having committed to joining the CSC in September 2008, this government is under significant pressure to ensure that the legislation is passed. This is the pressure of the nuclear industry that wants a slice of India’s multi-billion dollar nuclear energy business. By succumbing to that pressure, we are making many more Bhopals possible,” he said.

There is further evidence to suggest industry collusion and pressure. Activists from Greenpeace, Toxics Watch and senior commentators writing on the subject told TEHELKA that the DAE drafted the nuclear liability bill based on a 57-page Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) report. The 25-member FICCI group that drafted the report was led by SK Jain, chairman and managing director of NPCIL, the government undertaking in charge of operations at all 19 nuclear plants in India. Jain refused several attempts at clarification by TEHELKA. But the pressure from the industry didn’t end there.

For the PM Subbarami Reddy (left) heads an important parliamentary committee on science, where nuclear issues go to

In a letter dated 13 July 2010, a copy of which is with TEHELKA, Rajesh Menon, senior director of the CII, wrote to T Subbarami Reddy, the chairman of the Standing Committee, asking for specific changes in the legislation. It was a forceful submission — “In order that the Indian industry can even participate in the nuclear industry and trade calls for the following changes in the draft nuclear legislation, in entirety...”. The CII wanted a modification of Article 46 “to channel all liability to the operator of a nuclear power plant”. Further, they asked for an inclusion to read: “This law shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for all nuclear damage claims.” And significantly, deletion of clause 17 (b).

About a month before the CII letter to the Standing Committee chairman, the Committee had called for a meeting to hear the representatives of FICCI, CII and ASSOCHAM. The meeting records accessed by TEHELKA show the Committee met with industry representatives on 15 May in the second sitting of the Committee, the first one was with the DAE secretary. Also, the meeting with the industry representatives took place before a crucial 5 August round with stakeholder ministries such as the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and the Ministry of Environment and Forests — the ministries that would need to act in case of a nuclear accident. In what must be acknowledged as a credit to the Standing Committee, only one of the CII’s suggestions were taken on board — the contentious clause 17 (b), which provides recourse to suppliers. On 25 August, the Lok Sabha passed the Nuclear Liability Bill with 18 amendments.

Between 1999 and 2009, there have been 13 accidents in Indian nuclear facilities. Our record is poor and worrisome

IN THE final analysis, what is disturbing is the short shrift given to assertions by officials in the ministries of water resources, health and environment, which will be responsible for managing situations in the eventuality of a nuclear accident — that their opinions were not considered before the legislation was drafted. Consider this, even as there is vocal opposition about the final liability amount, the Environment Ministry official revealed to the Standing Committee that there had been no attempt to even define the scope of what constitutes environment — an integral requirement if environmental damage was under discussion for assessment in case of disaster. Even more disturbingly, the Health Ministry official told the Committee that her ministry is “nowhere [ready] to meet an eventuality that may arise out of nuclear and radiological emergencies”. Further, a poor response system and ill-equipped hospitals would only ensure that “mortality and morbidity... could be on a very high scale”. In fact, for a legislation that claims to focus on payment of compensation due to health impacts of radiation, there isn’t a single clause that details diseases or health care!

India’s track record of nuclear accidents or incidents is barely a clean one. Between 1999 and 2009, there have been 13 accidents at various nuclear facilities — a figure that may well be inaccurate since there is no document in the public domain — the list of 13 accidents have been pieced together by various DAE statements and reports over the years. As we move towards a rapid opening up of the nuclear power sector, the words that come back to haunt are those of Sonia Gandhi. Will we remain prisoners of the past? Can we truthfully say we are doing all we can now? That we will not have occasion to revisit the inadequacies we speak of when we remember Bhopal? 

 -Sanjana

(sanjana@tehelka.com)

Courtesy: Tehelka, September 04, 2010