SYNOPSIS
Nuclear energy is a
form of energy that comes with the risk of catastrophic accidents. In the words
of Justice V R Krishna Iyer, “Nuclear
energy involves the potential for dangerous radiation, high cost generation and
the use of delicate technology that could be disastrous… The diabolic, dreadful
immortality of nuclear waste that can cause lethal radiation after two or three
decades of the use of each nuclear plant represents the gravest crime against
humanity.” Therefore the petitioner submits that a foolproof standard of
safety is required while dealing with nuclear energy. As has been pointed out
by the CAG and several experts including from within the establishment, India’s
nuclear safety regulator AERB is body under the control of the very department
it is supposed to regulate and merely acts as a rubber-stamping authority,
thereby putting to grave risk the rights of the citizens under Article 21 of
the Constitution.
The instant SLP is
being filed challenging the decision of the Madras High Court dated 31.08.2012
in WP No. 22253 of 2012 giving a go ahead to the Kudankulam nuclear power plant
without first ensuring that critical safety features (that the Government’s own
expert task-force recommended) are put in place and in violation of AERB’s own
undertaking on affidavit before the High Court in petitioner’s earlier writ
petition. The said recommendations are extremely critical to the safety of the
said plant and the plant could not be allowed to run for a day without adequate
safety & backup features in place. Though the High Court in the impugned
order stated: “It is the duty of the AERB
to ensure that these requirements are complied with by the NPCIL (the
operator of the plant),” but at the same time allowed the plant to go ahead
even though many of the recommendations by AERB’s own admission would take 2
years to implement.
The Government has
also absolved the Russian company that is supplying the nuclear reactor from
any liability in case of an accident in complete violation of the absolute
liability principle evolved by this Hon’ble Court. The Government has also
brutally cracked down on the local community peacefully protesting against the
plant and has slapped sedition cases against thousands of protestors. Thus it
is absolutely clear that the Government intends to push the project through
without any consideration of safety, costs, environmental impact and other
concerns regarding the project.
Immediately after the
shocking nuclear tragedy in Fukushima in Japan, the Government of India
constituted a Task Force to review, among other things, the capability of
Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) to withstand and mitigate earthquakes,
tsunamis and other natural phenomenon. The Task force made a detailed review of
the safety measures of KKNPP in the light of inadequacies of Fukushmia plant
which suffered due to lack of alternative fresh water storage and want of
back-up power system, and gave 17 recommendations for implementation before
commissioning of Units 1 and 2 of KKNPP. There are three important
recommendations amongst several others, concerning with alternative fresh water
storage system and emergency pumping equipment, which are yet to be implemented
even today: “1. Back up provisions from alternate sources should be made for
(a) Charging water to secondary side of Stream Generators. (b) Make-up of
borated water to spent fuels pools (c) Injection of borated water in the
reactor coolant system. 2. Seismic qualification of emergency water storage
facility and augmentation of its storage capacity for core decay heat removal
for a period of at least one week. 3. Mobile self powered pumping equipment for
emergence use.”
Since the Government
of India was in a hurry to commission Units 1 and 2 of KKNPP without first
implementing the recommendations of Task Force constituted post-Fukushima
nuclear, the petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition (no. 8262/2012) in
the Madras High Court for a direction to implement all the recommendations
contained in Annexure 8 to the Final Report of the Task Force before Initial
Fuel Loading (IFL) in KKNPP.
The Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board (AERB) filed its counter affidavit in the said writ petition
stating that further clearances in respect of KKNPP would be granted only after
implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force constituted
post-Fukushima nuclear disaster. The
Task Force gave seventeen recommendations and all these recommendations related
to the safety of KKNPP. AERB stated:
“The next major sub-stage of
commissioning involves Initial Fuel Loading (IFL) for KK Unit No. 1 for which
NPCIL has submitted an Application on April 18, 2012 along with relevant
documents requesting consent for the same. AERB is conducting safety review of
the IFL Application as part of its multi-tier review process before grant of
consent. One of the pre-requisites as identified by AERB while giving Clearance
for Hot-Run for KK unit No. 1 was that all the relevant recommendations of
various AERB Safety Committees (including the AERB Committee to Review Safety
of Indian NPPs against External Events of Natural Origin –in short “Expert
Committee”) should be assessed and these need to be implemented on a time bound
schedule for which NPCIL was asked to give their required submissions. NPCIL is
working on the detailed scheme of safety enhancements in the light of various
safety committee recommendations and
have submitted their proposal/scheme for KK NPP which is under review by
relevant AERB specialist groups and safety committees as appropriate. Hence in view of the above, the Respondent
No. 3 submits that the contention raised by the petitioner for implementation
of the Report of the Expert Committee (Annexure-8) before IFL for Unit No. 1 of
KK would be taken care as appropriate during the various reviews before the
next stage of Clearance i.e. IFL.”
“Subsequently, AERB has been
reviewing various commissioning reports based on hot-run test results for KK
Union No. 1 and issue of further clearances would be only after the completion
of review and resolution of related issues, including the implementation of
safety measures in post-Fukushima accident.”
It is this
undertaking that the AERB has violated by its order dated 10.08.2012 allowing
initial fuel loading (IFL) at KKNPP which is just a stage prior to the
commissioning of the project which is slated to start in a few weeks, thus
putting to grave risks the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of a large
section of the population. AERB now states that implementation of these measures
would take 6 months to 2 years. If, by chance, any natural disaster happens
before the said measures are implemented, then there is every chance of a
meltdown and huge leakage of radiation that would make a large area
uninhabitable for decades and would need evacuation of millions of people.
The petitioner
therefore challenged the said IFL clearance before the Madras High Court by way
of the writ petition (out of which this SLP is arising) on the ground that IFL
clearance to Unit 1 of KKNPP could not have been granted by AERB before the
implementation of all the recommendations made by the Task Force. AERB in its counter affidavit has now stated
that implementation of some of the recommendations would take 6 months and the
rest would take 2 years. AERB ignored that several of these recommendations if
not implemented puts to grave risks the safety of millions of people. AERB now
in their latest affidavit states: “Based on the
review and resolution of NPCIL submissions, AERB agreed for short term (less
than 6 months) and long term (less than 2 years), implementation of post
Fukushima recommendations from the date of IFL clearance.”
The Madras High
Court, after having held that compliance of all the 17 recommendations relating
to KKNPP was rightly found by the AERB to be necessary, in the impugned order
has dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the AERB is competent to decide
whether those recommendations should be implemented before or after IFL in
KKNPP, ignoring that final commissioning of the nuclear plant is just weeks
away and AERB is neither independent nor credible to be entrusted with the
final decision making authority.
This
Hon’ble Court in A. P. Pollution Control Board vs. M V Nayudu, (1999) 2 SCC
718, held that precautionary principle is part of the law of the land. The
principle mandates that when a new technology or process can cause serious and
irreversible harm to human health and the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically. In this context, the proponent of the uncertain activity rather
than the public has to bear the burden of proof. Therefore,
it is absolutely essential in the interest of life, health and safety of a
large sections of the population that the precautionary principle is invoked
and the Government be directed not to go ahead with the project till all the
recommendations of its own task force on safety are implemented.
AERB: The
administration of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, is entrusted to the DAE. The
Secretary, DAE, in turn constituted the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)
by an executive order in 1983, because of which the AERB is a subordinate
entity of the DAE. The AERB is answerable to the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), whose Chairman is also the Secretary, DAE. Indeed, one cannot conceive
of a more subservient existence - the regulatory agency has to report to those
whom it is required to regulate and control in the public interest. Hence AERB
is riddled with conflicts of interests, as it is answerable to a department
whose stated aim is to build more and more nuclear plants.
Former AERB Chairperson Dr. A Gopalakrishnan has
stated “The independent safety assurance and regulation has thus been made the
responsibility of the same people who manage these installations, defeating the
very principle of unbiased external scrutiny.” He has also written that “A
captive AERB with its Chairman reporting to Secretary, DAE makes the overall
nuclear safety management in India a farce and worthless.”
The International Convention on
Nuclear Safety, which India has ratified, mandates that “Each contracting
Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation between
the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or
organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.” In
India, however, the nuclear regulator has been subordinate to and under control
of those whose stated purpose is the promotion of the use of nuclear energy. In
fact, lack of independent regulator in Japan was one of the major reasons for
the Fukushima disaster as brought out by Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission which stated: “the
TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident was the result of collusion
between the Government, the regulators and TEPCO and the lack of governance by
the said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from
nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly
‘manmade’. We believe that the root causes were the organizational and
regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions.”
Now, the
CAG has given a detailed report confirming the fact that AERB is neither
independent nor credible enough to regulate the safety of our nuclear plants. CAG has stated that AERB continues to be a subordinate
authority and this “failure to have an
autonomous and empowered regulator is clearly fraught with grave risks”.
Other petition: The petitioner had also earlier filed a PIL in High Court
in 2011 (WP 24770 of 2011) challenging the go-ahead to the Kudankulam nuclear
plant despite the fact that the environment clearance was given on the basis of
1988 agreement that India signed with erstwhile USSR and since then material changes
had been made in the said plant, including 1) earlier project envisaged that
water for cooling would be used from a lake, but later it was changed to use of
sea water with the use of mega-desalination plants; 2) earlier clearance was
for increase in water temperature upto 5 degree Celsius (which hugely affects
marine life), and later project took it to 7 degrees; 3) original agreement was
that Russia would take back the spent fuel, but later agreement had the
provision that spent fuel would be retained at the plant; 4) enormous design
changes had been to the plant. Without considering these aspects, the earlier
environmental clearance was revived. The said clearance is not based on the
Costal Zone Regulation, EIA Notification issued by the Government in the year
1991 and 1994 respectively. The HC has however held that MoEF was competent to
simply revive the earlier clearance. The Petitioner is moving a separate SLP on
this issue for the consideration of this Hon’ble Court.
LIST OF DATES
26.01.1950 Constitution of India comes
into force. Article 14, 19, 21 guarantee right to equality, freedom and life
respectively. This Hon’ble Court interprets the said fundamental rights to
include right to information, freedom from arbitrariness, right to health, clean
environment, public safety, and life. Clean environment includes environment
free from harmful radiation. This Hon’ble Court holds that ‘precautionary
principle’, ‘polluter pays principle’, ‘absolute liability principle’ to be
part of the law of land as a facet of right to life guaranteed by the
Constitution.
03.08.1954 Department
of Atomic Energy (DAE) is set-up under the direct charge of Prime Minister of
India. The stated objective of DAE is to promote the use of nuclear energy.
01.03.1958 Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) is set-up under the DAE. Secretary DAE is the ex-officio Chairperson of
the AEC.
1962 Atomic
Energy Act comes into force
28.03.1979 United States: Accident at
Three Mile Island nuclear reactor due to equipment failure and operator error that
result in loss of coolant and partial core meltdown officially costing US $2400
million.
1979 First safety audit conducted by Government
after the three mile island incident.
15.11.1983 Atomic
Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is set-up. AERB is made answerable to the Atomic
Energy Commission.
26.04.1986 Ukraine:
Chernobyl disaster occurs wherein mishandled safety test causes steam explosion
and meltdown, necessitating the evacuation of 300,000 people from the region
and dispersed radioactive material across Europe. It costs tens of thousands of
lives and about US $ 10 billion.
April 1986 Second
safety audit conducted by AERB following the Chernobyl disaster
November 1988 An inter-governmental agreement was signed
between Union of India and the erstwhile USSR regarding KKNPP. As per the
agreement “Spent fuel” will be send back to USSR.
May 1989 Environmental Clearance was granted
to the said project. Some of conditions invoked in the said clearance includes
: (i) Pechiparrai river water was identified as source for fresh water required for the reactor coolant. (ii) Sea
water temperature should not exceed 5 degree C over the ambient temperature of
the sea.
27.01.1994 Environment Impact Assessment
Notification came into force. Para 2 of the notification reads: “2.
Requirements and procedure for seeking environmental clearance of projects ;
1. (A)
Any person who desires to undertake any new project or the expansion or
modernisation of any existing industry or project listed in Schedule 1 shall
submit an application to the Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests,
New Delhi.
The application shall be made in the proforma
specified in Schedule II of this notification and shall be accompanied by a
project report which shall, inter-alia, include an Environmental impact
Assessment Report/Environment Management Plan and details of public hearing as
specified in schedule IV prepared in accordance with the guidelines issued by
the Central Government in the Ministry of environment and Forests from time to time.”
July 1995 Third safety audit is conducted by
AERB. It identifies 130 serious problems with nuclear installations in India
out of which 95 are marked urgent.
24.10.1996 International
Convention on Nuclear Safety that India has signed and ratified came into force.
It mandates that “Each contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to
ensure an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and
those of any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or
utilization of nuclear energy.” In India, however, the nuclear regulator
has been subordinate to and under control of those whose stated purpose is the
promotion of the use of nuclear energy.
May 1998 A fresh agreement was signed between
Union of India Russia regarding KKNPP. The term with regard to “Spent fuel” has
been changed, and would be retained at the plant.
06.09.2001 Ministry of Environment and Forests revalidated
1989 Environmental Clearance. The letter reads as: “It was observed during the
visit that land acquisition has been completed and construction work on various
components such as township, Environmental and Health Research Centre, RO Plant
etc. is in progress. …Keeping in view the steps already taken to implement the
project, the environmental clearance issued in May, 1989 stands valid and there
is no need to conduct public hearing and seek fresh environmental clearance.”
23.09.2008 MoEF gave environmental clearance for
units 3 & 4 at KKNPP.
21.09.2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act
2010 comes into force that limits the liability of the nuclear operator and
supplier to only Rs 1500 crores, in complete violation of absolute liability
principle propounded by this Hon’ble Court.
Russia claims that it is even exempt
from this minimal liability since their contract with the Indian government
states that they would not be liable.
March 2011 There was an unprecedented nuclear disaster
in Fukushima, Japan. Immediately after this nuclear disaster, the Government of
India constituted a Task Force to review the safety of all nuclear plants in
the country including Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP).
26.04.2011 After severe criticism and protests,
Government announced that the report of the Task Force would be put in public
domain and the Government would constitute an independent nuclear safety
authority that would subsume the AERB.
11.05.2011 The Task Force constituted
by the Government of India to evaluate the safety systems of Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Project filed its interim report
herein it has been mentioned that engineering details of additional measures
would be given in August 2011.
August 2011 AERB committee submitted its
report. Annexure 8 to the Report
details the recommendations that are required to be implemented before the 2nd
stage of Commissioning i.e. Fuel Loading of the reactor core in KKNPP. Relevant parts of
the AERB report are annexed as ANNEXURE
P1. (Page ____________)
2012 Government arrests thousands of peaceful
protestors, slaps thousands of sedition cases, in order to brutally crush the
agitation of the local population over fears for the safety of the nuclear
plant.
16.03.2012 This Hon’ble Courts admits a PIL (WPC
464/2011) filed by Common Cause, CPIL and several eminent citizens, challenging
the constitutional validity of the nuclear liability act since it violates the
polluter pays and absolute liability principles.
26.03.2012 The petitioner filed WP No.8262 of 2012
in the Madras High Court for a direction to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
to implement all the recommendations of the Task Force constituted
post-Fukushima disaster before fuel loading in KKNPP.
5 June 2012 AERB filed its counter affidavit in Writ
Petition No. 8262 of 2012 inter alia stating that all further clearances in
respect of KKNPP would be granted only after implementation of all 17
recommendations made by the Task Force with regard to KKNPP. A copy of the
counter affidavit of AERB in Writ Petition No. 8262 of 2012 is annexed as ANNEXURE P2. (Page ____________)
July 2012 Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission submits its report and
blames lack of independent regulator for the Fukushima tragedy. The report
states: “the TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant Accident was the result of collusion between the Government, the regulators
and TEPCO and the lack of governance by the said parties. They effectively
betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we
conclude that the accident was clearly ‘manmade’. We believe that the root
causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty
rationales for decisions and actions.”
23.07.2012 Tamil Nadu Pollution control
Board gave Consent Order under Water Act prescribing the tolerance level of
trade effluent of KKNPP to be 45 degree celsius contrary to the stipulations of the
aforesaid two EIAs.
01.08.2012 Union of India filed an
Additional Counter Affidavit in WP.No: 24770 of 2011 in Madras HC, wherein it
was stated that terms of storing “Spent fuel” has been changed by 1998
Supplemental Agreement. Also, para 8 of Counter Affidavit reads: “ The capacity
of each of these pools is sufficient to hold the discharged spent fuel from
each reactor, which would be produced during seven years of full power
operation of the reactor.” Admittedly till date the KKNPP doesn’t have
implemented safety requirements recommended by the AERB committee.
02.08.2012 The
Hon'ble High Court reserved its orders in WP No. 8262 of 2012 and until 2
August 2012 no further affidavit regarding implementation of the said
recommendations was filed by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board.
09.08.2012 107th Board meeting of AERB
was held to consider the application of NPCIL, respondent 3, for initial fuel
loading in KKNPP.
10.08.2012 By totally ignoring the said
undertaking dated 5 June 2012 given to the Madras High Court, the AERB granted
IFL clearance with regard to KKNPP (Unit 1). A copy of the same is annexed as ANNEXURE P3. (Page ____________)
10.08.2012 Petitioner filed writ
petition in WP No: 22200 of 2012 challenging the Consent order to operate given
by Tamil Nadu Pollution control board.
13.08.2012 The petitioner therefore filed Writ
Petition No. 22253 of 2002 challenging the IFL clearance dated 10 August 2012
inter alia on the ground that initial fuel loading in unit 1 of KKNPP without
implementation of all the recommendations of Task Force would be violative of
Article 21 of the Constitution and that the failure of AERB to adhere to the
undertaking dated 5 June 2012 given before the Madras High Court would amount
to contempt of court. A copy of WP 22253 of 2012 is annexed as ANNEXURE P4. (Page ____________)
18.08.2012 AERB filed a counter affidavit in response to
the said petition. A copy of the same is annexed as Annexure P5. (Page __________)
22.08.2012 AERB also filed an additional counter
affidavit in the above writ petition detailing the recommendations made by the
Task Force, implemented and unimplemented.
The AERB said in the said additional counter affidavit that 6
recommendations had already been implemented, and the remaining 11
recommendations would be implemented within a period of six months to two
years. A copy of the said additional
counter affidavit is annexed as ANNEXURE
P6. (Page ____________)
Withdrawing its earlier Consent order
dated 23.07.2012, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board passed a fresh Consent
order No: 22654 wherein earlier tolerance limit
temperature level 45 degree C trade effluent was modified into : “Not to exceed 7 degree C
over and above the ambient temperature of sea.”
CAG’s detailed report on the AERB’s
“effectiveness of its role as the nuclear regulator of India” is tabled in
Parliament. It confirms the fact that AERB is neither independent nor
credible enough to regulate the safety of our nuclear plants. CAG has stated that AERB continues to be a subordinate
authority and this “failure to have an
autonomous and empowered regulator is clearly fraught with grave risks”.
31 Aug 2012 The Madras High Court, without
appreciating the fact that KKNPP would be unsafe in the absence of
implementation of all the recommendations of the Task Force constituted
post-Fukushima disaster and that such inaction on the part of AERB would be
dangerous to the lives thousands of people living near KKNPP, dismissed the
Writ Petition by holding that the High Court would not be in a position to say
that the aforesaid 17 recommendations should be implemented before or after IFL
in KKNPP. The High Court has failed to
appreciate that eleven (out of seventeen) unimplemented recommendations go to the
root of safety of KKNPP and that any negligence on the part of AERB in this
regard would result in untold misery and irretrievable damage to the people for
generations together.
11.09.2012 Hence the instant Special Leave Petition.
***
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
{Order
XVI Rules 4(1) (a)}
(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India)
SPECIAL
LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. OF 2012
[Arising
out of the Impugned Final Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in WP No. 22253/2012]
IN
THE MATTER OF:
POSITION OF PARTIES
|
|
High Court
|
|
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
|
G.
Sundarrajan
106/2
First floor, Kanaga Durga complex,
Gangai
Amman Koil street,
Vadapalani,
Chennai 600 026
The
Union of India
rep. by the Secretary to Government of
India
Department of Atomic Energy, Anushakti
Bhavan
Chatrapathi
Shivaji Maharaj Marg, Mumbai – 400 001.
The
Chairman Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
Niyamak Bhavan, Anushaktinagar
Mumbai – 400 094.
The
Chairman and Managing Director,
Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Ltd.,
Nambhkiya
Urja Bhavan, Anushaktinagar,
Mumbai
- 400 094.
The
Member Secretary,
Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board,
Chennai - 600 032
The
Site Director,
Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project,
Koodankulam,
Radhapuram
Taluk,
Tirunelveli
Dist.
|
Petitioner
VERSUS
Respondent No. 1
Respondent No. 2
Respondent No. 3
Respondent No. 4
Respondent No. 5
|
Petitioner
Respondent No. 1
Respondent No. 2
Respondent No. 3
Respondent No. 4
Respondent No. 5
|
To
The
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India And His Hon’ble Companion Justices of The
Hon’ble Supreme Court Of India
The humble Special Leave Petition of the Petitioner above
named:
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. The Petitioner is filing the present Special Leave
Petition against the impugned Final Order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition
No. 22253 of 2012 whereby the High Court had dismissed the Writ
Petition.
2. QUESTIONS OF LAW
The following questions of law arise for
consideration by this Hon'ble Court:
I.
Did the High Court err
in holding that the courts would rely on the opinion of an expert body even if
its does not follow the considered advice of other experts and its own
undertakings?
II.
Did the High Court
err in upholding the clearance dated 10 August 2012 granted by respondent
2-Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) for 'Initial Fuel Loading' (IFL) and
'First Approach to Criticality' (FAC) of Unit 1 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power
Project (KKNPP), without applying the precautionary principle?
III. Did
the High Court err in holding that an expert body can deviate from its own
undertakings before the Court and the Courts would desist from interfering in
the same?
IV. Did the High Court not err by stating that since AERB is
an expert body so courts will not question its decisions?
V. Did the High Court err in holding that courts will rely
on the opinion of the regulator even if that regulator is subordinate to those
whom it is supposed to regulate?
VI. Can the Courts ignore the potential risk to the lives of
millions merely on the basis of undertaking given by Government and its instrumentalities?
3. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 4 (2)
The
Petitioner state that no other Petition seeking leave to appeal has been filed
by them against the final judgment and order of the Hon’ble Division Bench of
the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated 31.08.2012 passed in WP No. 22253/2012
titled G.Sundarrajan v. Union of India & Ors.
4. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 6
The
annexures produced along with the SLP are true copies of the
pleadings/documents, which formed part of the record of the case in the High
Court below against whose order leave to appeal is sought for in this Petition.
5. GROUNDS
A. That
the High Court erred in not appreciating that the respondent-AERB had given an
undertaking to the Court as early as on 5 June 2012 in Writ Petition No. 8262
of 2012 filed by the present petitioner to the effect that any further
clearance in respect of KKNPP would be granted only after implementation of all
the recommendations contained in Annexure 8 to the Report of Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board Committee to Review the Safety of Indian Nuclear Power Plants
including KKNPP and that ignoring such an undertaking and granting clearance
for IFL in KKNPP would amount to contempt of court.
B. That
the High Court has erred in not appreciating that it was incumbent upon AERB to
implement all the recommendations made by the Task Force constituted by the
Government of India post-Fukushima nuclear accident. The first recommendation of the Task Force
is: "Back up provisions from
alternate sources should be made for charging water to secondary side of SGs,
make-up of borated waster to spent fuel pools, and injection of borated water
in the reactor coolant system." To
implement this recommendation, NPCIL should construct a seismically qualified
8000 cubic metre tank as an alternate backup water source. Having noted that this tank has not yet been
constructed and that it would take about six months for its construction, the
High Court ought to have quashed the clearance for IFL granted by AERB.
C. That
the High Court has erred in not appreciating the second recommendation of the
Task Force in proper perspective. The
second recommendation says: "Seismic qualification of emergency water
storage facility and augmentation of its storage capacity for core decay heat
removal for a period of at least one week." The schedule for completion by NPCIL says:
"Seismic qualification of emergency water storage facility and augmentation
as required will be done progressively. (short term)". The High Court ought to have quashed the
clearance dated 10 August 2012 granted by AERB solely on the ground that the
AERB had failed to implement the above recommendation before "initial fuel loading" in KKNPP.
D. That
the High Court ought to have appreciated that the Task Force was constituted by
the Government of India post-Fukushima nuclear accident for safety enhancements
in nuclear plants including KKNPP, that
the recommendations of the Task Force were supposed to be implemented in letter
and spirit before IFL, and that the AERB
undertook before the High Court that those recommendations would be implemented
before IFL in KKNPP. The High Court
ought to have held that any further clearance for KKNPP including the clearance
dated 10 August 2012 for IFL without first implementing the remaining 11
recommendations detailed in the additional counter affidavit of AERB dated 22
August 2012 would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.
E. That the
High Court erred in relying on AERB and stating that since it is an expert
body, its decisions could not be questioned in judicial review.
F. That the non-implementation of the said recommendations
of the task force before the start of the project puts to grave risk the safety
of millions of citizens and is in violation of the precautionary principle
6. GROUNDS
FOR INTERIM RELIEF
A.
That the loading of fuel in the reactor core being the essential part in
commissioning a nuclear plant, the loading of fuel in Unit 1 of KKNPP will make
the plant to attain criticality. Criticality in plant means that the all safety
measures needed to prevent any accident must be completed. As on this date
KKNPP has not yet implemented about 11 out 17 recommendations made by post
Fukushima Task force committee, allowing the loading of fuel in Unit 1 & 2
of KKNPP will adversely put millions of people life in danger. Hence any
further action in compliance with fuel loading in Unit 1 & 2 and further
commissioning of KKNPP must be stayed.
7. PRAYER:
In
view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is most respectfully For the reasons aforesaid and those that may be urged at
the time of hearing it is most respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble Court be
pleased
A) To grant Special Leave to Appeal to the petitioner
under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order dated 31.08.2012 in
W.P. No. 22253 of 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras and
B) Pass such other and further order or orders
as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts of the case.
8. INTERIM PRAYER:
In view of the facts
and circumstances of the case, it is most respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
A) To grant ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the
respondents from further proceeding with Initial Fuel Loading and/Or
Commissioning the Unit 1 & 2 of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project till
the recommendations of the task force regarding the said project are fully
implemented.
B)
Pass such other and further order or orders
as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts of the case.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER
AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.
PETITIONER
THROUGH: PRASHANT BHUSHAN
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER
DRAWN BY: Pranav Sachdeva, adv.
DRAWN ON: September 2012
FILED ON: September 2012
NEW DELHI