A Nuclear-Free, Carbon-Free World is Possible..!

We don’t need nuclear power, coal, or biofuels. We can get 100 percent of our energy from wind, water, and solar (WWS) power. And we can do it today—efficiently, reliably, safely, sustainably, and economically.

We can get to this WWS world by simply building a lot of new systems for the production, transmission, and use of energy. One scenario that Stanford engineering professor Mark Jacobson and I developed, projecting to 2030, includes:

• 3.8 million wind turbines, 5 megawatts each, supplying 50 percent of the projected total global power demand
• 49 000 solar thermal power plants, 300 MW each, supplying 20 percent
• 40 000 solar photovoltaic (PV) power plants supplying 14 percent
• 1.7 billion rooftop PV systems, 3 kilowatts each, supplying 6 percent
• 5350 geothermal power plants, 100 MW each, supplying 4 percent
• 900 hydroelectric power plants, 1300 MW each, of which 70 percent are already in place, supplying 4 percent
• 720 000 ocean-wave devices, 0.75 MW each, supplying 1 percent
• 490 000 tidal turbines, 1 MW each, supplying 1 percent.

We also need to greatly expand the transmission infrastructure in order to create the large supergrids that will span many regions and often several countries and even continents. And we need to expand production of battery-electric and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, ships that run on hydrogen fuel cell and battery combinations, liquefied hydrogen aircraft, air- and ground-source heat pumps, electric resistance heating, and hydrogen for high-temperature processes.

To make a WWS world work, we also need to reduce demand. Reducing demand by improving the efficiency of devices that use power, or substituting low-energy activities and technologies for high-energy ones—for example, telecommuting instead of driving—directly reduces the pressure to produce energy.

Because a massive deployment of WWS technologies requires an upgraded and expanded transmission grid and the smart integration of the grid with battery-electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles—using both types of these vehicles for distributed electricity storage—governments need to carefully fund, plan, and manage a long-term, large-scale restructuring of the electricity transmission and distribution system. In much of the world, we’ll need international cooperation in planning and building supergrids that span across multiple countries, because many individual countries just aren’t big enough to permit enough geographic dispersion of generators to mitigate local variability in wind and solar intensity. The Desertec project proposes a supergrid to link Europe and North Africa, and 10 northern European countries are beginning to plan a North Sea supergrid for offshore wind power. Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia, Australia/Tasmania, China, the Middle East, North America, South America, and Russia will need supergrids as well.

Although this is an enormous undertaking, it does not need to be done overnight, and there are plenty of examples in recent history of successful large-scale infrastructure, industrial, and engineering projects.

During World War II, the United States transformed motor vehicle production facilities to produce over 300 000 aircraft, and the rest of the world was able to produce over 500 000 aircraft. In 1956, the United States began work on the Interstate Highway System, which now extends for about 47 000 miles (around 75 000 kilometers) and is considered one of the largest public works project in history. The iconic Apollo program, widely considered one of the greatest engineering and technological accomplishments ever, put a man on the moon in less than 10 years. Although these projects obviously differ in important economic, political, and technical ways from the project we discuss, they do suggest that the large scale of a complete transformation of the energy system is not in itself an insurmountable barrier.

Efficient and Reliable: A 100-percent wind, water, and solar power system can deliver all of the world’s energy needs efficiently. Jacobson and I estimated the potential supply and compared those estimates with projections of energy demand made by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. We calculated that the amount of wind power and solar power available in locations that can likely be developed around the world, excluding Antarctica, exceeds the projected world demand for power in 2030 for all purposes by more than an order of magnitude. On top of that, Jacobson and I estimate that converting to a WWS energy infrastructure can actually reduce world power demand by more than 30 percent (based on projected energy consumption in the year 2030), primarily because electric motors have less energy loss than do combustion devices.

But, the naysayers will retort, what about reliability? Can these resources deliver power reliably? Indeed they can. While it is true that no single wind-power farm or solar-photovoltaic installation can reliably match total power demand in a region, it is also true—and often not recognized—that no individual coal or nuclear plant can either.

Indeed, any electricity system must be able to respond to changes in demand over seconds, minutes, hours, seasons, and years, and must be able to accommodate unanticipated changes in the availability of generation due to outages, for example. Today’s mainly fossil-fuel electricity system responds with backup systems, power plants brought online only during periods of peak demand, and spinning reserves—that is, the extra generating capacity available by increasing the power output from already operating generators.

A WWS electricity system handles changes in demand far differently. To start with, WWS technologies generally suffer less downtime than do current electric power technologies. However, they face inherently more variability; the maximum solar or wind power available at a single location varies over minutes, hours, and days, and this variation generally does not match the demand pattern over the same timescales.

Dealing with this short-term variability can be challenging, but it is doable. Including hydropower—which is relatively easy to turn on and off as needed—in the generating package helps, as does managing demand (for example, by shifting flexible loads to times when more generating capacity is available) and forecasting weather more precisely; these have little or no additional cost. A WWS system also needs to interconnect resources over wide regions, creating a supergrid that can span continents. And it will probably need to have decentralized energy storage in residences, using batteries in electric vehicles. Finally, WWS generation capacity should significantly exceed the maximum amount of demand in order to minimize the times when available WWS power runs short. Most of the time, this excess generation capacity could be used to provide power to produce hydrogen for end uses not well served by direct electric power, such as some kinds of marine, rail, off-road, and heavy-duty truck transport.

Economical and Safe: WWS power is economical. The private cost of generating electricity from onshore wind power is already less than the private cost of conventional fossil-fuel generation and is likely to be even lower in the future—less than US $0.05 per kilowatt-hour including some transmission costs, according to our calculations (this includes the fully amortized cost of capital and land).

By 2030, Jacobson and I estimate that the social cost (which includes the private or consumer cost, plus additional external costs: for example, the value of health damage from air pollution, which society bears but the individual consumer does not) of generating electricity from any WWS power source is likely to be less than the social cost of conventional fossil-fuel generation, and that includes the amortized cost of land acquisition, capital, and construction.

The cost of transmitting and managing—as opposed to generating—electricity will probably be somewhat higher in a wind, water, and solar system than in a conventional electricity system. In an intelligently designed and operated WWS system, the extra infrastructure and energy cost of sending electricity long distances over a supergrid and of vehicle-to-grid storage, along with demand management, hydropower, and weather forecasting, will probably add up to an average of $0.02/kWh generated. By comparison, conventional long-distance transmissions in the United States today cost about $0.01/kWh.

We don’t have to worry too much about the costs of the basic construction materials, because the supply of steel and concrete used in a wind, water, or solar power system is virtually unlimited—these materials are abundant and recyclable. The rarer materials, including neodymium (in electric motors and generators), platinum (in fuel cells), lithium (in batteries), and silver, tellurium, indium, and germanium (in different kinds of photovoltaic systems), are harder to get, more expensive, and limited in supply, so they will have to be reduced, recycled, or eventually replaced with less-scarce materials unless new sources emerge. However, the cost of reducing, recycling, or replacing neodymium, platinum, or the materials for photovoltaics is not likely to noticeably affect the economics of WWS systems.

WWS power is safe and sustainable. Wind, water, and solar power have essentially zero emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants over the whole life cycle of their systems. They do little to hurt wildlife, water quality, and terrestrial ecosystems; they are not catastrophic disasters waiting to happen in terms of waste disposal, terrorism, war, human error, or natural disasters; and they are based on natural resources and materials that are indefinitely renewable or recyclable.

Nuclear power, coal, and biofuels are anything but safe and sustainable. Biofuels and so-called clean coal systems still cause air pollution, water pollution, habitat destruction, and climate change; biofuels also contribute to higher food prices. Nuclear power already has had two catastrophic accidents, and even though the industry has improved the safety and performance of new reactors and has proposed even newer (but largely untested) ”inherently safe” reactor designs, the industry can’t guarantee that the reactors will be designed, built, and operated correctly. And catastrophic scenarios involving terrorist attacks are still conceivable. Furthermore, any nuclear-fuel cycle can contribute, even if very indirectly, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With a wind-water-solar system, the risk of any such catastrophe is zero.

Finally, though critics envision sprawling solar installations or rows of wind turbines crowding out farms, a WWS power system won’t take a lot of land. The equivalent footprint area on the ground for enough WWS devices needed to power the world is about 0.74 percent of the global land area, and the spacing needed around wind turbines adds about 1.16 percent of global land area. However, the land used for such spacing is available for other purposes, including agriculture, ranching, and open space, and so is not ”used” in the way that land for biomass production or coal mining is used. Moreover, if we assume that one-half of wind devices will be placed over water, and recognize that all wave and tidal devices will be in water, that 70 percent of hydroelectric is already developed, and that rooftop solar power doesn’t require new land, then the additional footprint and spacing of devices on land will be only about 0.41 percent and 0.59 percent of the world land area, respectively.

The more extensive the supergrid, the less local fluctuations in power generation are a problem. However, more energy is lost in transmission, and infrastructure costs climb. Figuring out how to balance these factors in order to design the optimal grid and determine the best location of generation facilities will take additional research.

Getting in our way today is the fact that energy markets, institutions, and government policies support the production and use of fossil fuels. The world needs new policies to ensure that WWS systems develop quickly and broadly. The United States and other countries have adopted or discussed policies that stimulate production of renewable energy, including feed-in tariffs, which are subsidies to cover the difference between generation costs and wholesale electricity prices, investment subsidies, quotas requiring that a certain amount of generation be WWS power, and carbon and other environmental-damage taxes.

The obstacles to this transformation are primarily social and political, not technical or economic. If we continue to make decisions based on interest-group politics and muddle through with nuclear power, ”clean” coal, offshore oil production, and biofuels, then our energy system will continue to threaten the health and well-being of everyone on the planet. But with sensible broad-based policies and social changes, it indeed is possible to convert 25 percent of the current energy system to WWS in 10 to 15 years, 85 percent in 20 to 30 years, and 100 percent by 2050.

About the Author
 Mark Delucchi is a research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Davis, specializing in economic, environmental, engineering, and planning analyses of current and future transportation systems. He is a member of the Alternative Fuels Committee and the Energy Committee of the Transportation Research Board.

To Probe Further
 The material for this article is based on the detailed analyses presented in ”Providing All Global Energy With Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part II: Reliability, System and Transmission Costs, and Policies,” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 1170–1190 by M.A. Delucchi and M.Z. Jacobson, and
”Providing All Global Energy With Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part I: Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities and Areas of Infrastructure, and Materials,” Energy Policy 39 (2011): 1154–1169 by M.Z. Jacobson and M.A. Delucchi.

Copies of these papers are available from the author upon request by e-mail (madelucchi@ucdavis.edu).

Article Courtesy: IEEE Spectrum

For Nuclear Sanity - Praful Bidwai

THE Tamil Nadu Cabinet's resolution urging Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to suspend work on the Kudankulam nuclear reactors until “the apprehensions of the people” regarding their safety “are allayed” represents an unprecedented and handsome victory for the popular movement against ultra-hazardous technologies. It is a tribute to the moral strength and courage of the 12-day peaceful fast by more than 100 people, and successful mobilisation of tens of thousands of committed supporters from Tirunelveli, Kanyakumari and Thoothukudi districts, that Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa had to reverse her pro-project stand within days.

Never before has a State government demanded suspension of a project that it had approved, when it is at an advanced stage. Two reactors were cancelled in Kerala in the past, and two uranium mining projects, in Khasi Hills in Meghalaya and Nalgonda in Andhra Pradesh, have been kept in abeyance in deference to public opposition. But the Kudankulam decision is unique and holds the key to the post-Fukushima future of nuclear power in India.

The Kudankulam agitation was not sudden or new. Nor were the local people instigated by “outsiders” raising a false alarm about the safety of the Russian-designed reactors just before a planned evacuation drill. Local people have opposed the project right since its conception in the 1980s. They organised spirited demonstrations against it as early as in 1989. Indeed, misgivings about Kudankulam extend next door to Kerala. Numerous groups led by the People's Movement against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) have criticised the project on several grounds.

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) has all along failed to persuade the local farmers and fisherfolk that the reactors will cause minimal displacement with no damage to the marine ecosystem and that they pose no hazard to people – despite offering the lure of thousands of jobs, and labour and materials supply contracts, and the promise of vigorous “development” of the region. The people, highly literate and well-informed (as this writer found during two visits to the area) were not taken in. By 2007, large numbers of farmers had joined fisherfolk in agitating against the project, a process catalysed by Environment Impact Assessment-related public hearings for Reactors 3 to 6.

The most important factor that explains the recent struggle is without doubt the still-continuing meltdown of three nuclear reactors at Fukushima in Japan, which highlights the unique potential of nuclear power for catastrophic accidents even in a highly advanced industrial economy. Nuclear power generation is the sole mode of energy production with that hazard. Fukushima also highlighted the prevalence of unsafe practices and collusion between reactor operators and nuclear regulators. The recent accident at the Marcoule reprocessing facility in France has further undermined the public's already feeble confidence in the global nuclear industry.

FLAWED RUSSIAN REACTORS

Not least, three other factors have strengthened the opposition in Kudankulam. The first is the shocking disclosure by a Norwegian group, with a history of integrity and informed activism (http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rosatom_report), of a special report presented by nuclear safety experts from Russian state agencies to President Dmitry Medvedev this June on the country's nuclear reactors. This reveals that they are grievously underprepared for both natural and man-made disasters ranging from floods to fires to earthquakes and plain negligence.

The report comes from an amalgam of sources such as the Ministry of Natural Resources, Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Oversight, as well as Rosatom, the nuclear reactor operator. Chief engineer Ole Reistad of the Norwegian Institute for Energy Technology says: “The report reveals deficiencies which have never before been mentioned publicly, nor reported internationally.”

To paraphrase some of its alarming findings, Russian reactors are marked by 31 “serious flaws”. Among the more critical are: absence of regulations for personnel to know how to deal with large-scale natural disasters or other major contingencies; inadequate protective shelters for workers in the event of an accident; lack of records of previous accidents, which would enable learning from past mistakes; and poor attention to electrical and safety-significant systems.

This holds true not just of the RBMK design, which was implicated in the Chernobyl accident, but also of the VVER-type reactors being installed at Kudankulam. The report questions the reactors' ability to remain safe for extended periods if cooling systems fail, with no guarantee that the power backup will be effective. This is the primary difficulty that beset Fukushima Daiichi when the quake and tsunami hit Japan. Also, key equipment involved in the cooling process suffers from metal fatigue and welding flaws – yet another problem ignored at Fukushima. Russian reactors are vulnerable to the kinds of hydrogen explosions that ripped up three reactor buildings at Fukushima.

Most important, the report says that the risk of earthquakes has not been considered as a safety factor in designing Russian reactors. Not all of them have automatic shutdown mechanisms to be activated if an earthquake occurs. Nor are there currently clear guidelines or sufficient infrastructure for spent nuclear fuel management, leading to fears of its leaks during a disaster – as had happened in Japan.

These disclosures, to put it mildly, are damning. Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko has not denied their veracity or accuracy, but merely claimed that more money would fix the flaws. At any rate, the report totally contradicts the official Russian statement, made soon after March 11, that a Fukushima-type meltdown could never happen in Russia. This was supposedly based on a check ordered by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Russian reactors, of which no details have been made public. The global – and the Kudankulam – public has no more reason to trust the Russian government's early statement than to believe the Indian Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE) assessment, following a purely internal and collusive recent review, that all of India's nuclear reactors have adequate safety systems to cope with earthquakes and tsunamis as well as human error.

A second reason underlying the public's sharpened opposition is the fact that the first two units of the Kudankulam project have never been put through the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) process, under which a comprehensive EIA report is prepared, made available to the local people in advance, and a public hearing is held, at which those affected can record their opposition. The EIA procedure is far from sound, and has been considerably weakened.

Reactors 1 and 2 did not even have to face such cursory or minimal EIA scrutiny – simply because the EIA procedure only came into being in 1994. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had cleared the reactors in 1989. There is no reason to believe that the approval process considered the intrinsic hazards of nuclear power, radiation releases, or long-term waste storage. NPCIL has not shared reports on site evaluation and selection or safety review with the public.

A third reason is the DAE/NPCIL's doublespeak as regards the reactors' siting. The siting norms stipulate that there be no human habitation within 1.6 km from the plant. The next 5-km radius area must be a “sterilised zone”, where population density is small “so that rehabilitation will be easier”. Finally, in the outlying 16-km radius, “the population should not exceed 10,000”. But it is clearly visible that thousands of people live within the 1.6-km zone, including 2,000-plus in a recently built tsunami rehabilitation colony. Two other large settlements lie within the 5-km zone: Kudankulam (population: 20,000) and Idinthakarai (population: 12,000). The population in the 16-km radius is at least 70,000. Yet, NPCIL says nobody will be displaced.

Add to these the generic safety problems of nuclear power, including harmful radiation exposure at each stage of the “nuclear fuel cycle”, routine emissions and effluents, accidental radioactivity releases, and generation of huge quantities of waste which remains hazardous for thousands of years, which science has found no safe way of storing. And the case for stopping work at Kudankulam becomes compelling.

Jaitapur falls in the same category. The government has postponed the purchase of the French-origin reactors for Jaitapur until they clear post-Fukushima safety tests ( The Hindu, September 20). Logically, all work at the site must be stopped until the certification is obtained and independently reviewed.

Fukushima marks a watershed for the global nuclear industry, which has been on the decline especially in the countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development since even before Chernobyl (1986). Not one new reactor has been ordered in the United States since 1973, and none completed in Western Europe for a quarter-century.

Reactor technology has stagnated and exhausted its potential. Nuclear generation costs are exorbitant in relation to not just fossil fuels but renewable sources such as wind and biomass too. Nuclear power competes poorly with renewables in reducing/averting greenhouse emissions.

Country after country is retrenching its nuclear plans, or opting out altogether – witness Germany, Japan, Italy and Switzerland. Investment banks say nuclear power has no future after Fukushima. Its unpopularity is spreading everywhere.

It would be suicidal for India not to impose a moratorium on new nuclear projects and subject all installations to an independent, thorough and transparent review by a broadly representative body, which includes non-DAE personnel and civil society.

Courtesy: Frontline, Oct 8-21, 2011